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Abstract
The thesis comprises two essays in health economics.
The first examines the impact of health insurance on lifestyle. The ex ante
moral hazard (EAMH) postulates that health insurance reduces prevention effort
(healthy lifestyle) since the cost of ill health to the insured individual is reduced.
There is little evidence to support this hypothesis. I extend the standard model
of EAMH by allowing for the fact that the consequences of a more healthy cur-
rent lifestyle take some time to affect health. This extended model predicts that
anticipated future insurance can alter current behaviour. I test this prediction
by using as a natural experiment the granting of Medicare at age 65 to all in-
dividuals, including the large proportion who have no insurance when under age
65. I first use classical parametric and semi-parametric empirical methods. Then,
these methods are combined into a more robust estimator to compare the changes
in lifestyle between ages 59 and 68 for individuals with different amounts of in-
surance before age 65. The results suggest reductions in physical activity by the
uninsured two years before being covered by Medicare. Anticipation of Medicare
has no effect on alcohol consumption or smoking behaviour.
The second essay investigates the role of maternal parenting style on child
health. The analysis is innovative in using econometric methods that allow for
possible biases arising from unobservable family circumstances and from parenting
style being influenced also by child health. Using two waves from the Millennium
Cohort Study I also develop a set of measures of parenting style and allow for po-
tential reporting bias and for the role of the father. I find that maternal parenting
style mainly influences the mental health of the child, rather than the physical
health. Parenting style and socio-economic factors do not appear to interact in
their effect on child health.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Health economics is concerned with the production and consumption of health, health
related behaviour, and health care. This thesis consists of two essays. The first in-
vestigates the effect of incentives on behaviour, specifically the effect of insurance on
activities (drinking, smoking, exercise) which influence the probability of good rather
than poor health. The second investigates the effect of behaviour on health, specifically
the role of mothers’ parenting style on the health of their children.
Although the contexts of these two investigations differ in terms of the sample
age, gender mix, country, and the institutional background, they share important fea-
tures. First, both essays use theoretical economic models of individual behaviour to
formulate hypotheses and to make explicit some of the difficulties, especially unobserved
heterogeneity and endogeneity, likely to be encountered in testing these hypotheses with
observational data. Second, the essays employ relevant econometric methods to mitig-
ate some of the problems suggested by the theoretical models. Some of the methods
have not previously been used to address the research questions in the essays. Third,
the empirical investigations both use panel data sets with large numbers of observa-
tions and with rich socio-economic variables to help mitigate the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity. Fourth, in both cases I pay close attention to the fine details of the data-
sets, particularly in constructing alternative empirical measures of the key concepts
suggested by the theoretical models.
The first essay focuses on the consequences of health insurance on individual life-
style. Almost all developed countries, with the noticeable exception until recently of
the USA, provide basic universal health insurance coverage for their citizens. At a time
when health care costs are an increasing share of national income, it is important to
better understand the unintended side-effects of health insurance for behaviour which
may affect health and hence health care costs.
Ex ante moral hazard (EAMH) occurs when insurance against the consequences
of illness reduces insured individuals’ investments in preventive health activities which
reduce the probability of illness. There is no consensus over whether EAMH exists.
Past evidence shows that insurance seems to reduce investment in secondary prevention
(e.g. check-ups), but has not supported the hypothesis of EAMH in the case of primary
prevention (e.g. healthy lifestyles). Since primary and secondary prevention have very
different characteristics, we review in this essay first the theoretical predictions about
14
the effects of insurance on primary and secondary prevention, and then the previous
empirical evidence.
We then outline a theoretical model that extends the standard EAMH frame-
work by assuming that healthy lifestyles reduce the probability of illness not only in
the current period but also in future periods. If there is a lag before lifestyle affects
health, current preventive behaviour will be affected by anticipation of future insurance
coverage. We call this effect “Anticipatory Ex Ante Moral Hazard”, and test for it by
examining the effect of future insurance on current health lifestyle activities.
Most of the available evidence relies on the granting of Medicare to almost all the
population at the age of 65 in the United States as a natural experiment. Researchers
have tested for a reduction in healthy behaviour of the uninsured relative to the insured
at the age of 65. However, as the provision of Medicare insurance at age 65 is certain
and longstanding, it cannot be considered as an unanticipated exogenous change in
health insurance status. If anticipated health insurance affects behaviour, we should
observe a change in the relative lifestyle trends before the age of 65 for those uninsured
before the age of 65 compared with those insured before age 65.
We use the nine waves of the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to test
whether uninsured individuals change their lifestyle (physical activity, smoking, drink-
ing) as they approach the age of 65 and afterwards. First, we test the hypothesis of
EAMH using propensity score matching which does not require any assumption on life-
style functional form. We compare the level of lifestyle activities between the insured
and uninsured, and repeat the analysis to compare the changes between two periods for
the two groups. This matching Difference-in-Differences (matching DID) accounts for
constant differences between the two groups. Second, we replicate the classical linear
regression Difference-in-Difference (DID) approach implemented by Dave and Kaest-
ner (2009) and extend it to allow for EAMH to appear some years before receiving
Medicare.
These approaches have two potential weaknesses. First, propensity score match-
ing is valid only if selection into the insured or uninsured group is based on observable
characteristics and these characteristics do not vary over time. Matching DID accounts
for time-invariant unobservable characteristics, and the classical regression based on
DID in addition accounts for time-variant observable characteristics, but these meth-
ods rely on the correct specification of the functional form. Second, the comparison
of changes over the years between insured and uninsured groups (DID) does not allow
us to identify a change in the relative trends, as suggested by the hypothesis of An-
ticipatory EAMH. DID is vulnerable to unobserved linearly time-variant unobservable
factors. For example, unobserved lifestyle preferences change with age at different rates
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between the groups. Therefore, we also use a third approach that addresses these two
issues. We combine DID and propensity score methods in a double-robust estimate that
is robust to the miss-specification of one or the other method. Finally, we use differ-
ence in double-robust DID estimates (double-robust DIDID) to account for differences
in trends and linear-variant unobservables. All the approaches are estimated for three
different definitions of the uninsured group and with alternative definitions of healthy
lifestyle.
We find no clear effect of the receipt of Medicare or its anticipation on alcohol
consumption nor smoking behaviour, but the previously uninsured do reduce physical
activity just before receiving Medicare.
The second essay analyses the role of the parenting style of mothers on the phys-
ical and mental health of their children. There is an extensive economics literature
on the links between socio-economic factors and children’s health. But little attention
has been given in this literature to the possible pathways, including the relationship
between socio-economic factors and parenting style and to whether parenting style af-
fects child health. Possible reasons that could explain the lack of attention in economics
on the role of parenting style include, first, the non-availability, until recently, of large
representative datasets that collect information on variables that measure parenting
style. By contrast, there is an extensive psychological literature on the role of parent-
ing style in influencing the child’s health, which tends to rely on data sets with detailed
parenting style variables but with small sample size and relatively sparse information
on socio-economic characteristics of the families. Second, the problem of endogeneity
of parenting style in the child health production function requires either an extensive
set of variables to account for the possible confounding factors, or it requires the re-
searcher to make assumptions on the form of the possible endogeneity problem to apply
advanced econometric techniques to account for them.
In this second essay, we analyse the role of parenting style in determining the
physical and mental health of children. We review the evolution of the definition of
parenting style in the psychology literature and discuss the main correlations identified
there between the different types of parenting style and children’s outcomes. We then
use the Millennium Cohort Study data, a UK national longitudinal birth cohort study
started in 2000, to examine the associations between parenting style and children’s
outcomes previously found in the literature. We also attempt to define various types
of parenting style using cluster and factor analysis applied to the rich set of parenting
style questions in the data. Next, we sketch a simple economic model which allows
us to illustrate the different hypotheses about relationships between parenting style,
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child outcomes and socio-economic factors. We describe the sources of unobserved
heterogeneity and progressively modify our model to take them into account. Our final
specification allows us to account for a recursive effect between parenting style and the
child outcome.
The empirical models are estimated using linear specifications and a recursive
system of equations for health and parenting style, which is jointly estimated by full
information maximum likelihood with freely correlated error terms. The recursive sys-
tem of equations allows us to relax independence assumptions imposed in the ordinary
least squares models and to get closer to causal effects of parenting style on child out-
comes. The various specifications are estimated for physical health and mental health,
measured as externalising and internalising behavioural problems. The former refers to
antisocial and aggressive behaviours, whereas the latter refers to emotional problems or
aggression directed to the child himself. We also look at cognitive ability and parenting
style, and compare the results to the ones obtained for the health outcomes.
A potential difficulty is that health outcomes and parenting style are reported
by the mother which may introduce reporting bias. This is addressed by re-estimating
all the results using outcomes reported by the child or the teacher. We also estimate
models in which we use parenting style as reported by older children in the household.
In order to assess the role of parenting style as a possible pathway between chil-
dren’s outcomes and socio-economic factors, we first compare models where parenting
style is not included, then simply add it to the models, and finally assume it to be endo-
genous. Furthermore, we interact parenting style with a measure of household wealth
and an indicator of the mother’s level of education.
We find very limited effects of parenting style on the physical health of the
children, but their mental health is negatively affected by high levels of mother’s super-
vision, and cognitive ability is decreased when the mother is either too involved or too
strict. The results are stronger when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account.
In all models the role of socio-economic factors remains strong, which suggests that
parenting style may not be an important pathway between socio-economic factors and
children’s health.
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Chapter 2
Anticipatory Ex Ante Moral Hazard
2.1 Introduction
In the case of illness, insurance can reduce the cost of medical care and may also com-
pensate the individual for her income loss.1 Ex Ante Moral Hazard (EAMH) is the
reduction of preventive effort due to health insurance (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968; Shav-
ell, 1979). It requires that individuals are able to reduce their probability of illness by
costly effort, and that these efforts are not directly observable. Theoretical predictions
are ambiguous: in their seminal paper, Ehrlich and Becker (1972) conclude that health
insurance and preventive effort (referred to as “self-protection”) can be complements.
Whether there is EAMH depends on the cost of illness (lost of wages, opportunity
cost of time and the physical limitations created by the illness) and on individual risk
aversion (Zweifel and Manning, 2000).
Empirical evidence is also ambiguous. Using the only study based on a ran-
domised trial, the RAND experiment, Newhouse et al. (1993) conclude that health
insurance does not significantly affect lifestyles. Several authors (Decker, 2005; Card
et al., 2004, among others) have used the granting of Medicare at the age of 65 to look
at a change in behaviour due to an exogenous change in health insurance. However,
it cannot be used as a perfect natural experiment without adjustment because this
exogenous change is anticipated.2 For example, a direct consequence in the case of re-
imbursed preventive care is that individuals tend to postpone them (e.g. Lichtenberg,
2002) which would bias upwards the effect of insurance on the demand of medical care.3
Anticipation becomes an issue if the benefit of healthy lifestyles are not immediate. In
order to test for EAMH, one should take into account that individuals may change their
behaviour already before being covered by Medicare because prevention changes future
illness probabilities.
Our contribution to the literature on insurance and moral hazard is first that
we develop a theoretical model that extends the classical EAMH framework by tak-
1Typically with sick leave payments.
2Similarly, when evaluating the New Deal for the Young Unemployment program, Blundell et al.
(2004) take into account the possibility that individual could react in anticipation of the program,
before being actually eligible.
3McWilliams et al. (2003), presented below in the literature review, look at secondary prevention
and distinguish between reimbursed vs. non-reimbursed preventive care. They find that the demand
for reimbursed preventive care increases significantly after 65, but not the demand for not reimbursed
preventive care.
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ing into account (1) the existence of a lag in the effect of lifestyle on health and (2)
anticipated insurance coverage. Our model predicts that EAMH appears some years
before receiving insurance (Medicare) and that, at the time of the coverage, lifestyle
behaviours have already been adapted. We call this phenomenon Anticipatory EAMH
(sometimes referred to as EAMH with anticipatory behaviour).
Second, we test this hypothesis using semi-parametric methods. We start with
propensity score matching (PSM) that controls for non-random selection based on ob-
servable characteristics. PSM compares differences in lifestyles between the two groups,
but does not account for unobserved time-invariant differences. Therefore, we then es-
timate matching on the changes in lifestyles over two interviews to control for constant
differences over the years. Third we estimate Difference-in-Differences (DID) models
that have been the classical approach in the literature (Dave and Kaestner, 2009). Al-
though it relies on strong assumptions such as common trends in the treatment and
control groups, this approach is useful to decompose the incentives between the direct
effects of insurance (e.g. EAMH) and its indirect effects (e.g. more contact with doctors
who encourage a healthier lifestyle - Dave and Kaestner, 2009). We also estimate non-
linear models to account for the nature of the dependant variables (binary and count
variables). Those approaches are standard in the policy evaluation literature and have
been used for example by McWilliams et al. (2003) to measure the effect of insurance
on the demand for secondary prevention.
Fourth, we reconcile these two approaches by using for the first time in this liter-
ature, the double-robust (DR) estimator that is robust either if the selection mechanism
or the regression model is correctly specified. Although this estimator is more reliable
than the DID and PSM alone, it is still affected by unobservable differences. We there-
fore propose a double and triple differences double-robust estimators that account for
time-invariant and linearly-time variant differences, respectively.
We use the Health and Retirement Study, a biennial survey of Americans of 50
and over. We define the uninsured group based in three different ways that take into
account the different types of health insurance available for those aged under 65. We
estimate the average effect of Medicare and its anticipation effect on the behaviour of
the uninsured for different lifestyles: physical activity, drinking and smoking behaviour.
Our results for physical activity support the existence of anticipatory EAMH.
Uninsured and insured generally do not differ in terms of their alcohol consumption,
although the DR estimates suggest some evidence for EAMH. Based on the DID estim-
ates, we find significant differences in terms of tobacco consumption between the two
groups that we attribute to a positive selection rather than EAMH. These results are
robust across the three alternative definitions of insured and uninsured groups.
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Our results contribute to the current policy debate on universal coverage. Al-
though past evidence has generally rejected the existence of EAMH, we find that in-
surance coverage may still create incentives to reduce investment in certain types of
prevention for a certain part of the population, and this reduction may appear some
time before the receipt of insurance if anticipated.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 surveys previous eco-
nomic literature on primary and secondary prevention. Section 2.3 presents the U.S.
health insurance system. In Section 2.4, we present the theoretical model and discuss
its predictions. Section 2.5 introduces the identification approach and the different em-
pirical methods. Section 2.6 describes the data, and the empirical results are analysed
in Section 2.7. Finally, Section 2.8 contains a short conclusion.
2.2 Insurance and Prevention: Literature Review
There is a general consensus on the existence of Ex Post Moral Hazard (EPMH): the
insured consume more health care when ill. The existence of EAMH is still debated.
In order to understand past evidence of EAMH, one should distinguish between two
types of prevention: self-protection, which refers to the individual ability to reduce the
probability of illness, and self-insurance, which refers to the individual ability to reduce
the size of the future costs of illness. This formal distinction comes from the seminal
paper of Ehrlich and Becker (1972). Self-insurance, like health insurance provided by
an insurer against the cost of healthcare, reduces the monetary cost of bad health
and redistributes income from good health states to bad health states. Self-protection
reduces the probability of bad health. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) demonstrate that
health insurance and self-insurance are substitutes and that health insurance and self-
protection can be complements: greater insurance against the costs of bad health can
reduce or increase self-protection.
The strict definition of EAMH only concerns activities that reduce the probability
of illness, and that are unobserved or uncontractable by the insurance (self-protection).
Empirically, self-protection is often associated with primary prevention (e.g. exercise,
healthy diet) whereas self-insurance is associated with secondary prevention (e.g. check-
ups, screening procedures)4, but a clear categorisation is generally not possible as there
are few activities that only affect either the probability or the consequences of illness
(Kenkel, 2000).
However, it is still useful to analyse separately the impact of insurance on these
4There also exists a tertiary prevention that we do not consider here: it consists of all the actions
that reduce disability associated with a chronic illness.
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two types of prevention as they also often differ in observability and therefore in the
extent that they can be controlled by insurance contracts. Primary prevention is gen-
erally not observed and personal investments in those activities are generally not re-
imbursed.5 Secondary prevention may be observed by the insurer and reimbursed. A
change in secondary prevention due to insurance is generally due to a direct price effect
of reimbursement of these activities, whereas a change in primary prevention, if not
contractible, is due to an indirect effect of insurance by changing the cost of ill health.
Therefore, although evidence in the case of secondary prevention is instructive, it has
no relevance for EAMH.
There is no or very little evidence of EAMH for primary prevention, but an
increase in the demand for secondary prevention due to higher insurance coverage is
generally observed (Card et al., 2004). We now review separately the main evidence in
the case of secondary and primary prevention.
2.2.1 Secondary prevention
Evidence from randomised trials comes from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment
(HIE) and the Oregon health insurance experiment. Using HIE, Newhouse & al. (1993)
look at different procedures such as immunisations, general medical examinations in-
cluding mammography and Pap smears, and compare the percentage of individuals that
have used some preventive care in the different plans. They conclude that “cost sharing
[...] reduces the use of preventive services, but even with the free care this use falls
short of widely accepted standards” (Newhouse & al. (1993), p.180).
The Oregon health insurance experiment is the extension of Medicaid to a ran-
domly selected group of low-income adults aged between 19 to 64 years old who were
given the opportunity to sign up for Medicaid in 2008 (Baicker and Finkelstein, 2011,
Sommers et al., 2012). Finkelstein et al. (2012) estimate the impact of expanding access
to Medicaid and the impact of being insured by Medicaid on the demand for preventive
care. The impact of expanding access to Medicaid, referred to as the intention to treat
effect, is estimated using OLS regressions, and the impact of being insured by Medicaid,
referred to as the local average treatment effect, is estimated using instrumental vari-
ables where being covered by Medicaid is instrumented with the lottery. The authors
find a significant increase in the demand for blood cholesterol checks, blood tests for
diabetes, mammograms, and Pap tests due to the availability of Medicaid. The inten-
5Past literature assumes that lifestyle is not observed and that its costs are not reimbursed. However
a new type of health insurance has recently been marketed that covers some of the costs of primary
prevention: for example, via the offer of a gym membership. See for example in the UK, PruHealth
(http://pruhealth.pruhealth.co.uk/individuals/home).
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tion to treat effect ranges from 2.6% (blood tests) to 5.5% (mammograms), whereas the
local average treatment effect ranges from 9% (blood tests) to 18.7% (mammograms).
Kenkel (1994) uses two cross-sectional datasets6 to estimate the determinants of
the demand for preventive care and compares the results from two approaches. First,
he implements a probit to estimate the determinants of the demand for breast examina-
tions and Pap tests. Second, he runs a bivariate probit to estimate the determinants of
the demand for doctor visits and the demand for the same preventive care conditional
on a doctor visit. The second approach allows him to take into account the influence of
the physician on the demand for preventive care.7 This idea of supply induced demand
in the case of preventive care has been taken up by Dave and Kaestner (2009) and is
described below. In both models, Kenkel (1994) uses a set of dummies to control for age
(10-years categories), schooling, health status, type of physician (board certified, gyn-
aecologist, age), and insurance types (private or public coverage for physician services,
private insurance for hospital care, membership in Health Maintenance Organisations
- HMOs). In order to proxy the price paid by the individual for preventive care, Ken-
kel (1994) uses the type of insurance coverage (public, private, private with hospital
coverage, HMOs).8 His results indicate that age significantly reduces the demand for
preventive services by women whereas more education increases the probability of use
of these services. Individuals with a more complete insurance coverage for curative
care have significantly higher demand for preventive care compared to individuals with
no insurance. Coverage for preventive care in the case of HMOs also significantly in-
creases the demand for preventive care again compared to the case with no insurance,
but people with coverage for curative care are less likely to use preventive care than
people with the other types of insurance (insurance for physician services and/or hos-
pital care).9 These results show that the demand for preventive care is price sensitive
and increases when insurance reduces the cost of preventive care and decreases when
insurance reduces the cost of curative care. As recognised by the author, the main
6Kenkel (1994) uses data from (i) a survey conducted by the Center for Health Administration
Studies of the University of Chicago and the National Opinion Research Center in late 1975 and early
1976, and (ii) a telephone survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates in 1982.
7The bivariate model can only be estimated using data from the Center for Health Administration
Studies of the University of Chicago and the National Opinion Research Center in late 1975 and
early 1976 as they contain detailed information about the doctor. However, the data on insurance
only contains information about physician services and hospital care coverage but not about HMO
coverage.
8The insurance types are listed in increasing order in terms of coverage with the most complete one
being the HMOs as they “provide complete coverage for preventive and curative care” (Kenkel, 1994,
p.317).
9The results are the same in the case of univariate and bivariate models, although the positive effect
of insurance on the demand for preventive care is less strong. The effect of HMO on the demand of
preventive care can only be estimated in univariate model as explained in previous notes.
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weaknesses of the results are the use of non-experimental cross-sectional data that does
not allow to control for selection into insurance.
Using 11 years of a sample of women aged between 50 to 80 in the Behavioural
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), Decker (2005) tests whether Medicare in-
creases the use of mammography (covered by the insurance).10 In order to estimate a
discontinuous change in the demand at the age of 65, the following pooled probit model
is estimated:
Hi = β0 + β1Xi + β2AGEi + β3A65Mi + β4LOW_SESi
+β5A65Mi ∗ LOW_SESi + εi (1)
whereHi is preventive care, Xi is a vector of covariates including education, race, region,
and years effects, AGEi is vector of powers of age, and cubic specifications, A65Mi
indicates whether the individual is eligible for Medicare, and LOW_SESi allows for a
specific effect of individual with low socioeconomic status (SES) in terms of education
or race who have a higher probability of being uninsured before 65. The effect of
insurance is therefore measured for the whole sample by β3, but is allowed to differ
by SES (β5). Her results demonstrate a strong and significant increase in the number
of mammographies at age 65 when receiving Medicare, and the effect is stronger for
women without a high school degree and for Black and Hispanic women.
McWilliams et al. (2003) look at the impact of receiving Medicare on the demand
for covered11 vs. uncovered care using differences in the demand of the insured and
uninsured adjusted with a propensity score. Using three waves of the HRS (1994, 1996,
and 2000), they define three types of insurance status: (a) the individual is either
intermittently insured (n=216) if she reports at least once being insured either by her
employer, individually, or by a public insurance; (b) she is continuously insured if she
reports at least one of these coverages over the 3 waves (n=1820); (c) she is not insured if
she never reports one of these (n=167). First, they compare the continuously uninsured
(c) with the continuously insured (b), then the intermittently uninsured (a) with the
continuously insured adults (b). The authors find that the increase in the demand at age
65 for preventive care is significantly greater for the continuously uninsured compared
to continuously insured. Whereas the effect of Medicare is significant for covered care,
the effect may not be significant in the case of uncovered care (they find no effect of
10Decker (2005) also tests further whether Medicare improves survival rates of breast cancer.
11Medicare covers services such as mammography or office visits with physicians for arthritis, but
does not cover services such as cholesterol testing of individuals without diabetes or hypertension or
use of medications for arthritis or hypertension. McWilliams et al. (2003) consider cholesterol testing,
mammography (in women), prostate examination (in men), and treatment of arthritis and hypertension
in the prior 2 years.
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Medicare on the demand for anti-hypertensive medications which is not covered by
Medicare). This suggests that secondary prevention reacts to an out-of-pocket price
effect only, and suggests that, as Medicare is expected at the age of 65, individuals may
postpone covered care until this age.
Those studies, either using the only available natural experiment HIE, or using
Medicare as a natural experiment, show that the demand for preventive health care
(secondary prevention) increases when it is reimbursed by insurance.
2.2.2 Primary prevention
One key difference between primary and secondary prevention is the asymmetry of
information between the insured and the insurance. Generally, secondary prevention
is observable, and often covered, whereas primary prevention cannot be monitored by
the insurance and thus be reimbursed (Bradley, 2005).12 A change in the demand for
secondary prevention, if refunded by the insurance, is a form of EPMH. It is directly
due to a change in the price of care paid by the insured.
However, the demand for primary prevention if not contractible can be indirectly
affected by insurance. As the curative cost in the case of illness are reduced thanks
to the insurance, the financial gains from primary prevention are also reduced. The
effect of insurance on non-observed prevention may even be exacerbated if secondary
prevention is reimbursed, as the individual will be more likely to demand secondary
prevention which reduces the financial consequences of the illness and thus reduces the
benefit of investing in primary prevention. This indirect effect of insurance is EAMH.
We review here the main evidence from EAMH in the health insurance literature.
Courbage and de Coulon (2004) tackle two previously mentioned problems: first,
to compare the effect of insurance on reimbursed and observable preventive care vs. not
observed and not reimbursed care, they estimate the impact of having health insurance
on the probabilities of having a breast check and a cervical smear (secondary preven-
tion13) vs. the probabilities of exercising and of being a smoker (primary prevention,
unobserved and uncovered).14 They use wave 10 of the British Household Panel Survey
and define three groups of privately insured based on the burden of cost (in decreasing
order): insured at their own cost, at the cost of the their employer, at the cost of a
12Quite recently this has changed by the emergence of a new “type” of insurance that constrains
their insurees to report their lifestyle to benefit from lower insurance premia.
13“The NHS covers those tests and purchasing private health insurance supplements their coverage”
Courbage and de Coulon (2004), p. 721.
14In the case of secondary prevention, the indicators of breast check and a cervical smear are only
measured on women, whereas the lifestyles behaviour variables include both genders.
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family member.15 They first estimate, using a probit model, the probability of prevent-
ive care controlling for gender, age, education level, household income quantiles, and
subjective well-being. Based on this specification, their results suggest that privately
insured individuals compared to individuals only covered by the NHS are significantly
more likely to undergo breast screening, but not to have cervical smears, even though
both are covered by the insurance. The privately insured are also more likely to have a
healthier lifestyle.
In the second part of their paper, in order to take into account the possibility
of unobserved characteristics such as unobserved risk aversion that could affect the de-
mand for preventive care and private insurance, the authors use instrumental variables.
They use political party affiliation to predict the probability of having a private insur-
ance. They assume that it influences positively the decision to contract for an insurance
and to behave in a responsible way (risk averse people). Courbage and de Coulon use as
instruments (i) supporting the Conservative party to predict the decision to purchase
private insurance and (ii) supporting the Labour party to predict the propensity not
to go private. Additionally, they make the strong assumption that the choice of a job
offering private insurance is not correlated with risk aversion. The instruments only
satisfy the exogeneity condition for the probability of exercising. Their results corrob-
orate previous ones in the case of practising sport, i.e. private insurance encourages
more healthy behaviour.
Although their approach is original in distinguishing between covered and not
covered preventive care, their identification strategy presents some problems. First,
their indicator of physical exercise only indicates some physical activity versus none. It
is possible that this indicator captures a change in the mobility status; therefore, the
results should be interpreted as having insurance improves mobility or more generally
health status (probably by making it easier to contact doctors). Second, the impact of
insurance on the demand for primary prevention is measured on the male and female
samples jointly, whereas for secondary prevention it is only evaluated on the female
sample, and thus their conclusions are not directly comparable. Finally, the IV ap-
proach is only applied to the lifestyle variables. Moreover, the IV approach when the
second-stage is nonlinear16 is not consistent due to the non-additivity of the predicted
instrumented variables; instead, the first-stage residuals should be used as additional
regressors (see Terza et al. (2008) for further discussion).
15These categories differ in the burden of the cost of the premium. We view these distinctions as
an attempt to control for different degree of self-selection, but it is not really relevant to evaluate the
effect of different types of insurance on prevention as only the marginal cost of prevention and the
marginal cost of care when ill matter.
16Note that this approach is more generally called the two-stage predictor substitution approach.
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Card et al. (2004) look at the impact of health insurance coverage on health
outcomes17 and some health related behaviour18 using a regression discontinuity design
and a two-step approach. Their data is two cross-sectional surveys, the National Health
Interview Survey (NHIS) and the BRFSS data. Their model19 is
yia = Xiaα + f(ai) + Ciaδ + uia (2)
where yia is the outcome variable of individual i at age a, X ia is a set of characteristics,
f(·) is a polynomial function of age, Cia is an indicator equal to one if the individual
has a health insurance coverage, and uia is the error term. To take into account the
endogeneity of insurance coverage, they define a first stage model as
Cia = Xiaβ
C + gC(ai) +Dapi
C + vCia (3)
where βC is a set of coefficients determining the impact of the set of socio-economic
characteristics, gC(a) is a polynomial function of age and Da is a dummy for Medicare
eligibility. Combining both equations, we have
yia = Xiaβ
y + gy(a) +Dapi
y + vyia (4)
where piy = piC ∗ δj is the reduced form effect of reaching age 65 on outcome y. They
find that smoking, exercising and the probability of being overweight smoothly evolve
with age with no significant changes at age 65.
The framework to test for the existence of EAMH has been recently extended
by Dave and Kaestner (2006, 2009).20 They argue for the existence of a direct effect
of insurance on behaviour and an indirect effect that goes in the opposite direction:
health insurance decreases the incentives to invest in prevention but increases the op-
portunities to visit the doctor, and greater contact with the medical professionals is
likely to influence health behaviour positively. Omission of the indirect effect would
explain why past research has failed to identify EAMH. Their empirical approach is
based on difference-in-differences (DID) and triple differences (DIDID) approaches.
17More precisely, Card et al. (2004) look at the impact of insurance on 5 types of variables: (i)
probability of visiting the doctor, (ii) probability of a hospital stay, (iii) lifestyle behaviour, (iv) SAH,
(v) mortality. We only report here their results on the effect of insurance on lifestyle.
18The smoking behaviour variable is captured using an indicator of daily smoking, and the exercise
variable is equal to one if the individual reports having participated in the past month in any physical
activity or exercise such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening or walking.
19For simplicity, we dropped the subscript j indicating the age group of the individual; all their
results are estimated clustering the age group.
20Their approach is described in more details as it is similar to the one we use later in our DID
approach.
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Based on OLS and Poisson regressions, their model is estimated using the Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS). BMI21 and three lifestyle behaviours (Yit) are considered:
exercise (a binary variable equal to one if the individual reports participating in vigor-
ous activities at least three times a week), smoking (an indicator of daily smoking, an
indicator of quitting, and the number of cigarettes smoked daily), and alcohol consump-
tion (an indicator equal to one if the respondent drinks any alcohol and an indicator
of daily drinking). They consider only individuals age 60 to 69 years old.22 In order
to show that the impact of the omission of the indirect effect of insurance (increasing
exposure to medical professionals who encourage prevention), they first estimate the
following lifestyle model23
Yit = αi +
69∑
k=60
βkAGEkit + δMARITALit + ωXit +
2004∑
t=1992
γtY EARt
+λ1(UNINi ∗ POST65t) + λ2(UNINi ∗ POST63_64t) + εit (5)
i = 1, ...N
t = 1992, ...2004
where AGE, MARITAL and Y EAR are dummy variables indicating the age in year,
whether the individual is married, and the year of the interview respectively; X is
a vector of individual characteristics; αi is the individual fixed effect. They make the
strong assumptions that “while receipt of Medicare at age 65 is exogenous, having health
insurance prior to age 65 is a choice. We assume that this choice depends solely on a
fixed, personal characteristic, conditional on other observed time-varying factors such as
employment, and that once we control for this factor, insurance status prior to age 65 is
exogenous” (Dave and Kaestner, 2006, p.11). UNIN indicates whether the individual
has been uninsured prior to 65, AGE63_64 and POST65 indicate whether a person is
63 or 64 and over 65 respectively. Note that they do not include a term measuring the
constant difference between the insured and uninsured groups, and therefore assume
that both groups have the same level of lifestyles, except at 63 or 64 and after receiving
Medicare.
The coefficient λ1 is the DID estimator of the treatment “being uninsured before
65”: it measures the difference in the change in behaviour between the uninsured before
65 (the treatment group), and those insured before 65 (the control group) when they
21This variable was only used in Dave and Kaestner (2006).
22Furthermore, they remove from their sample disabled persons and those on Medicare prior to age
65.
23Note that the notation is the one used by the authors. However, the model as specified cannot be
estimated as such due to the “dummy trap”.
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were 65 or older compared to being under 63. The key identification assumption is that
the effect of having a health insurance on behaviour is the same for both groups, once
we condition on observed covariates. The coefficient λ2 is used to assess the validity of
this assumption: as λ2 is close to zero, Dave and Kaestner assume that the two groups
follow the same trend before 65.
Finally, they estimate the DIDID estimator equal to the difference between
λ1 − λ2: “it would be preferred to the difference-in-differences estimate if the inter-
action between the uninsured dummy variable and a dummy variable for ages 63 to
64 controlled for any differential trends between individuals who are insured versus
uninsured”.
The main hypothesis in their paper is the existence of an indirect effect of insur-
ance that would also influence the lifestyles: health insurance increases the opportunity
to visit the doctor and greater contact with the medical professionals is likely to influ-
ence positively health behaviour. Therefore they also estimate an extended model to
allow doctor visits to have a different impact if the individual is uninsured:
Yit = αi +
69∑
k=60
βkAGEkit + δMARITALit + ωXit +
2004∑
t=1992
γtY EARt
+λ1(UNINi ∗ POST65it) + λ2(UNINi ∗ POST63_64it)
+ρ1DOCTORit + ρ2(DOCTORit ∗ POST65it) + ρ3(UNINi ∗DOCTORit)
+ρ4(UNINSi ∗DOCTORit ∗ POST65it) + εit (6)
i = 1, ...N
t = 1992, ...2004
The DOCTOR variable indicates whether the individual visited the doctor at
time t. In order to identify the treatment effect, they do not include a health indicator
that they believe to be correlated with the DOCTOR and the Y variables. Moreover,
they assume that the omitted health status is not correlated with the interaction term
UNIN ∗POST65, and that the effect of Medicare is the same for those who did not and
those who did visit the doctor pre- and post-Medicare. The sign of their estimated coef-
ficients generally indicates that the receipt of Medicare increases unhealthy behaviour
and the EAMH effect is even stronger when they control for doctor visits. However the
coefficient λ1 of the interaction term UNIN ∗ POST65 is never significant.24
Contrary to the previous literature Stanciole (2007) recently found strong evid-
ence of EAMH. Using the PSID panel data, he estimates a multivariate probit model
24In Appendix B, we discuss their approach and replicate their results.
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where he allows unobservable factors to influence insurance decision and various life-
style choices, themselves directly affected by the insurance status. This framework
supposes that the decision to contract for insurance and the lifestyle choices are se-
quential but interdependent. His results suggests that insurance strongly encourages
heavy smoking, sedentary behaviour, and obesity, but insured individuals are less likely
to be heavy drinkers. The analysis of the correlation of the residuals supports the
existence of unobserved factors influencing health insurance and lifestyle. With the ex-
ception of smoking behaviour, coefficients of the model argue for the existence of EAMH
and the correlation of the residuals may suggest the existence of important unmeasured
influences. Regrettably, the definition of the insured is not explained in this paper.
The BMI is sometimes also considered as a lifestyle measure. We do not use
it our empirical work as we see it rather as a summary of past lifestyles, but it has
recently been used in Bhattacharya et al. (2009). The authors look at the extent to
which different types of insurance copayments influence BMI. Using the RAND data,
they find weak evidence that individuals with higher cost sharing have a larger decrease
in BMI during the experiment. Second, they use instrumental variable (IV) methods
to investigate the impact of different types of insurance (private, public or none) on
body mass. As IVs they use the percentage of workers insured in firms as a predictor
of private coverage, and Medicaid coverage in different states as a predictor of public
coverage. Their evidence supports the hypothesis that insurance, private or public,
increases BMI.
In summary, there exists very little evidence of EAMH. One reason might be
that we are omitting part of the whole story. Dave and Kaestner (2009) suggest that
we should account for the indirect effect of doctor advice, Stanciole (2007)’s suggests
that there is unobserved heterogeneity. We argue that the lack of evidence of EAMH
may be due to an anticipation effect in the case of Medicare, and that the impact of
insurance may have already appeared before the change in insurance status. Another
explanation may be the existence of positive selection.
Recent theory has suggested the possibility of advantageous selection, also called
positive or propentious selection (Hemenway, 1990, 1992): more risk averse individuals
are more likely to be insured and also more likely to invest more in preventive activities.
Evidence exists in the case of life insurance (Cawley and Philipson, 1999), long-term
care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), private insurance (Buchmueller et al.,
2008), and car insurance (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000) among others. Positive selection
is compatible with EAMH, but makes the identification of the EAMH effect more
difficult. We discuss this in more detail in in Section 2.5 where we set out the modelling
approach.
29
2.3 The U.S. Health Insurance System
Since we propose to test for EAMH using data from the US, we first provide some
background on the US health insurance system. The United States has the highest
proportion of uninsured individuals in a developed country, and therefore offers a control
group of significant size. In 1992, the first year of our data, 17.4% (38.5 million people) of
the non-elderly Americans were not covered by either public or private health insurance
and did not receive publicly financed health assistance (Snider and Boyce, 1994). It is
the only country of the OECD which does not to provide universal health insurance
coverage and the role of the government is the most limited (Scott, 2001). The US
health system is the most competitive (Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), Bureau of Labor
Education (BLE), 2001) and the most expensive in the world, not only as a percentage
of GDP, but also in terms of health expenditures per capita (BLE, 2001).
The US health insurance system has private and public insurance providers.
Private insurance is provided through group or individual health insurance. The pre-
dominant source of private coverage is employer-sponsored health insurance which cov-
ered 58.8% of Americans in 1992 (Employee Benefit Research Institute - EBRI25).
Employment-based plans can be accessed through one’s employer, union or employed
relative, but even when an employer offers a health insurance, not all the workers decide
to contract in. There are two reasons for the predominance of this type of insurance;
tax exemption and lower experience-rated premiums for large companies. Employer-
provided insurance generally covers inpatient hospital and physician services but the
type of coverage provided varies widely. Some employers allow employees to choose
between several plans (e.g. indemnity insurance, managed care, HMOs), while other
employers offer only one plan. Some group plans may offer dental and/or vision benefits
as well as medical benefits (Agency for Healthcare Research on Quality - AHRQ26). If
individuals are self-employed or have no employer-provided insurance, they are able to
purchase individual coverage directly from an insurance company, but will be responsi-
ble for the entire premium. In 1992, only 11.8% of the population had private insurance
that was not from an employer and only 8.5 % among the non-elderly.
Public health insurance only covers subsets of the population. There are two
major sources of governmental health insurance: Medicare and Medicaid. Medicare is
a federal health insurance program that came into force in 1965 and is now the largest
health insurance in the country (Scott, 2001). It is for Americans aged of 65 and older,
or with long-term disabilities or end-stage renal disease regardless of their age. In 1992,
25www.ebri.org
26www.ahrq.gov
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it was covering 1.8% of the non-elderly and 96.2% of the elderly (EBRI). Medicare
offers different plans: the original Medicare plan, part A, is financed by payroll taxes
and covers inpatient hospital expenditures, some nursing home care and home health
services (Scott, 2001). Most people do not pay a premium for part A, but the other plans
are optional and require generally a monthly payment. Additional plans include part B,
covering outpatient hospital treatment and doctor’s services, and part D which covers
part of the cost of prescription drugs and was available from January 2006. In 1997 part
C was established and combines part A and part B, but is provided by approved private
insurance companies. Part C is a lower-cost alternative to the original Medicare plans,
and providers usually offer extra benefits but care is provided by networks of doctors
and hospitals (PPOs, HMOs, etc.) belonging to the plan.27 Some part C plans may
offer part D.
The second main governmental insurance is Medicaid: it is a joint federal and
state health insurance program and covers certain groups with very limited income and
financial resources (pregnant women or mothers of dependent children, the blind, and
disabled (Organization for Economic Cooperation et al., 1994). Medicaid programs vary
from State to State, but generally covers nursing home care, home care and prescription
drugs that are not covered by Medicare. In 1992, Medicaid was covering 11.6% of the
non-elderly and 9.4% of the elderly (EBRI).
Additionally, the government offers various specific health insurance coverage,
such as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniform Services (CHAMPUS),
and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs
(CHAMPVA). CHAMPUS is an insurance plan that provides medical insurance for
active and retired members of the military and their families. The level of cost-sharing
depends on the type of plan chosen. At the age of 66, all CHAMPUS beneficiaries
move to Medicare. CHAMPVA is a health insurance offered to non CHAMPUS eligible
spouses and dependent children of veterans who have been rated disabled due to a
service, or to widows and dependent children of a veteran who died disabled or in the
line of duty. CHAMPVA covers 75% of inpatient and outpatient care, and prescriptions.
Related types of private insurance used in the analysis include: long-term care
(LTC) insurance and life insurance. LTC insurance is voluntary and partially covers
chronic or disabling conditions that require care provided in a nursing home, in an
assisted living facility, or in an individual’s own home. LTC insurance coverage for
institutional and non-institutional care varies widely depending on the chosen plan.
Life insurance is individually purchased and also varies by type of plan.
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of health insurance coverage in the US for the
27www.medicareconsumerguide.com
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Table 1: Non-elderly (<65 years old) Americans: sources of health insurance coverage
(percentage, and total population in million)
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
ESI 62.5 64.4 64.8 67.2 68.4 65.7 63.1 62.2
Individual Purchased 8.5 7.5 7.2 6.9 6.5 6.6 7.1 6.8
Public HI 15.1 17.1 16.2 14.5 14.6 15.9 17.7 18.2
Medicare 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5
Medicaid 11.6 12.7 12.2 10.6 10.7 11.9 13.6 13.4
CHAMPUS/VA/TRICARE 2.6 3.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.7
No HI 17.4 15.9 16.4 16.5 15.6 16.6 16.9 17.2
Total Population (non-elderly) 220.8 229.9 234.1 238.6 244.8 250.8 255.1 260.0
Notes: HI: health insurance, ESI: employer-sponsored health insurance, population is in million. Note
that total percentage may not add to 100% as individuals may have more than one coverage. Sources:
Employee Benefit Research Institute
non-elderly.
2.4 Theoretical Model
The formal model of self-insurance, self-protection and health insurance was introduced
by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) and developed further by Dave and Kaestner (2009) to
account for the indirect effects of doctor visits. In Section 2.4.1, we extend the model
of self-protection and health insurance by assuming that the benefits of lifestyle only
appear in the future. Consequently, individuals’ incentives for preventive efforts depend
on future insurance: this is the anticipatory EAMH. In Section 2.4.2, we combine the
anticipatory and classical EAMH, and generalise the model over three time period to
illustrate the model’s implications in the case of Medicare.
2.4.1 Lagged health effects of lifestyle
We sketch a very simple model of self-protection where the individual maximises her
expected utility by choosing her investment in health related behaviour and consump-
tion at each period. Utility is state dependant. In each period (age), the individual can
be either in good health (h = g) or in bad health (h = b). Expected utility at age a is
ua = [1− pia(La−1)]uga(La, xga, 0) + pia(La−1)uba(La, xba, camba) (7)
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where La is the lifestyle chosen at age a before the individual knows her health status in
that period. The higher L is, the healthier the lifestyle. xha is the composite consumption
good consumed at age a with health status h, ma is medical care received if ill at age
a (otherwise 0) and ca is the coinsurance rate so that the out of pocket cost of medical
care is cama. uga and uba are decreasing and convex in lifestyle, and increasing and
concave in xga and xba.28 pia is the probability of being ill at age a and is decreasing and
convex in the last period lifestyle (La−1). The budget constraint in state h at age a is
given by
pxx
h
a + pLLa + capmm
h
a 6 Ia (8)
where px, pL, pm are the constant prices of the commodity good, lifestyle and medical
care respectively and Ia is the exogenous income received at age a. We assume that the
marginal utilities of the commodity good and medical care are positive but decreasing.
We restrict the marginality utility of each type of good to be independent of the con-
sumption of the other goods. We assume that the goods are measured in units such that
each price is equal to one. Moreover, we assume that there is no inter-temporal transfer
of income (no borrowing or lending). The only inter-temporal effect is the benefit of
lifestyle: the investment in lifestyle at age a reduces the probability of sickness at age
a+ 1.
We assume that the individual first chooses the optimal lifestyle for the age a
before knowing her health status at this same age, and then, once the health status
is revealed, chooses the commodity good xha. We assume that the exogenous amount
of medical care ma is decided by the doctor in the case of illness. Using Bellman’s
Optimality Principle, we can solve the maximisation problem. The optimal xha for
h = g, b solves
Maxxa u
h
a(La, x
h
a,m
h
a) s.t. x
h
a + La + cam
h
a 6 Ia (9)
which gives xh∗a = xha(La,mha, Ia).
The optimal La solves
MaxLa Ua = [1− pia(La−1)]uga(Ia − xg∗a − La) + pia(La−1)uba(Ia − xb∗a − La − cama)
+δ{[1− pia+1(La)]uga+1(Ia+1 − xg∗a+1 − L∗a+1)
+pia+1(La)u
b
a+1(Ia+1 − xb∗a+1 − L∗a+1 − ca+1ma+1)}
+δ2U∗a+2 (10)
28Although some types of healthy lifestyle may have, at low levels, a positive marginal utility, the
individual will never choose L such that her expected marginal utility is positive, and so the assumption
of the negative marginal utility of L does not affect the analysis.
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where L∗a+1 is the level of lifestyle optimally chosen at a+ 1 and U∗a+2 is the discounted
expected utility from a+2 onwards given optimal decisions on La+2, La+3, ..., and xha+2,
xha+3, ... . δ is a discount factor on expected utility such that (0, 1).
The first order condition on La implies
MCa ≡ ∂u
g
a
∂La
+ pia
{
∂uba
∂La
− ∂u
g
a
∂La
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
= δ
∂pia+1
∂La︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
{
uba+1 − uga+1
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
≡MBa (11)
where the LHS represents the marginal cost (MC) of lifestyle and the RHS the marginal
benefit (MB) at age a. (a) is the direct cost of lifestyle on current utility, (b) is the
marginal productivity of lifestyle, and (c) is the future utility gain from better health.
If the individual is uninsured at age a + 1, her future benefits of today lifestyle
depend on the reduction of future probability of illness (b) and the gain from better
health (c). However, if the individual is insured at age a + 1, the latter gain (c) is
reduced and is even equal to zero if the individual is fully insured (assuming that the
coinsurance rate equal to zero and no other impact of illness on the utility) which
removes all the future benefits of a healthy lifestyle.
2.4.2 Generalisation of the model
It is likely that the effects of a healthy lifestyle have a current effect and a delayed
effect that lasts over many years on the probability of being ill. We extend the model
above by assuming that current lifestyle also has direct effects on the illness probability
in the current period and two periods later (pia(La, La−1, La−2)) to illustrate how the
anticipation of Medicare can affect uninsured individuals two periods before they receive
it. We omit the choices of the commodity good to simplify.
At age a, before the state of the world is known, the individual chooses her
current lifestyle to maximise her discounted expected lifetime utility
∞∑
s=0
δsva+s(La+s, La+s−1, La+s−2; ca+s) (12)
where
va(La, La−1, La−2; ca) = [1− pia(La, La−1, La−2)]uga(La) + pia(La, La−1, La−2)uba(La; ca)
(13)
We can now interpret uga(La) and uba(La, ca) as quasi indirect utility functions showing
utility achieved by optimal decisions as are other variables, except La which affects
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utility.
Using Bellman’s optimality principle, the optimal La now satisfies
∂uga
∂La
+ pia
{
∂uba
∂La
− ∂u
g
a
∂La
}
=
∂pia
∂La
{
uba − uga
}
+δ
∂pia+1
∂La
{
uba+1 − uga+1
}
+δ2
∂pia+2
∂La
{
uba+2 − uga+2
}
(14)
Similarly to equation (11), the marginal cost of a healthier lifestyle when aged a (the
LHS of equation (14)) is equated to its marginal benefit which depends on the pro-
ductivity of lifestyle in reducing the probabilities of ill health and on the loss in utility
if ill rather than well not only at age a+ 1 but also at ages a and a+ 2.
The reduction in utility if ill rather than well is greater when the individual is
not insured:
0 > uba(La, 0)− uga(La) > uba(La,ma)− uga(La) (15)
since she must bear the cost of medical care. Thus prevention at age a depends on
current insurance and anticipated insurance status at ages a + 1 and a + 2. Suppose
that the utility and illness probability functions do not vary with age and that the
individual is not insured at ages a < aM but is fully covered from age aM onward.
From ages a > aM the individual will therefore choose the same level of prevention
at each age, which we denote as LI . For ages a < aM − 2 she is uninsured and the
future benefits of prevention arise when she is not insured. Denote the optimal level of
prevention at a < aM − 2 by LU . Since the benefits from prevention are less when fully
insured, prevention is greater at ages a < aM − 2 than at a = aM : LU > LI .29 The
expected discounted marginal benefits from prevention (the RHS of equation (14)) will
also be smaller at age aM − 2 than at aM − 3 and smaller at aM − 1 than at aM − 2.
Thus anticipation of full cover insurance at age aM will lead to the optimal level of
prevention trending downward even before the individual is fully insured:
... = L∗aM−4 = L
∗
aM−3 = L
U > L∗aM−2 > L
∗
aM−1 > L
I = L∗aM = L
∗
aM+1 = ... (16)
We call this phenomena anticipatory EAMH.
Although utility and probability functions do vary with age, the result that
anticipation of future receipt of Medicare at age 65 will affect the behaviour before age
29The assumption that ∂[∂uba/∂La]/∂cama ≥ 0 implies that the expected marginal cost of prevention
is not reduced by full cover insurance against medical costs.
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Figure 1: Ex Ante Moral Hazard
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65 of those who are uninsured before age 65 holds in general. There will be no such
anticipatory change in behaviour before age 65 for those who are insured before age
65, assuming that the generosity of the coverage remains very similar. Thus it will
be possible to test for anticipatory EAMH by comparing the changes in the trends of
lifestyles affecting health before and after age 65 for those previously uninsured and
insured before age 65.
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of the receipt of Medicare at age 65 on those previ-
ously insured and uninsured, as discussed above. The first graph shows EAMH without
anticipation. The uninsured are assumed to have a much more healthy lifestyle before
65 and to suddenly reduce their effort at 65 and thereafter. The second graph presents
anticipatory EAMH with prevention by those uninsured before age 65 falling relative to
that of the insured as age approaches 65. The third graph combines positive selection
and anticipatory EAMH so that the uninsured undertake less prevention even before
they start to anticipate the change in their insurance status. Our identification strategy
presented in the next section makes no prior assumption on the type of relationships
potentially present in the data and is flexible enough to accommodate any of these
patterns.
2.5 Estimation Strategy
We use the granting of Medicare to almost all Americans at the age 65 to analyse the
impact of an anticipated exogenous change in health insurance on lifestyles. The clas-
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sical EAMH hypothesis postulates that the uninsured will adopt a less healthy lifestyle
once insured post 65 because health insurance removes the financial consequences of
illness. Our theoretical model in Section 2.4 has shown that, if the consequences of a
less healthy current lifestyle also affect future health, individuals who anticipate Medi-
care will change their lifestyle before 65. As we do not know when the anticipation
of Medicare has an effect on lifestyles, if any, we use flexible methods that not only
allow us to identify an effect of Medicare on lifestyles before 65 years old (if there is
anticipatory EAMH), but also after 65 years old (the classical EAMH effect).
Americans not continuously insured generally face the same risk of forgoing
needed medical care or having problems paying their medical bills as the ones continu-
ously uninsured (Schoen and DesRoches, 2000). Therefore, we use the continuously
insured individuals as our reference or control group as they have been continuously
exposed to the treatment (health insurance coverage) and Medicare only prolongs their
health insurance. The uninsured or temporally insured are our treatment group as they
experience an expected change in exposure at the age of 65. In what follows, we will
refer to the “insured” and “uninsured” to distinguish between the two groups. But this
appellation does not always correspond precisely to the their actual coverage up to age
65. We use various definitions of the insured and uninsured groups which are described
in detail in Section 2.6.2.4.
Our model in Section 2.4 predicts that, if the individual knows that the con-
sequences of her lifestyle will also appear in the future after she is insured, she will
reduce her current investment in healthy lifestyle. However, when she starts decreasing
her effort depends on when she believes she will experience the consequences. As her
beliefs cannot be observed, we adopt flexible models allowing for a change in beha-
viour in the last 6 years before receiving Medicare.30 We use different approaches to
test for the presence of classical and anticipatory EAMH without imposing a specific
age at which Medicare could influence the lifestyles of the uninsured. Our identifica-
tion strategy is to measure the impact of age on lifestyles allowing for different effects
between the treatment (uninsured pre 65) and the control (insured pre 65) groups at
all ages.
We seek to measure the average treatment effect (ATE), but, as the uninsured
group only represents a sub-sample of the population that is not representative, very
often only the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) will be measured, i.e. the
impact of becoming insured on the previously uninsured.
30We did not consider more lags as we also want to observe the individual just after receiving
Medicare to allow for the classical EAMH effect. Ideally, we would of course prefer to observe more
time periods before the age of 65 but we are limited by our data and the size of the sample.
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As the interviews are conducted every two years, for each method we compare
individuals and their lifestyles by pairs of years; the effect of insurance on lifestyles is
measured at ages 59/60, 61/62, 63/64, 65/66 and 67/68. The main reason for comparing
individuals by pairs of years is to compare the same group of individuals at all ages.
Otherwise, some individuals would only be observed at odd ages and the other at even
ages.31
We start our analysis with matching methods. Simple comparison of the lifestyles
of the insured and uninsured before they are eligible for Medicare will not identify the
effect of insurance on lifestyle since selection into insurance is not random. It may be
that individuals who are better educated will be more likely to choose a healthy lifestyle
and to be richer, hence more able to buy insurance. If such selection depends on observ-
able characteristics then it can be allowed for either via regression or using propensity
score methods which make fewer assumptions about the way selection depends on ob-
servables. For example, in order to remove the correlation between the observables and
the treatment, Horvitz and Thompson (1952) suggest comparing weighted means of the
outcome variable using the inverse of the propensity score as weights.
The objective of matching is to recreate post-experiment a random allocation to
treatment based on observable characteristics. This is possible if the confounding factors
affecting pre 65 insurance status are observable. We limit our sample to individuals
aged between 59 and 68 years old, and as the control and treatment groups allocation
is defined on the basis of insurance coverage between 61 and 64 years old, we use
information at the ages 59 and 60 to estimate the propensity score, assuming that the
variables at theses ages are not affected by the allocation of the insurance group defined
in the future nor the change in health insurance coverage.
Matching methods allow us to compare the lifestyle variables between the insured
and uninsured group at the different ages (M(a)). If there are differences between the
two groups, these could simply be due to adverse selection, if the uninsured have a more
healthy lifestyle than the insured, or to positive selection if the insured generally have
a more healthy lifestyle than the uninsured. Therefore, we then compute difference-
in-differences matching (MDID(a, a′)) to analyse the changes over the ages a to a′
in lifestyle between the two groups. If the differences remain constant over the years,
they cannot be attributed to EAMH. This approach has been suggested by Heckman
et al. (1997) to control for bias stability (Eichler and Lechner, 2002): if there are
differences between the two groups that are not observed but affect the selection to
treatment, this bias can be removed if it is constant over time by taking the difference.
The main advantage of these two semi-parametric approaches is that they allow us to
31Our data is described in detail in Section 2.6.
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control for self-selection based on observables without imposing a type of selection. The
simple matching and DID matching methods are complementary. The M(a) estimator
informs us about which group has the most healthy lifestyle at a specific age, that is
the differences in levels at the different ages. The MDID(a, a′) estimators account
for constant differences between both groups and only measure the relative changes in
behaviour between the two groups. For each estimator, matching is performed with
different methods to see how sensitive our results are.
A drawback of the matching methods is that they do not allow us to distinguish
between the direct and possible indirect effects of insurance, for example due to the
lower cost of a doctor visit if insured that would encourage a healthier behaviour (Dave
and Kaestner, 2009). The main purpose of the DID model is to compare the mean of the
outcome variable between the two groups before and after the treatment controlling for
observable time-varying factors. Adding interactions terms permits us to disentangle
direct and indirect effects due to doctors visits.
Difference-in-differences regression methods have been widely used to estimate
the impact of a change in policy (for example Ashenfelter, 1978; Ashenfelter and Card,
1985, Blundell et al. (2004)) by comparison of changes in outcomes before and after
treatment for the treated and untreated. DID methods can be applied to estimate the
effect of Medicare eligibility at age 65 (e.g. Dave and Kaestner, 2009, Decker, 2005). But
these methods may not be appropriate if they assume that the change in lifestyle due
to Medicare occurs only from age 65 onwards when the previously uninsured are now
covered.32 Comparing lifestyle post 65 with lifestyle immediately before the granting
of Medicare does not allow for anticipation effects at earlier ages. It also assumes that
those who are insured and uninsured before age 65 would have the same lifestyle trends
in the absence of Medicare eligibility at age 65, conditional on observables. Therefore,
our approach extends the Dave and Kaestner’s model based on DID by allowing for
more possible indirect effects and we analyse all the possible differences over the age
range of observations not to limit EAMH to age 65. We also estimate the models using
non-linear models that better fit the data.
The DID approach identifies the ATE over the whole sample. However, the
estimated effect is biased if the different covariates do not overlap between the two
groups as some coefficients will be affected mainly by one group, the others by the
other group. As illustrated in the descriptive statistics in Section 2.7.1, the two groups
are different, but the range of their PSs overlaps, so it is not an issue.
32In addition to a dummy variable equal to one if the individual has been previously uninsured and
is 65 or more, Dave and Kaestner (2009) include a dummy equal to one if the individual is uninsured
and 63/64 years old to assess the validity of their identification assumption at 65. The coefficients on
this dummy variable are often but not always equal to zero suggesting some anticipatory EAMH.
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The classical DID approach assumes random assignment to treatment after we
control for the observable time-variant confounding variables. With non-experimental
data, random assignment to treatment is very unlikely and in the context of health in-
surance; self-selection on observables and possibly unobservables is a recurrent problem.
Originally, it was assumed to arise from adverse selection problem: insurance coverage
was attracting bad risks (Bundorf et al., 2005; Cardon, 2001) which means that indi-
viduals who want to smoke, drink and not exercise, or individuals who already know
they have (or will have) bad health, would be more likely to have insurance. However,
some authors have recently suggested the existence of positive selection, also called
propentious selection (Hemenway, 1990): more risk-averse individuals are more likely
to have an insurance and also more likely to have a healthy lifestyle, and probably a
better health too. Risk aversion is a major issue as it is not explicitly measured in the
data.
In our final approach, we therefore combine matching with regression, first to
avoid having to arbitrarily choose the most appropriate method between matching
and regression, and second to investigate further more complex forms of unobservable
selection. The propensity score model is used to remove the correlation between the
observables and the insured and uninsured at the age 59 or 60. The regression models
control for the time varying observable confounding factors (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2008). This combination of both the propensity score and DID regressions methods
is called the double-robust (DR) estimator (Rubin, 1973, Robins et al., 1995) and
estimates the difference DR(a) in lifestyles between those insured and uninsured before
age 65 at a given age. The DR method is consistent if either the propensity score model
or the regression model is correctly specified (Lunceford and Davidian, 2004, Bang and
Robins, 2005). It allows us to relax the assumption that either the parametric model
or the use of the propensity score is the appropriate identification method.
The DR estimates measure the lifestyle differences DR(a) between the insured
and uninsured groups at each age, adjusted for observable differences (e.g. education)
and selection on observables. But it remains potentially affected by time-variant and
invariant unobserved differences that do not permit us to distinguish selection from
EAMH. We therefore compute the differences in the DR estimates (DR(a)) at the dif-
ferent ages (DRDID(a, a′)) in order to remove unobserved time-invariant differences.
DRDID(a, a′) estimates close to zero indicate that the observed differences, if any, are
due to selection based on time-invariant unobserved factors. Contrarily, DRDID(a, a′)
estimates different from zero indicate that the two groups follow different trends. Only
a change in the trend of the uninsured relative to the insured could indicate the pres-
ence of EAMH as predicted by the theoretical model in Section 2.4 and illustrated
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in Graph 1. Differential linear trends may be due to unobserved time-variant factors
changing gradually with age. For example the two groups may have different pref-
erences for physical exercise and those preferences may be diminishing more rapidly
with age for the uninsured group. The difference-in-differences of the DR estimates
(DRDIDID(a, a′, a′′, a′′′)) are robust to time-invariant and time-variant factors as long
as those latter change linearly with respect to age.
We now explicitly formulate the different methods used in the analysis.
2.5.1 Propensity score matching
Control and treated groups are defined by their insurance status between ages 61 and
64.33 Let Ui be equal to 0 if the individual is assigned to the pre age 65 insured (control)
group or equal to 1 if the individual is allocated to the pre 65 uninsured (treatment)
group. Matching can re-create post-experiment the experimental conditions if selection
is due only to observable characteristics: matching allows us to select a group of insured
individuals (the control group) who are the counterpart of the uninsured individuals so
that the only remaining lifestyle differences are due to the receipt of insurance.
As we only match treated individuals to the controls (the insured individuals),
the PSM estimation approach only estimates the ATT. Matching requires two main
assumptions.34 First, the (weak) conditional independence assumption (CIA, Rubin,
1974, 1997)35
L0i,a⊥Ui|Xia˜ (17)
where L0i,a is the lifestyle for individual i at ages a = 59/60, ..., 67/68 if insured (Ui = 0)
and Xia˜ the pre-treatment (a˜ = 59/60) observable confounding factors. The CIA
supposes that assignment to treatment is associated only with observable intervention
variables Xia˜ (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). As we are interested in the impact of insur-
ance on the uninsured, we only assume that the insurance assignment is independent
of the lifestyle in the case of insurance once we control for the observable factors. This
assumption does not exclude selection on unobservables, but they should not be related
to the outcome of interest, otherwise our estimate will be biased (Moreno-Serra, 2007).
As a result of the CIA,
33As individuals are interviewed every two years, it means that we use the information from the two
waves before receiving Medicare.
34The assumptions to identify the ATT are weaker than the ones necessary to retrieve the ATE.
35The conditional independence assumption is equivalent to the selection on observables assumption,
or the unconfoundness assumption (Imbens 2005), or the ignorable treatment assignment assumption
(Rubin 1978).
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E(L0ia|Xia˜, Ui = 0) = E(L0ia|Xia˜, Ui = 1) (18)
which means that the average lifestyle with no insurance is the same for the insured
and uninsured individuals once we control for the confounding factors. This allows us
to identify the ATT at ages a
ATTa = E(L
1
ia|Xia˜, Ui = 1)− E(L0ia|Xia˜, Ui = 1) (19)
where the last element (the counterfactual that is not observed) can be replaced by
E(L0ia|Xia˜, Ui = 0).
The second necessary condition is the the existence of a common support (CS)
for the treated individuals. This can be expressed as
Pr[Ui = 1|Xia˜] < 1 (20)
where Pr[Ui = 1] is the probability of being uninsured (treated). The CS assumption
refers to the joint distribution of the treatment conditional on the covariates and means
that if for some individuals, given their Xia˜, we know for sure that they will not be
insured, the ATT cannot be retrieved as these individuals will not have a counterfactual
with the same characteristics.36
If these two assumptions (equations (17) and (20)) are satisfied, we can conclude
that the treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given Xia˜ (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983) and that an unbiased estimate of the ATT can be computed. The ATT at ages
a is defined as
ATTa = EXi0CS{E(L1ia|Xia˜, Ui = 1)− E(L0ia|Xia˜, Ui = 1)} (21)
for Xi0 ∈ CS and for a = 59/60, ..., 67/68. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate
that if the treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given X,37 then it is strongly
ignorable given the propensity score (PS). This allows us to match individuals not on
the basis of all relevant X, but on the basis of their PS.
The PS is defined as the conditional probability of being treated (uninsured)
given some pre-policy-intervention variables X:
p(Xia˜) ≡ Pr[Ui = 1|Xia˜] = E[Ui|Xia˜] (22)
36In practice, when we impose CS to the sample studied it means that we exclude certain individuals
having a propensity score not in a certain range, but it has not been necessary in our case as both
groups overlap well.
37Strongly ignorable means that the CIA and CS assumptions hold.
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Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that the PS is a balancing score, which
means that individuals with the same PS are identical in terms of their covariates (Xi0)
independently of their group (Cameron and Triverdi, 2005). This property of the PS
simplifies the CIA (equation (17)) to
L0it⊥Ui|Xia˜ ⇒ L0it⊥Ui|p(Xia˜) (23)
It implies that the CIA is satisfied once we control for the PS. This is a very
convenient result as it is reduces the matching dimension to only one variable. The
ATT can be identified as
ATT PSMa ≡ E(L1ia − L0ia|Ui = 1)
= E{[E(Lia|p(Xia˜), Ui = 1)− E(Lia|p(Xia˜), Ui = 0)]|Ui = 1} (24)
≡ MD(a)
for X ∈ CS.
2.5.2 Matching difference-in-differences
Heckman et al. (1997) and (1998) have proposed to combine DID approach with match-
ing (MDID) to account for unobservable time-invariant differences that may still be
present even after conditioning on observables. Thus, when panel data (or repeated
cross-sectional data) is available, MDID eliminates selection on unobservable time-
invariant differences that pure PSM estimators fail to account for (Smith and Todd,
2005).
Similarly to the PSM approach, unbiasedness of the MDID estimators relies on
the assumptions of CIA and CS. In this case, the weak CIA in equation (23) becomes
(L0ia′ − L0ia)⊥Ui|p(Xi0) (25)
where a˜′ > a. It assumes that the change in lifestyles of the uninsured group would
have been similar to the insured individuals had they received an insurance (common
trend assumption). This is different from PSM as here the insurance status (Ui) can be
a predictor of the lifestyle if insured (L0) given the PS, but it must not be correlated
with the changes L0ia′ − L0ia conditional on the PS (Todd, 2008). As a results of the
CIA, we have that
E(L0ia − L0ia′ |Xi0, Ui = 0) = E(L0ia − L0ia′|Xi0, Ui = 1) (26)
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The CS assumption is identical as in equation (20) as we have a panel database.38
Based on these two assumptions, the net ATT using MDID is then defined as
ATTMDIDa′,a ≡ E((L1ia′ − L1ia)− (L0ia′ − L0ia)|Ui = 1)
= E{[E(Lia′ − Lia|p(Xi0), Ui = 1)− E(Lia′
−Lia|p(Xi0), Ui = 0)]|Ui = 1)} (27)
≡ MDID(a, a′)
for a = 59/60, ..., 67/68 with age a < a′.
2.5.3 Difference-in-differences approach
2.5.3.1 Anticipatory and classical EAMH
The unbiasedness of the DID estimator relies on two crucial assumptions (Blundell and
Costa Dias, 2008): (1) the composition of the two groups must remain constant before
and after the change in exposure to insurance, and (2) the two groups must be influ-
enced in the same way by the time trend. The first assumption is very strong in the
case of repeated cross-sectional data but may still be violated with panel data if attri-
tion or non-response cause a significant change in the groups structure. Moreover, the
assumption is violated if unobserved time-variant confounding factors exists.39 How-
ever, if unobserved characteristics vary linearly over time between the two groups, we
can still take them into account by taking triple difference (the difference of the DID
estimator). This approach is developed in Section 2.5.4.
The common time effect assumption implies that individuals are affected in the
same way by aggregate shocks, independently of their group. In our framework, it
means that the age effect is not systematically different between both groups in the
absence of treatment once we control for individual characteristics.
Although a parametric approach requires stronger assumptions, particularly the
specification of the estimated model, it is very useful in decomposing the possible direct
and indirect effects of insurance on lifestyle (Dave and Kaestner, 2009). Similarly to the
approach adopted by Dave and Kaestner, we start with a linear model but allow the
uninsured to be different from the insured at every age group.40 Our basic regression
38In the case of a repeated cross-sectional data, the CS would be a stronger assumption as it must
hold between the two periods, which does not have to be the case as the groups’ structure may change
over time. However, non-random attrition could be an issue in our case.
39For example, if risk aversion is time-varying.
40Dave and Kaestner (2009) allow insurance to have a different impact at age after 65, as well as
one wave before 65 years old.
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framework is
Lia = α + βXi +
67/68∑
t=61/62
ηtAit + δUi +
67/68∑
t=61/62
γtAitUi + εia (28)
for a = 59/60, ..., 67/68
where Lia represents the lifestyle of individual i at ages a, Xi are the control variables
including a dummy for doctor visits, Aia = 1[a = A] are the age dummy variables and Ui
equals 1 if the individual i is in the uninsured group or zero otherwise. The coefficients
γt in equation (28) measure the difference between the changes in lifestyles between ages
a and the baseline ages 59/60 between the uninsured and insured individuals. This can
be illustrated as follows:
DID(a, 59/60) = E[Lia − Li,59/60|Ui = 1]− E[Lia − Li,59/60|Ui = 0]
= {(α + βXi + ηa + δ + γa)− (α + βXi + δ)}
−{(α + βXi + ηa)− (α + βXi)} = γa = ATEDIDa,59/60 (29)
In Figure 2, we illustrate what the DID estimators would be in the case of
anticipatory EAMH if the reference age was 60 years old.41 Here, lifestyle is measured
in a positive way (e.g. exercise or quitting smoking), and we assume that it decreases
over the years for both groups, but faster for the uninsured before 65. In terms of the
DID estimators, from age 60 to 65, the difference between the change in lifestyles for
the two groups increases and becomes more and more negative. This is because, if the
uninsured group anticipates their insurance coverage and EAMH is present, they will
reduce their investment in healthy lifestyles already before 65. From 65 onwards, there
is only the age effect and both groups reduce their lifestyle investment of the same
amount. This is why after 65 years old the difference between the change compared to
the reference age is constant. Therefore, in the case of anticipatory EAMH only, the
coefficients would be such that |γ61/62| < |γ63/64| < |γ65/66| = |γ67/68|. The presence of
adverse or positive selection if it only shifts up or down the trends would not affect this
conclusion.
It is important to note that the presence of EAMH with anticipatory behaviour
implies a change in relative trends that can be examined by taking further differences.
These (in)equalities between the different coefficients can be pairwise tested using the
Wald test to test equalities and t-tests to perform one-sided tests. Let us define a′ = a+1
41For the intuition, we have represented the DID estimators at all ages, but in our case, we only
have five estimators (59/60, 61/62, 63/64, 65/66, 67/68) with respect to the reference ages 59/60.
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Figure 2: DID - Expected coefficients with anticipatory EAMH
Notes: We have assumed here that lifestyle is measured in a positive way (e.g. exercise) and that we
observe individuals at every age. The graph at the bottom represents possible lifestyle trends for the
insured (full line) and the uninsured (dashed line) in the case of EAMH with anticipatory behaviour.
The vertical lines are the differences for each group at each age with respect to their baseline age 60.
These differences are reported in the top graph on the horizontal line. Below the horizontal line, the
vertical lines are the differences between the group differences at each age, i.e. the DID estimates.
46
so that for example if a = 61/62 then a′ = 63/64. The null hypothesis can be expressed
as
H0 : γa′ = γa (30)
in the case of a Wald test and H0 : γa′ >= γa or H0 : γa′ <= γa in the case of one-
sided tests. Equation (30) can be reformulated as γa′ − γa = 0 (and γa′ − γa >= 0,
γa′−γa <= 0 in the case of one-sided tests) which is equivalent to looking at the changes
in behaviour between the two groups between two interviews.
Our theoretical model predicts a change in the relative trends between the un-
insured and insured if the uninsured anticipate the granting of Medicare in the future,
but it does not predict at which age it happens. The age at which anticipatory be-
haviour appears depends on the individual’s discount rate and the time it takes for
the reduction in healthy activities to affect health. These are only known to the indi-
viduals. However, we can identify the presence of anticipatory behaviour between two
interviews if we observe a change in the relative trends at least once before the age of
65. In the case of a healthy lifestyle, the assumption of anticipatory behaviour cannot
be rejected if the uninsured start investing less at age a′ < 65 compared to the age a in
the previous wave, relative to the insured between the same age i.e. if γa′ < γa. If the
relative change in trends appears after 65, we cannot reject the classical assumption of
EAMH.
2.5.3.2 Possible indirect effect
Dave and Kaestner (2006; 2009) assume that the effect of insurance on lifestyle may
be larger if we take into account the possible indirect effect that insurance has by
facilitating the contact to a medical doctor (as it reduces the cost of a doctor visit).
Therefore, we extend equation (31) to account for very flexible indirect effects
Lia = α + βXi +
67/68∑
t=61/62
ηtAit +
67/68∑
t=59/60
γtAitUi + βDrDria + βDrA65DriaAfter65i
+βDrB65UDriaBefore65iUi + βDrA65UDriaAfter65iUi + εia (31)
for i = 1, ..., N and a = 59/60, ..., 67/68
where the effect of doctor visits is allowed to be different before and at or after 65 for
the insured (βDr and βDrA65) as well as for the uninsured (βDrB65U and βDrA65U). It
allows us to identify separately the possible (indirect) effects of doctor visits on lifestyle.
Using equation (28) and equation (31), we illustrate the direct and indirect effects
in Figure 3. In the above relationship corresponding to our first model, γ measures the
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direct and indirect effect together, whereas in the second case the possible (positive)
effect of a visit to the doctor on the lifestyle is excluded to leave γ measuring only the
direct effect of insurance on lifestyle. The indirect effect is measured by β (in equation
(31) we have allowed for more flexible indirect effects). Doctor visits for the insured may
be beneficial if they receive some advice on their lifestyle during a routine visit, whereas
uninsured may visit the doctor when uninsured because of acute health problems and
thus the indirect effect of doctor visits maybe negative in this case.
Figure 3: Medicare - Its possible direct and indirect effects
Medicare lifestyle
Medicare lifestyle
visit to the doctor
γ(1)
γ(2)
ϐ(2)
2.5.3.3 Implementation
We apply first the classical DID methods using a linear fixed effect model for comparison
with previous results in the literature. However the assumption of linearity might be
viewed as inappropriate given the distribution of the various dependant variables used
here. Therefore, we then turn to probit and negative binomial42 methods in order to
account for the distribution of the dependent variables.
Although the analysis of the coefficients as described above is straightforward
when using linear methods, coefficients from non-linear regressions models just have
a qualitative interpretation.43 Therefore in the results below we present the average
marginal effects and test (in)equalities in the changes in the effect over the years.
2.5.4 Double-robust estimator
When we have large samples relative to the number of the covariates, one can be
confident using nonparametric or semi-parametric such as the propensity score due to
asymptotic efficiency (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008). With smaller sample, it maybe
42For the count variables, we started with a Poisson model but tests of equidispertion suggested that
the presence of overdispertion could not be rejected.
43There has been in the literature a debate on the interpretation of the interaction coefficients (e.g.
Ai and Norton, 2003), but Puhani (2008) shows that it is still relevant to focus on the interaction
term that estimates the treatment effect (it also only has a qualitative interpretation and therefore the
average marginal effects are always reported).
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better to estimate the conditional means using parametric approaches if they are cor-
rectly specified. But parametric models generally rely on strong assumptions that are
not testable in which case a propensity score approach has a smaller bias (Drake, 1993).
Rubin (1973) suggests combining propensity score and covariate adjustment
methods to obtain robust and efficient estimators. Based on the work of Robins and
Rotnitzky (1995) and Robins et al. (1995), Scharfstein et al. (1999) develop an estim-
ator combining propensity score matching and covariates to adjust for missing outcome
variables. Lunceford and Davidian (2004) adapt it to the case of non-random treatment
allocation (if the non-random treatment allocation is based on observables). This ap-
proach has been referred to in the literature as double-robust as “it remains consistent
when either a model for the treatment assignment mechanism (the PS) or a model for
the distribution of the counterfactual data is correctly specified” (Bang and Robins,
2005, p.962). In both cases, the unbiasedness of the estimator relies on the ignorability
of treatment assignment assumption.
The form of the double-robust estimator is similar to the inverse probability es-
timator but augmented for an expression involving the predicted values of the regression
model that permits to increase efficiency (Lunceford and Davidian, 2004). As we are
interested in the impact of insurance at different ages, we estimate the double-robust
estimator of the average treatment effect using the Emsley et al. (2008) implementation
but adapt it to measure separately the effect at different ages a:
DRD(a) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
UiLi,a − (Ui − pˆi)̂l1,a(Xia)
pˆi
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
(1− Ui)Li,a + (Ui − pˆi)̂l0,a(Xia)
1− pˆi (32)
where ̂lU,a(Xia) = E(Lia|Ui = U,Age = a,Xia) is the lifestyle at age a predicted for
individual i using regression models estimated separately for the insured (Ui = 0)
and the uninsured (Ui = 1) and applied to i’s characteristics Xia˜. The regression
model E(Lia|Ui = U,Xia) is estimated separately for the two groups allowing Xia to
have different effects on the insured and uninsured lifestyles. The predicted lifestyles
̂lU,a(Xia) at the different ages a for the uninsured (insured) from the model estimated
on the insured (uninsured) provide counterfactuals. We allow for doctor visits (Dria)
to have a different effect on the lifestyles of the uninsured, distinguishing between the
effect of doctor visits made by the uninsured before being insured and after being
insured (Dave and Kaestner, 2009). The regression model E(Lia|Ui = 1, Xia) estimated
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using the uninsured sample is
Lia = α +
67/68∑
t=61/62
γtAit + βDBDria ∗Before65 + βDADria ∗ After65
+ βXia + εia (33)
and the regression model E(Lia|Ui = 0, Xia) estimated using the insured sample is
Lia = α +
67/68∑
t=61/62
ηtAit + βDDRia + βXia + εia (34)
where the ηt capture the age trend of the insured and the γt the age trend of the
uninsured. βD captures the effect of doctor visits on the lifestyle of the insured, βDB
and βDA of the uninsured before and after they are insured respectively. Xia is the set
of observable covariates affecting lifestyles. Models (33) and (34) allow us to predict
the counterfactuals ̂l1,a(Xia) for the insured and ̂l0,a(Xia) for the uninsured.
The sampling variance can be estimated as
V (DRD(a)) =
1
N2
N∑
i=1
[
UiLi,a − (Ui − pˆi)l1,a(Xi)
pˆi
− (1− Ui)Li,a − (Ui − pˆi)l0,a(Xi)
1− pˆi −DRD(a)]
2 (35)
Similarly to the DID approach, the common support of the covariates maybe an
issue. The more confounding factors with lack of overlap between the two groups, the
more untrustworthy are the model-based extrapolations (Rubin, 1977). The estimated
effect will be determined by one group or the other depending on its predominance on
different regions of the control variables (Lunceford and Davidian, 2004). Therefore,
we also estimate the model restricting the controls to the ones having a PS in the range
of PS of the uninsured individuals.
2.5.5 Double and triple differences in the double-robust estim-
ator
The possible bias due to unobserved confounding factors can be reduced by controlling
for the unobserved time-invariant factors. This is achieved by taking the difference
between two estimates. Therefore, we present the difference-in-differences estimates
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defined as
DRDID(a, a′) = DRD(a′)−DRD(a) (36)
for a = 59/60, ..., 65/66 and a′ = 61/62, ..., 67/68 and we estimate their standard errors
using bootstrapping. The DRDID(a, a′) estimate will be zero if the two groups pursue
different levels of lifestyle but follow the same trend. It will be positive if the uninsured
have a flatter increasing or a steeper decreasing trend.
Our theoretical model predicts that uninsured individuals progressively reduce
their investment in lifestyle, relative to the insured, from the age at which current
lifestyle affects health at age 65. To test for a change in trends, we measure difference-
in-differences-in-differences in lifestyle using the DRDID(a) estimates:
DRDIDID(a, a′, a′′, a′′′) = DRDID(a′′, a′′′)−DRDID(a, a′) (37)
where the differences are measured at the ages a < a′ < a′′ < a′′′. For example the
DRDIDID(5960, 6162, 6364, 6566) measures the difference between the relative change
between the insured and uninsured between ages 63/64 and 65/66 with respect to the
relative change between the two groups between ages 59/60 and 61/62. We bootstrap
the standard errors. The DIDID(a, a′, a′′, a′′′) estimate is robust to linear time-variant
unobserved characteristics, but will be biased by other unobserved time-variant factors if
the change in those factors is not due to (anticipatory) EAMH (Blundell and Costa Dias,
2008).
2.6 Data
2.6.1 The Health and Retirement Study
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a representative longitudinal survey of
Americans over age 50, and their spouse, living in a household. It began in 1992
and has been repeated every two years, adding cohorts to maintain a representative
sample. In 1993 and 1995, separate similar interviews were administrated to nationally
representative individuals over 70 years. This AHEAD cohort (the Asset and Health
Dynamics Among the Oldest Old study) was integrated with the HRS cohort in 1998
(wave 4 of the original HRS).44 In 1998, two new samples were added to the survey:
the Children of the Depression Age (CODA) cohort, who are national representative
44The first and second waves of the AHEAD have been added to the second and third waves of the
HRS sample. But as we only consider individuals aged between 60 and 69 years old, this addition
represents only a few individuals being the young spouses of the original sample. We control for time
effect in the analysis using the interview year dummies.
51
individuals born between 1924 and 1930, and the War Baby (WB) cohort with indi-
viduals born between 1942 and 1947. The purpose of the former was to fill the gap
between the individuals of the HRS born between 1931 and 1942 and the individuals
from the AHEAD cohort born before 1921. The latter have been added in order to
keep a representative sample of the American population aged 50 or more. In all cases
the same questionnaire has been applied to the spouses of those sampled irrespectively
of their age.
The RAND Center for the Study of Ageing has created the RAND HRS data
files, which is a user-friendly version of a subset of the HRS containing most of the
variables that have been consistently and repeatedly asked over all the waves. In this
chapter, we use the RAND data with some additional variables from the HRS.
2.6.2 Selected sample and variables
We use the first nine waves of the HRS. We briefly describe here the key data for the
analysis. The insurance variables are detailed in Appendix A.
2.6.2.1 Sample
To concentrate on the impact of Medicare on behaviour pre and post 65, we consider
only individuals aged between 59 and 68, and who report being covered by Medicare
after 65.45 We also drop at all the waves those who report being disabled in at least
one wave. Disability information is from the working status question and often retire-
ment status takes the precedence over disability status. Typically, this would create a
bias if an individual is not in the labour force before 65 years due to disabilities but
is then considered as retired after 65 years, although her disability status would not
have changed (she may even have taken an early retirement due to her handicap).46
Moreover, it is very likely that some disabilities may have appeared already some times
before someone reports a disability status, which would bias our results.
45They are two main reasons why an individual would not report being covered by Medicare after
the age of 65. First, because she (or her spouse) has not paid Medicare taxes for at least 10 years
(typically if she has not been permanent residents of the United States). Second, we cannot exclude
that some individuals may not be aware that they are covered. In both cases, we excluded them from
our analysis as they would not anticipate Medicare before the age of 65.
46A respondent can give evidence of working, being retired, and disability alone or in combination
with other statuses. If a respondent reports both working part-time and mention retirement, then his
working status is set to partly retired. If an individual reports a disability status and retirement, then
only retirement is reported. Therefore, if the individual reports being disabled in any wave, we drop
her at all the waves to avoid reporting bias such as considering him retired, although she may have
quit her job due to important disabilities.
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2.6.2.2 Dependent variables
We use three lifestyle measures: physical activity, alcohol and cigarette consumption.
The HRS has many variables describing these habits, but we only selected the ones
likely to vary for those above 60 years old.47
The physical activity variable indicates whether the individual reports having
some vigorous physical activities defined as sports, heavy housework, or a job that
involves physical labour, at least three or more times a week. This question was asked
until wave 6 (i.e. 2002).
To study the impact of insurance on drinking behaviour, we construct an indic-
ator of daily alcohol consumption and also use a count variable equal to the average
daily number of alcoholic drinks per week. The latter variable is only measured from
the third wave (i.e. 1996).48
Finally, two variables are used to analyse smoking behaviour:49 the average
number of cigarettes smoked per day and a dummy variable indicating whether the
individual has quit smoking if she has ever tried in her life.
2.6.2.3 Insurance variables
We know whether the individual is currently covered by Medicare, Medicaid, a military
insurance such as CHAMPUS, VA, or TRI-CARE, or any other governmental insurance.
Private insurances are measured by indicators of insurance provided by her own or her
spouse’s employer, or if she reports having other health insurance than government,
employer-provided, or long-term care insurance. These variables are used to define the
individual’s insurance group. Long-term care and life insurances are also recorded at
all the waves, and we use them as proxy for risk aversion.
2.6.2.4 Definitions of the uninsured group
The uninsured group refers to a sub-sample of individuals defined by their insurance
status before 65. Thus the classification of a respondent does not change with the
age and remains the same after 65 years old, when all the individuals are covered by
Medicare.
47For example, we do not model the decision to start smoking, but do examine the probability to
quit smoking.
48If the individual answered positively to the question “Do you ever drink any alcoholic beverages,
such as beer, wine, or liquor?” in waves 3 to 9, the individual was then asked for the number of days
per week she had any alcohol, and for the number drinks the days she drinks, in the last three month,
on average. We multiplied the number of days and drinks.
49The questions about smoking only consider cigarettes and unfortunately no other type of smoking
(pipes or cigars).
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The definitions of the uninsured and insured groups are based on insurance cov-
erage at the ages 61/62 and 63/64 (i.e. for the two interviews preceding the one at age
65/66 when all respondents are insured by Medicare). If the individual reports being
uninsured at 61/62 or 63/64, she is defined as uninsured.50 Those individuals who are
insured at 61/62 and 63/64 are defined as insured. We use the insured individuals as
our reference/control group, assuming that Medicare is a continuation of their previous
health insurance.51 The uninsured are our treatment group as they experience an ex-
pected change in health insurance at the age of 65. To test the sensitivity of the results
due to the choice of insurance coverage considered, we use three alternative definitions
of coverage in a year.52
All the estimators are calculated separately for the three definitions. These three
definitions of insurance status come from three different insurance indicators at the ages
61/62 and 63/64.
• The first definition (All Types) considers all types of health insurance, i.e. it is
equal to 1 if the respondent reports any type of insurance either private or public
including Medicaid, military insurance or Medicare. For example if an individual
reports having only an employer provided insurance at the age 62 (the insurance
indicator for this definition is equal to 1 at age 61/62) and no insurance at the
age 64 (indicator equal to 0 at age 63/64), she is considered as uninsured as she
has not reported any types of insurance at the two interviews preceding Medicare.
Had she reported being insured by for example Medicaid at 64, she would have
been considered as insured based on this definition.
50The decision to consider as uninsured individuals who do not report a coverage for these two
interviews is motivated by the conclusion of Schoen and DesRoches (2000): Americans not continuously
insured generally face the same risk of forgoing needed medical care or of having problems paying their
medical bills as the ones continuously uninsured. We have also used more stringent definitions where
the individuals must be uninsured at both waves to be considered as uninsured, but the results are
similar.
51This is a strong assumption as insurance coverages vary between private insurances and also
between the different Medicare plans. The HRS do not contain enough information to control for the
generosity of private insurance, but we control for the number of insurance plans in the regressions.
52Dave and Kaestner (2009), based on an indicator that includes all types of insurance coverage,
propose two definitions: (def1 ) are considered as uninsured the individuals who always have their
insurance indicator equal to zero before 65 years old. This means that any individual who reports a
health insurance coverage any time before 65 years old is considered as insured. def2 is less stringent for
individuals temporary insured: individuals who are observed fifty percent of the time or more uninsured
before 65 are considered uninsured, and all the others are considered insured. The main caveat of these
definitions is that it does not impose a minimum number of waves for which the individual must be
observed before her 65. If the individual is only observed one wave before 65, being uninsured at this
time classifies her in the uninsured group. But had she been observed insured the penultimate wave
before 65 years old, she would then be classified in the uninsured group following def1. Moreover, this
definition can only be used to estimate the simple DID model, as when we estimate the PS we need
some variables that can be defined as pre-treatment variables.
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• The second definition (Private Only) captures privately insured individuals only:
it is equal to 1 if the individual reports being insured by an employer provided
insurance or any other insurance other than provided by the government.
• The last definition (Private & Public) is very similar to “Private Only” but also
includes military insurance. Apart from the veteran insurance, the government
only provide need-specific53 insurance coverages before the age of 65. Someone
may be covered by Medicaid at the age of 40 because ill and very poor, but may
no longer be eligible at the age of 60 because richer. Private insurances are less
need-specific and the individual may have it for many years, either because she
has a stable work paying for it or because she pays for it without the intention
to stop. Similarly, military insurance is provided when the military personnel
become veterans and is kept until 65 years old. Therefore, this latter definition
considers insurances coverages that are less volatile and more independent of the
health status compared to the other ones provided by the government. It is a
good compromise between the two other definitions and we present the results in
more details for this definition.
Section A.2 in Appendix A has further information on these various definitions.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 are for the baseline age 59/60. Tables 3
and 4 describe the overall sample and also report the total number of observations in
column 5.
In terms of lifestyle, 40.1% of the sample has some vigorous physical activity
at least 3 times a week or more. 61.1% of the sample has ever smoked cigarettes by
age 59/60 but 66.4% of previous smokers have quit by this age, and for the others,
they smoke on average 3.3 cigarettes per day. The whole sample has quite moderate
alcohol consumption drinking only 1.1 days per week but some individuals drink up to
24 drinks per day. On average, the sample consumes about 2.5 drinks per week.
Physical health is captured by self-assessed health (SAH) and a mobility index.
SAH ranges from poor (score of 1) to excellent (score of 5), and the average at the
reference age is of 3.5 (between good and very good). The mobility index ranges from
0 to 5 and sums up ‘some difficulty’ reported by the individual in all the following
53Temporary and only for very specific reasons.
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activities: walking one block, walking several blocks, walking across a room, climbing
one flight of stairs and climbing several flights of stairs activities. On average, each
person reports 0.67 disabilities. Finally, 90.1% of the sample has visited the doctor in
the last two years.
The baseline age 59/60 is characterised by a majority of women (56.4%) and
83.6% of white individuals. The schooling variables indicate the highest grade achieved;
about 79.8% of the sample went to high school, but only 20.3% finished college. Most
of the individuals are married (75.5%). Only 49.3% of the sample is working full-time
and 21.5% is already retired. 17.6% is working part-time and 7.5% is partly retired.54
The rest is either unemployed (1.6%) or not in the labour force. On average, individuals
have worked for about 27.5 years. The spread in the household assets is ranging from
-4,480,701 to 21,199,369 expressed in 1992 dollars, with the average at 290,897 that is,
about 1% of the maximum household income. The average household total income is
52,958$ a year.
The government insures about 11.2% of our sample based on any type of insur-
ance provided by the government. The largest governmental insurance at age 59/60
is for the veterans and their family (CHAMPUS/VA: 5.4%), followed by Medicare
(4.1%). Private insurance represents 13.7% individually purchased and 74% by an em-
ployer. Life insurance has been purchased by 76.5% of the sample whereas long-term
care (LTC) insurance covers about 7.8% of the sample when aged 59/60.
The treated groups represent 15.0%, 20.8% and 24.1% of the whole sample at
age 59/60 based on the “All Types”, “Private & Public” and “Private Only” definitions,
respectively. The fewer insurance types we consider to define the insured indicator, the
larger the uninsured group.
Tables 5 and 6 describe the sample by uninsured groups at the reference age
59/60. t-tests for the equality of the means between the two groups are also repor-
ted for each uninsured definition. The characteristics of the two groups are generally
significantly different from one another, with differences depending on the uninsured
definition chosen. The uninsured are more likely to be in bad health while less likely
to have seen a doctor in the last two years. They are more likely to be a woman, non
white, with a lower education level and not married. Uninsured individuals are less
likely to be working full-time, although this is not the case in the for the “All Types”
definition. This may be because working-full time is important to obtain a private in-
surance (relevant in the case of the “Private & Public” and “Private Only” definitions),
but is likely not to be the case if one is insured by Medicaid. Finally, the uninsured are
less likely to be retired but more likely to be unemployed or self-employed. They have
54These categories are not mutually exclusive.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics - Lifestyle and control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All waves
mean min max count count
Lifestyle variables
vigorous physical activity >2/week (waves 1-6) 0.407 0 1 5,292 21,058
has ever smoked cigarettes 0.611 0 1 5,884 28,415
smokes now 0.204 0 1 5,884 28,415
quit smoking 0.664 0 1 3,571 17,296
# cigarettes smoked per day 3.295 0 100 4,005 24,401
has ever drunk alcohol 0.555 0 1 5,912 28,555
drinks daily (waves 4-9) 0.065 0 1 3,998 24,373
# days/week with alcohol (waves 4-9) 1.125 0 7 3,998 24,373
# drinks/day when drinks (waves 4-9) 0.757 0 16 3,996 24,351
# drinks/week (waves 4-9) 2.532 0 84 3,993 24,337
Covariates
SAH 3.481 1 5 5,912 28,555
mobility index 0.673 0 5 5,912 28,555
visited the doctor (in the last 2 years) 0.901 0 1 5,890 28,464
male 0.436 0 1 5,912 28,555
age (year) 59.510 59 60 5,912 28,555
white 0.836 0 1 5,912 28,555
black 0.134 0 1 5,912 28,555
hispanic 0.069 0 1 5,912 28,555
other race 0.029 0 1 5,912 28,555
did less than high school 0.200 0 1 5,912 28,555
went to high school 0.385 0 1 5,912 28,555
went to college 0.212 0 1 5,912 28,555
finished college and above 0.203 0 1 5,912 28,555
married 0.755 0 1 5,912 28,555
partnered 0.024 0 1 5,912 28,555
divorced/separated 0.119 0 1 5,912 28,555
widowed 0.074 0 1 5,912 28,555
works full-time 0.493 0 1 5,912 28,555
works part-time 0.176 0 1 5,912 28,555
partly retired 0.075 0 1 5,912 28,555
retired 0.215 0 1 5,912 28,555
unemployed 0.016 0 1 5,912 28,555
self-employed 0.130 0 1 5,912 28,555
# years worked (log) 3.313 0 3.85 5,912 28,555
job requires some physical activity 0.243 0 1 5,835 28,236
household total assets (in 1992$) 290,897 -4,480,701 21,199,396 5,912 28,555
household total income (in 1992$) 52,958 0 1,491,873 5,912 28,555
census: West 0.167 0 1 5,912 28,555
census: Mid West 0.260 0 1 5,912 28,555
census: North East 0.16 0 1 5912 28555
Notes: Descriptive statistics are presented for the reference age 59/60. SAH is for self-assessed health.
The total number of observations is reported for age 59/60 as well as for the whole sample.
57
Table 4: Descriptive statistics - Insurance variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All waves
mean min max count count
Insurance coverage
by government 0.112 0 1 5,906 28,525
by CHAMPUS/VA 0.054 0 1 5,904 28,532
by Medicare 0.041 0 1 5,907 28,533
by Medicaid 0.022 0 1 5,906 28,512
by employer 0.740 0 1 5,912 28,555
by other health insurance 0.137 0 1 5,906 28,484
number of insurance plans 0.802 0 4 5,275 26,737
life insurance 0.765 0 1 5,912 28,555
LTC insurance 0.078 0 1 5,912 28,555
Uninsured definitions
“All Types” 0.150 0 1 5,912 28,555
“Private & Public” 0.208 0 1 5,912 28,555
“Private Only” 0.241 0 1 5,912 28,555
Notes: Descriptive statistics are presented for the reference age 59/60. LTC is for long-term care. The
total number of observations is reported for age 59/60 as well as for the whole sample.
significantly less assets and also a lower income.
In terms of lifestyle, the uninsured are less likely to have some vigorous physical
activity at least three times a week, although the difference is not significant for the
“All Types” definition. The probability to have ever smoked is not significantly different
at the 10% level, but uninsured are more likely to still be smoking and to smoke more
when they smoke. However, the uninsured are less likely to have ever drunk alcohol
and drink less on average.
Differences in terms of the specific insurance plans vary accordingly to the vari-
ous definitions. Note that, following our different uninsured definitions, it is valid to
have for example individuals reporting a governmental health insurance but still be-
ing considered as uninsured based on “All Types” definition. This happens if they are
covered by for example by Medicaid but only in one wave preceding 65 years old and
not two, or because they are covered by Medicaid at the reference age 59/60 but are
not when aged between 61 and 64. Insured individuals are significantly more likely to
have a LTC insurance or a life insurance.
We next explain how we have implemented the different approaches described in
Section 2.5, and present the results.
2.7.2 Estimation of the propensity score and matching approaches
In this section, we present the estimation of the propensity score and the results of the
different matching methods.
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2.7.2.1 Estimated propensity score
The choice of the appropriate control variables X0 to estimate the PS is a trade-off
since with more variables the CS assumption (equation (20)) is less likely to hold but
the CIA (equation (17)) is more likely to be valid (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008).
Using more variables than the confounding factors or variables only weakly correlated
with the treatment and/or the lifestyle may decrease the precision of the PS as it
reduces the efficiency of the control on the relevant covariates (Rubin, 1977, Imbens,
2004). However, Rubin and Thomas (1996) argue that the bias created by leaving out a
weak predictor is larger than the efficiency loss. The variables should be pre-treatment
characteristics (i.e. before the insurance status is defined) in order not to have been
influenced by the insurance coverage, and simultaneously influence the lifestyle and the
insurance status. These variables are also referred to as confounding factors (Moreno-
Serra, 2007) as they affect at the same time the outcome and the treatment status.
For example, marital status is a confounding factor as it is correlated with the various
lifestyle measures of interest and the insurance status. We estimate the PS using a logit
model such that
Pr[Ui = 1|Xi0] = pˆ(Xi0) = e
X′β
1− eX′β (38)
and control for variables X0 available at the age 59 or 60 (t = 0) for all the individuals.
The validity of the estimated propensity score relies on the fact that the confounding
factors should not have been influenced by the insurance status. Therefore, this spe-
cification implicitly assumes that the set of control variables Xi at age 59/60 have not
been influenced by the treatment status which is defined upon variables at the ages
61-64. However, it does not mean that the insurance anticipation effect may not have
appeared before 61 years old.
The balancing property of the true PS (Xi0⊥Ui|p(Xi0)) implies that the distri-
bution of the covariates are the same across both groups; that is, if the mean of the
untreated outcome L0i is independent of the participation status conditional on X0, it
is also independent of the participation status conditional on the estimated PS (Blun-
dell and Costa Dias, 2008). This is only guaranteed for the true PS, but this property
should be tested for the estimated PS. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest dividing
the samples into different subclasses on the basis of the PS and to compare their two
first moments. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) also suggested adding higher-order and
interactions terms of the covariates until the mean of covariates do not differ within
strata. To check the balancedness of our estimated PS before matching, we group
observations into strata defined on the estimated PS and check if the mean of the co-
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variates within strata are different across the two groups (Becker and Ichino, 2002).55
We try different combination to maximise balancedness of the covariates for the three
definitions.
As we define the uninsured group in three different ways, we have to estimate
three different PS. However, in order to have balanced means in each strata for each
covariate, each PS estimation requires a slightly different combination of the covariates.
We decided to keep the same set of covariates and combination for each estimated PS,
selected on what covariates could possibly be a confounding factor. If some covariates
appear not to be always balanced in each strata and for each definition, we include
them in the Mahalanobis metrics described below (i.e. additionally to match on the
PS, we also match on these variables).
The regressions that estimate the PS are presented in Table 7 for the “Private
& Public” definition, and for the “All Types” and “Private Only” in Appendix C in
Tables 64 and 65, respectively. Column 1 reports the estimated coefficients of the logit
estimation of the PS. Balancedness is presented for the nearest neighbour matching
with replacement. Columns 2 and 3 report the means of the different covariates for
the uninsured and insured respectively, for the unmatched and the matched sample.
Column 4 reports the percentage bias reduction in the standardised bias before and
after matching, and the last column presents the t-tests for the equality of means in
the uninsured and insured groups, both before and after matching. After matching, all
the coefficients are balanced at least at the 10% significance level.
The distribution of the PS is summarised in Table 8. The range of the distribu-
tion of the PS of the uninsured is generally bigger than the one of the insured indicating
that in this case, there is no gain of restricting the sample to the common support. His-
tograms of the estimated PS for the different uninsured definitions are presented in
Figure 6 in the Appendix C.1. Graphs on the left represent the distribution of the PS
for the insured (Ui = 0), and the ones on the right are the uninsured PS distributions.
The first two graphs are based on the uninsured definition “All Types”, which takes into
account all sorts of insurance to define the insured group. The next pair is based on the
“Private & Public” definition and the last ones on the “Public Only” definition. From
the top to the bottom, being insured is based on more restrictive conditions which is
reflected by the increasing uninsured group. The distribution of the PS for the insured
55More precisely, we use the algorithm proposed by Becker and Ichino (2002): on the basis of the
estimated PS, the sample is split into 5 sub-groups and we test if the mean of the PS differs between
the two groups. If there is a significant difference in one interval, it is split again until the mean of
the PS is not significantly different between the two groups. Then, within each strata, the means of
the covariates for the two groups are compared. If for any of the variable in any strata the means are
significantly different at the 1% the level, we add interaction terms and higher-order covariates.
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Table 7: Propensity score regression estimates and balancedness tests of the covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Balancedness tests
Means
Estimates Uninsured Insured P>|t|
SAH -0.194*** Unmatched 3.001 3.608 0.000
(0.041) Matched 3.001 2.986 97.6 0.744
Mobility index 0.142*** Unmatched 1.056 0.572 0.000
(0.034) Matched 1.056 1.068 97.6 0.838
Male 0.252** Unmatched 0.402 0.446 0.006
(0.087) Matched 0.402 0.396 87.0 0.773
White -0.397 Unmatched 0.714 0.869 0.000
(0.214) Matched 0.714 0.701 91.6 0.479
Black 0.214 Unmatched 0.236 0.108 0.000
(0.233) Matched 0.236 0.244 93.6 0.637
Hispanic 0.829*** Unmatched 0.172 0.042 0.000
(0.137) Matched 0.172 0.167 95.6 0.707
Census West -0.280* Unmatched 0.172 0.165 0.602
(0.113) Matched 0.172 0.173 73.9 0.915
Census mid-West -0.473*** Unmatched 0.180 0.281 0.000
(0.099) Matched 0.180 0.166 85.4 0.338
Census North-East -0.448*** Unmatched 0.138 0.165 0.024
(0.109) Matched 0.138 0.154 41.6 0.278
Married -1.049*** Unmatched 0.587 0.800 0.000
(0.191) Matched 0.587 0.586 99.6 0.967
Partnered 0.035 Unmatched 0.043 0.019 0.000
(0.271) Matched 0.043 0.047 83.0 0.627
Divorced -0.098 Unmatched 0.198 0.098 0.000
(0.202) Matched 0.198 0.192 93.5 0.684
Widowed -0.137 Unmatched 0.125 0.060 0.000
(0.217) Matched 0.125 0.138 79.9 0.340
Went to high school -0.642*** Unmatched 0.354 0.394 0.012
(0.092) Matched 0.354 0.346 79.2 0.673
Went to college -1.004*** Unmatched 0.146 0.229 0.000
(0.117) Matched 0.146 0.137 89.3 0.524
Finished college or more -1.471*** Unmatched 0.073 0.237 0.000
(0.144) Matched 0.073 0.086 92.1 0.234
Works full-time -0.644*** Unmatched 0.385 0.521 0.000
(0.160) Matched 0.385 0.384 98.8 0.934
Works part-time -0.292 Unmatched 0.189 0.173 0.179
(0.170) Matched 0.189 0.159 -88.1 0.043
Retired -0.133 Unmatched 0.248 0.207 0.002
(0.152) Matched 0.248 0.237 72.5 0.510
Unemployed 0.688* Unmatched 0.037 0.011 0.000
(0.295) Matched 0.037 0.055 33.1 0.035
Self-employed 0.996*** Unmatched 0.156 0.123 0.002
(0.126) Matched 0.156 0.143 61.2 0.366
# years worked (log) -0.122* Unmatched 3.107 3.367 0.000
(0.053) Matched 3.107 3.015 64.5 0.035
HH total assets -1.280** Unmatched 0.126 0.334 0.000
(0.428) Matched 0.126 0.145 91.2 0.223
HH total assets (squared) 0.064** Unmatched 0.184 0.594 0.114
(0.020) Matched 0.184 0.130 86.9 0.478
Has long-term care -0.824*** Unmatched 0.028 0.091 0.000
insurance (0.197) Matched 0.028 0.037 85.8 0.214
Has life insurance -0.749*** Unmatched 0.587 0.812 0.000
(0.083) Matched 0.587 0.593 97.5 0.774
Constant 2.380***
(0.348)
N 5,912
% bias reduc.
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private & Public’. SAH is self-assessed health. HH (Household)
total assets are expressed in million. The propensity score is estimated using logit on individuals 59 or
60 years old and the coefficient estimates are reported in column 1. Matched sample is based on nearest
neighbour matching with replacement. Column 2 and 3 report the means of the different covariates
for the uninsured and insured respectively, for the unmatched and the matched sample. Column 4
reports the percentage bias reduction in the standardised bias before and after matching, and the last
column presents the t-tests for the equality of means in the uninsured and insured groups, both before
and after matching. Stars convention: * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 8: Distribution of the PS for the different uninsured definitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Uninsured definitions Count Mean SD Min Max
All Types Insured 4,622 0.133 0.118 0.020 0.855
Uninsured 876 0.307 0.203 0.021 0.877
Private & Public Insured 4,387 0.165 0.147 0.020 0.897
Uninsured 1,219 0.412 0.247 0.020 0.971
Private Only Insured 4,310 0.194 0.149 0.020 0.912
Uninsured 1,417 0.416 0.235 0.020 0.968
Notes: Distribution of the PS for the different uninsured definitions at the refernce age 59/60.
is always skewed on the right, and as a result, there will be very few individuals in
the insured group that will be comparable to the uninsured group for high PS. This
suggests that matching without replacement would create important bias for this part
of the distribution.
2.7.2.2 Different matching approaches
The ATT defined in equation (24) can be estimated (Moreno-Serra, 2007) by
ˆATT PSMA = γˆ
PSM
A =
∑
i{Unin∩CS}
L1i − ∑
j{N(pi(Xi0))∩CS}
WijL
0
j
 1
M
(39)
where N(pi(Xi0)) defines the set of (control) neighbours of i based on i’s PS, Wij is
a weight placed on the compared outcome of insured individual j with W [0, 1] and∑
j{N(pi(X))∩CS}Wij = 1, and M represents the number of uninsured individual falling
within the region of the CS. N(pi(Xi0)) and Wij depend on the type of matching.
Different algorithms have been developed using different numbers of comparison
units as well as different weights based on closeness (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).
Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching is the most intuitive approach where each treated
individual is matched to her closest control. Although easy to implement and to un-
derstand, this approach may impose bad matches if the closest individual is far away.
Caliper matching avoids this problem by imposing a maximum distance to match two
individuals, but it is difficult to know a priory what this optimal distance is (Smith and
Todd, 2005). Radius matching (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) is a variant of the caliper
matching: it allows uninsured individuals to be matched to more than one insured in-
dividuals as long as the distance between the two is smaller or equal to the pre-defined
radius. The more comparison units for one treated individual, the more precise the es-
timate, but the worse the bias (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Kernel matching is similar
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to Radius matching but uses weighted average of the controls’ outcomes depending on
their distance to construct the counter part of treated’s outcome. This method reduces
the variance as it takes into account more information, but may also increase the bias
as it may use more information. Finally, stratification matching (Dehejia and Wahba,
1999) can be used to estimate the ATT: based on strata defined on the basis of the
PS where all the covariates are balanced, the ATT is the weighted sum of the within
stratum differences in means between the insured and uninsured individuals. The main
advantage of this approach is that it does not require a precise estimate of the PS as
the process of validating the PS within each strata is “all that is needed for an unbiased
estimate of the treatment impact” (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, p.1058).56
These matching methods can be applied with or without replacement. With
replacement allows individual to be matched to their most similar counterpart, and
thus reduces the bias. But at the same time, it increases the variance of the estimator
as it reduces the number of distinct controls (Smith and Todd, 2005). Matching without
replacement has the opposite properties but additionally is sensitive to the order of the
data. As we have very limited overlap for some part of the distribution of the covariates,
we always apply matching with replacement to avoid bad matches.
If we had the true PS, matching on the PS would guarantee that all the covariates
were balanced. In practice it may be the case that after matching the distributions of the
covariates may no longer be balanced between the two matched groups, although they
were before matching. This is the case when not all the controls are matched to a treated
observation, which may happen even if the controls were not on the CS. Therefore, we
use Mahalanobis metrics to match the individuals not only on the basis of their PS but
also to guarantee that some variables are correctly balanced between the two groups. As
exact matches are rarely the case, Mahalanobis method uses closeness of the different
variables but also takes into account the covariance between the matched variables
(Moreno-Serra, 2007). This method permits an equal per cent bias reduction, where
the bias is defined at the mean between the treated and the control for the different
covariates. The Mahalanobis distance between a treated i and a control individual j is
defined as
M(X1i , X
0
j ) =
√
(X1i −X0j )′Σ−1(X1i −X0j ) (40)
where X represents the set of covariates (including the PS) to be matched and Σ their
variance-covariance matrix. As a result, better measured covariates will be given a
higher weight in the computation of the Mahalanobis distance (Moreno-Serra, 2007).
We always use the Mahalanobis metrics additionally to the PS to improve the match in
56A much more detailed review of these approaches has been written by Moreno-Serra (2007) among
others.
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the case of NN and Kernel matching to guarantee the balancedness of less well balanced
covariates.
The estimation of the variance of the estimator involves the unknown true PS,
and thus only the asymptotic variance can be estimated. The most commonly used
approach is bootstrapping, although there is no evidence that it will lead to correct
standard errors and confidence intervals. Moreover, it is inappropriate when we estim-
ate the ATT for the sample (Imbens, 2004). In the results presented below, we use
the analytical variance which assumes that the observations are independent, that the
weights are fixed and that the outcomes are homoscedastik within the treated and the
untreated groups.57
In order to choose the appropriate matching methods, we use similar criteria to
Moreno-Serra (2009): t-tests of the balancedness of the covariates, lowest use of each
control observations to improve efficiency, lowest standardised bias58 after matching
and lowest pseudo R2 from the logit estimation of the PS on all the covariates after
matching. Based on those criteria, we prefer the NN approach with Mahalanobis,
and Kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.08 with Mahalanobis metrics. The NN is
intuitive and only uses the most similar match (based on the Mahalanobis metrics), but
the Kernel and stratification approach also allow larger comparison groups to provide
a better estimate of the effect and a larger reduction bias. The bias reduction for the
NN matching and for the Kernel method is illustrated in Table 9 for vigorous physical
activity and the probability to drink daily.59 In addition, we also use stratification as
it does not require the true PS.
For our three preferred matching methods, we calculate p-values assuming that
the errors are asymptotically normally distributed (Moreno-Serra, 2009). PSM estim-
ators are simple differences at specific ages between the two groups, and not the change
in lifestyle between two ages between the two groups.
It is important to understand how the differences in the number of observations
vary for the different approaches. First, the number of observations reported when using
NN and Kernel matching are based on the whole sample with no missing observations
57When using stratification, it is however possible that there is only one control and/or treated
observation in one strata at a specific age. In this case, the variance cannot be computed in this block
nor the overall standard error of the estimator at this age. If this occurs, we replace the analytical
standard errors by the one estimated using bootstrapping and indicate it with a star next to the
coefficient name in the results tables.
58The standardised bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full
or matched) sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in
the treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).
59The additional variables to the PS used in the Mahalanobis metrics are the ones that were not bal-
anced based on the PS only at the 5% significance level between the insured and uninsured individuals.
Balancedness of the covariates is presented in details in the next Section.
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Table 9: Pseudo R2 - probit regression, “Private & Public” definition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vigorous physical activity Drink daily
Matching
NN NN
Complete Sample R2 (P>chi2)  0.050 (0.000) 0.050 (0.000) 0.050 (0.000) 0.046 (0.000) 0.215 (0.000) 0.046 (0.000)
Mean Bias 55.839 55.839 55.839 53.34 53.34 53.34
Matched Sample R2 (P>Chi2)  0.000 (0.231) 0.000 (0.985) 0.000 (0.898) 0.000 (0.982) 0.000 (1.000) 0.000 (0.510)
Mean Bias 5.457 0.087 0.583 0.116 0.000 3.425
NN 
Mahalanobis
Kernel 
Mahalanobis
BW(0.06)
NN 
Mahalanobis
Kernel 
Mahalanobis
BW(0.06)
Notes: Pseudo R2 are reported for the probit regressions to estimate the probability of being uninsured
based on definition Private & Public. The value are reported for matching based at the age 59/60.
Mahalanobis metrics matches, in addition of the PS, on White, works full-time, works part-time,
retired, unemployed, and total assets.
necessary to compute the specific ATT, whereas stratification additionally restricts the
sample to the CS.60 NN uses all the treated observations and match each to its nearest
neighbour. As the distributions of the PS for the two groups are not the same (the two
groups are quite different as discussed in the summary statistics), this approach only
uses a very small number of controls, and these controls are used extensively. The Kernel
approach uses the same controls but also all the ones that have a distance included in
the bandwidth of 0.08. Therefore uninsured individuals that are too different from any
control are not accounted for in this method, but better matches are given a higher
weight. These estimates are therefore a local ATT. Finally, stratification uses all the
observations included in the CS region, and only once.
2.7.2.3 Propensity score matching results
PS estimates are presented and balancedness tests of the covariates are presented in
Table 7 for the “Private & Public” definition, and in the Appendix C in Tables 64 and
65 for the “All Types” and “Private Only” definitions, respectively. For all the uninsured
definitions, the better the individual’s health, the less likely they are to be uninsured.
Males are more likely to be uninsured as well as the Hispanic. Married and highly
educated individuals are less likely to be uninsured. Individuals working full-time are
more likely to be insured whereas self-employed are more likely to be uninsured. The
probability to be uninsured is also negatively correlated with the household assets,
and LTC and life insurances. The t-tests of the equality of the means show that,
before matching, most of the covariates are unbalanced between the two groups, but
after performing a NN matching, all the covariates are balanced at least at the 10%
significance level.
60The CS is defined is defined at the range between the minimum and maximum PS of the uninsured
individuals.
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Results of the PSM for the binary and count variables are presented in Tables 10
and 11 respectively for the “Private & Public” uninsured definition. In the Appendix
C, results for the “All Types” definition are presented in Tables 66 and 67, and for the
“Private Only” definition in Tables 68 and 69.
Before describing the results in details, it is worth discussing the differences in
the number of observations. Columns 4 and 5 report the number of observations used
in the insured and uninsured groups, respectively, whereas columns 6 and 7 report the
total number of observations available in the same groups. The number of available
observations in the NN and Kernel matching methods is same, but is smaller for the
stratification matching as it is restricted to the common support although the difference
is very small. Kernel matching uses almost all the uninsured observations available
unless there is no match in the bandwidth imposed of 0.08. NN matching uses a very
small sub-group of the insured individuals which worsen the precision of the estimates.
Kernel and stratification matching use almost the same number of insured individuals,
but the former accounts for the distance to the treated observations and gives less
importance to further away observations.
The difference between the two groups in the probability to have some vigorous
physical activity at least three times a week is generally positive at the age 59/60 for
all uninsured definitions and all matching approaches suggesting that the uninsured
tend to have a healthier lifestyle at this age, but the the difference is insignificant. At
the age 61/62, the difference between the two group is still not significantly different
from zero. At the age 63/64, the difference between the two groups is negative and
different from zero for all matching methods in the case of “All Types” definition and
using Kernel and stratification matching for the “Private & Public” definition. At this
age, the uninsured are about 5 percentage points less likely to have some vigorous
physical activity, suggesting that either the uninsured suddenly exercise less, or the
insured exercise more just before being covered by Medicare supporting the hypothesis
of EAMH with anticipatory behaviour. The results are insignificant in the case of
the “Private Only” definition implying that the individuals covered by a governmental
insurance have a similar lifestyle than the privately insured. After this age, and thus
once insured by Medicare, the difference between the two groups is no longer significant
ruling out the hypothesis of pure EAMH.
The graphs in Figure 7 in the Appendix represents the various differences for each
outcome and all the uninsured definitions and matching methods. The plain and dashed
lines, based on the “Private & Public” and “All Types” definitions respectively, illustrate
that the difference between the two groups is the largest at age 63/64 supporting the
existence of anticipatory behaviour, whereas the dotted line based on the “Private Only”
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definition suggests rather the existence of pure EAMH, although only the results based
on stratification are significant.
The probability to quit smoking is always smaller for the uninsured group. Based
on the “Private & Public” and “All Types” definitions, the differences increase over the
years from about 9 percentage points at age 59/60 up to 15 percentage points at the
age 67/68. The differences are more stable in the case of the “Private Only” definition.
These consistent negative differences suggest the presence of positive selection, that
is the insured individuals have a more healthy lifestyle in general compared to the
uninsured. However, in order to assess the presence of anticipatory EAMH or classical
EAMH we have to test for a change in the relative trends which we do in the next
section. The uninsured also smoke more cigarettes than the insured, from one extra on
average at age 59/60 and the difference goes up to two at age 67/68. These increasing
differences are identifies for all the uninsured definitions and PSMmethods as illustrated
in the graphs in Figure 7.
The probability to drink daily is generally positive but not significantly different
between the two groups, however the number of alcohol drinks per week tends to be
significantly larger for the uninsured just before receiving Medicare at the age 65 and
up to age 66, suggesting the presence of EAMH possibly with anticipatory behaviour.
The last graph in Table 7 shows that the uninsured differ from the insured from age
61/62 or 63/64 with the difference between the two groups remaining relatively stable
after these ages. Again, we test for a change in trend in the next section.
2.7.2.4 DID and matching
The DID estimator removes any observed or unobserved systematic time-invariant dif-
ferences between the individuals, and combined with PSM, it ensures that insurance
status and lifestyles dependences are removed if these confounding factors are observ-
able. Positive or adverse selection, if constant over time, are therefore removed by
taking the DID. The ATT estimator of the DID using the MDID in Formula 27 can be
approximated by
ˆATTMDIDA =
∑
i{Unin∩CS}
(L1ia′ − L1ia)− ∑
j{N(pi(X))∩CS}
Wij
(
L0ja′ − L0ja
) 1M (41)
and can be estimated using the same matching methods described in Section 2.7.2.2.
Therefore, similarly to the PSM estimator, we estimate the MDID estimator using NN
and Kernel with Mahalanobis metrics, and stratification limited to the CS. However,
whereas PSM estimators estimate differences in lifestyle at different ages, we measure
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Table 10: Propensity score matching - “Private & Public” definition (binary variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
Vigorous physical activity
age 59/60 0.014 0.030 0.647 1,078 673 1,078 3,952
age 61/62 -0.019 0.033 0.566 954 592 954 3,463
age 63/64 -0.041 0.037 0.264 755 469 755 2,838
age 65/66 -0.069 0.043 0.107 495 321 495 1,901
age 67/68 -0.063 0.053 0.234 320 205 320 1,216
Kernel 
age 59/60 0.013 0.023 0.575 1,078 3,952 1,078 3,952
age 61/62 -0.039 0.025 0.120 954 3,463 954 3,463
age 63/64 -0.051 0.028 0.067 755 2,838 755 2,838
age 65/66 -0.046 0.033 0.164 495 1,901 495 1,901
age 67/68 -0.005 0.044 0.917 320 1,216 320 1,216
Stratification
age 59/60 0.015 0.021 0.462 1,078 3,948 1,078 3,948
age 61/62 -0.040 0.024 0.101 954 3,459 954 3,459
age 63/64 -0.059 0.028 0.035 755 2,834 755 2,834
age 65/66 -0.052 0.032 0.109 495 1,887 495 1,887
age 67/68 -0.012 0.038 0.754 320 1,156 320 1,156
Quit smoking
age 59/60 -0.079 0.038 0.035 758 466 758 2,649
age 61/62 -0.083 0.037 0.025 774 471 774 2,687
age 63/64 -0.063 0.036 0.081 779 469 779 2,689
age 65/66 -0.059 0.039 0.132 612 361 612 2,190
age 67/68 -0.141 0.043 0.001 495 295 495 1,805
Kernel 
age 59/60 -0.106 0.028 0.000 757 2,649 758 2,649
age 61/62 -0.109 0.027 0.000 772 2,687 774 2,687
age 63/64 -0.099 0.027 0.000 778 2,689 779 2,689
age 65/66 -0.092 0.028 0.001 612 2,190 612 2,190
age 67/68 -0.112 0.032 0.001 495 1,805 495 1,805
Stratification
age 59/60 -0.091 0.032 0.004 758 2,645 758 2,645
age 61/62 -0.102 0.031 0.001 774 2,683 774 2,683
age 63/64 -0.083 0.031 0.007 779 2,685 779 2,685
age 65/66 -0.085 0.029 0.003 612 2,167 612 2,167
age 67/68 -0.111 0.037 0.003 495 1,783 495 1,783
Drink daily
age 59/60 -0.023 0.019 0.231 828 511 828 2,934
age 61/62 0.000 0.016 1.000 1,064 637 1,064 3,703
age 63/64 0.004 0.014 0.779 1,246 760 1,246 4,464
age 65/66 0.009 0.015 0.524 956 588 956 3,593
age 67/68 0.004 0.016 0.817 795 490 795 3,008
Kernel 
age 59/60 -0.002 0.014 0.887 827 2,934 828 2,934
age 61/62 0.013 0.013 0.344 1,062 3,703 1,064 3,703
age 63/64 0.011 0.011 0.353 1,246 4,464 1,246 4,464
age 65/66 0.011 0.013 0.379 956 3,593 956 3,593
age 67/68 0.007 0.014 0.638 795 3,008 795 3,008
Stratification
age 59/60 0.000 0.009 0.993 828 2,930 828 2,930
age 61/62 0.014 0.010 0.135 1,064 3,698 1,064 3,698
age 63/64 0.013 0.009 0.113 1,246 4,459 1,246 4,459
age 65/66 0.013 0.010 0.165 956 3,588 956 3,588
age 67/68 0.008 0.010 0.400 795 3,004 795 3,004
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private & Public’. The nearest neighbour and Kernel matching
use Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity
score. Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.08. Stratification
estimates are based on the common support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent
observations asymptotically normally distributed.
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Table 11: Propensity score matching - “Private & Public” definition (count variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
# cigarettes smoked per day
age 59/60 0.092 0.745 0.902 830 512 830 2,940
age 61/62 0.513 0.612 0.402 1,066 638 1,066 3,711
age 63/64 0.248 0.537 0.644 1,246 759 1,246 4,467
age 65/66 0.694 0.534 0.194 957 589 957 3,596
age 67/68 1.682 0.534 0.002 796 491 796 3,005
Kernel 
age 59/60 0.231 0.526 0.661 829 2,940 830 2,940
age 61/62 0.894 0.462 0.053 1,064 3,711 1,066 3,711
age 63/64 1.049 0.374 0.005 1,246 4,467 1,246 4,467
age 65/66 1.240 0.391 0.002 957 3,596 957 3,596
age 67/68 1.712 0.422 0.000 796 3,005 796 3,005
Stratification
age 59/60 0.525 0.595 0.378 830 2,936 830 2,936
age 61/62 1.016 0.544 0.062 1,066 3,706 1,066 3,706
age 63/64 1.031 0.389 0.008 1,246 4,462 1,246 4,462
age 65/66 1.206 0.381 0.002 957 3,591 957 3,591
age 67/68 1.718 0.417 0.000 796 3,001 796 3,001
# alcoholic drinks per week
age 59/60 -0.279 0.584 0.633 825 509 825 2,932
age 61/62 0.477 0.430 0.267 1,061 634 1,061 3,697
age 63/64 0.283 0.388 0.465 1,240 759 1,240 4,457
age 65/66 0.396 0.416 0.341 956 588 956 3,590
age 67/68 0.338 0.440 0.442 793 489 793 3,003
Kernel 
age 59/60 -0.017 0.372 0.963 824 2,932 825 2,932
age 61/62 0.376 0.354 0.287 1,059 3,697 1,061 3,697
age 63/64 0.506 0.294 0.085 1,240 4,457 1,240 4,457
age 65/66 0.333 0.305 0.275 956 3,590 956 3,590
age 67/68 0.289 0.317 0.363 793 3,003 793 3,003
Stratification
age 59/60 0.079 0.327 0.809 825 2,928 825 2,928
age 61/62 0.475 0.345 0.168 1,061 3,692 1,061 3,692
age 63/64 0.571 0.255 0.025 1,240 4,452 1,240 4,452
age 65/66 0.398 0.265 0.132 956 3,586 956 3,586
age 67/68 0.448 0.247 0.070 793 2,999 793 2,999
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private & Public’. The nearest neighbour and Kernel matching
use Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity
score. Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.08. Stratification
estimates are based on the common support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent
observations asymptotically normally distributed.
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here the differences between the changes in lifestyle of the uninsured and insured groups
between two ages. The changes over different ages are measured first with respect to the
age 59/60 to obtain comparable estimates to the ones presented below in the regression
DID approach, and second we look at the change in behaviour between two consecutive
interviews (63/64-61/62, 65/66-63/64, 67/68-65/66). This latter approach allows us to
decompose the change for each couple of years rather than relative to the 59/60 years
old benchmark. If we were able to measure perfectly the differences, the sum of the
consecutive two-year effects until age x would be the same as the effect at age x relative
to age 59/60.
For the the “Private & Public” definition, results for the binary and count vari-
ables are presented in Tables 12 and 13 respectively. Tables 70 and 71 in Appendix C
are for “All Types” definition and Tables 72 and 73 in the same Appendix correspond to
the “Private Only” definition. The number of observations available and used are based
on the same logic as in the case of simple PSM. However, the number of observations
is generally lower because the dependant variables cannot be missing for the two age
ranges of interest. This is particularly an issue for the variables that are not observed
at all waves. For example, in the case of alcohol consumption where our variables are
only observed at waves 3-9, the number of observations may be low when looking at the
differences with respect to age 59/60 if the individual was 59 or 60 years old in the first
wave (the PS can be estimated but not the DID estimates). Similarly, for the physical
activity variables, all the DID estimates can only be computed for the individuals that
were between 59 and 60 years old in the first wave as this variable is only observed in
the first 6 waves.
All the estimates are much less significant than in the PS matching approach.
This is due to the small number of observations and therefore high standard errors.
In the case of physical activity, the uninsured individuals appear to reduce more their
probability to exercise than the insured group relative to the age 59/60. The reduc-
tion, ranging from 7 to 9 percentage points based on “Private & Public” definition, is
significant between 63 to 66 years old relative to 59/60 except in the case of Kernel
matching and supports the assumption of anticipatory EAMH. The lack of significance
in the case of Kernel matching is possibly due to the small number of uninsured used
in the matching. After 65, there is no change in trends ruling out the presence of pure
EAMH. Similar results are obtained with the two other uninsured definitions.
The estimates of the change in the probability to quit smoking have generally
very high p-values and, even based on the sign of the coefficients only, it is difficult to
distinguish any pattern. The few significant changes in trends observed, for example
between 61/62 and 63/64 in the case of Kernel matching and “Private Only” definition
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Table 12: MDID estimators - uninsured definition “Private & Public” (binary variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
Vigorous physical activity
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.029 0.035 0.412 936 598 936 3,387
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.072 0.042 0.083 719 466 719 2,703
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.093 0.050 0.060 471 305 471 1,805
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.063 0.064 0.326 286 191 286 1,132
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.066 0.040 0.097 731 471 731 2,746
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.037 0.047 0.427 486 317 486 1,874
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.092 0.061 0.131 273 184 273 1,103
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.027 0.032 0.397 646 2,346 936 3,387
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.060 0.040 0.134 474 1,641 719 2,703
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.021 0.053 0.693 234 858 471 1,805
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.010 0.067 0.882 121 435 286 1,132
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.057 0.038 0.133 480 1,670 731 2,746
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.078 0.049 0.110 248 899 486 1,874
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.067 0.070 0.339 115 420 273 1,103
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.054 0.026 0.042 936 3,384 936 3,384
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.070 0.035 0.048 719 2,700 719 2,700
age 65/66 – 59/60* -0.074 0.038 0.051 471 1,792 471 1,792
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.030 0.047 0.517 286 1,081 286 1,081
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.026 0.033 0.436 731 2,742 731 2,742
age 65/66 – 63/66 0.036 0.039 0.346 486 1,860 486 1,860
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.023 0.048 0.629 273 1,056 273 1,056
Quit smoking
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.003 0.021 0.901 751 470 751 2,622
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.012 0.024 0.610 737 463 737 2,570
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.002 0.029 0.953 579 354 579 2,091
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.025 0.037 0.500 446 276 446 1,677
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.016 0.022 0.462 753 472 753 2,609
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.007 0.022 0.758 592 364 592 2,131
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.018 0.024 0.460 443 270 443 1,659
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.009 0.019 0.627 443 1,511 751 2,622
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.008 0.021 0.700 433 1,460 737 2,570
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.000 0.028 0.992 311 1,120 579 2,091
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.039 0.032 0.229 215 791 446 1,677
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.004 0.019 0.845 446 1,506 753 2,609
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.018 0.021 0.392 320 1,150 592 2,131
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.058 0.020 0.004 211 779 443 1,659
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.013 0.023 0.592 751 2,618 751 2,618
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.010 0.017 0.569 737 2,566 737 2,566
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.010 0.029 0.721 579 2,069 579 2,069
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.006 0.034 0.866 446 1,657 446 1,657
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.018 0.024 0.454 753 2,605 753 2,605
age 65/66 – 63/66 -0.022 0.026 0.402 592 2,109 592 2,109
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.007 0.017 0.692 443 1,639 443 1,639
Drink daily
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.008 0.013 0.508 827 521 827 2,932
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.015 0.014 0.298 821 517 821 2,909
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.008 0.014 0.568 610 382 610 2,254
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.007 0.016 0.679 442 282 442 1,676
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.006 0.014 0.679 1,045 651 1,045 3,645
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.001 0.012 0.931 942 596 942 3,538
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.001 0.014 0.919 706 457 706 2,753
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.019 0.013 0.152 543 1,971 827 2,932
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.014 0.014 0.330 539 1,953 821 2,909
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.020 0.016 0.205 376 1,451 610 2,254
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.024 0.019 0.227 249 1,006 442 1,676
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.002 0.012 0.859 720 2,589 1,045 3,645
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.007 0.011 0.515 643 2,469 942 3,538
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.010 0.015 0.493 460 1,838 706 2,753
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.006 0.009 0.509 827 2,928 827 2,928
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.015 0.010 0.124 821 2,905 821 2,905
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.007 0.010 0.509 610 2,250 610 2,250
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.010 0.011 0.379 442 1,673 442 1,673
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.001 0.009 0.934 1,045 3,640 1,045 3,640
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.003 0.008 0.690 942 3,533 942 3,533
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.004 0.009 0.648 706 2,749 706 2,749
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private & Public’. The nearest neighbour and Kernel matching
use Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity
score. Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.08. Stratification
estimates are based on the common support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent
observations asymptotically normally distributed.
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Table 13: MDID estimators - uninsured definition “Private & Public” (count variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
# cigarettes smokes per day
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.196 0.444 0.658 830 521 830 2,940
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.226 0.512 0.659 823 516 823 2,914
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.082 0.516 0.874 612 383 612 2,258
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.027 0.608 0.965 444 282 444 1,673
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.296 0.367 0.420 1,047 652 1,047 3,652
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.394 0.348 0.256 943 596 943 3,546
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.295 0.327 0.368 709 457 709 2,751
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.380 0.423 0.370 543 1,978 830 2,940
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.333 0.452 0.462 539 1,956 823 2,914
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.119 0.530 0.823 377 1,452 612 2,258
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.357 0.685 0.603 248 1,006 444 1,673
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.840 0.317 0.008 722 2,596 1,047 3,652
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.384 0.307 0.212 642 2,470 943 3,546
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.052 0.304 0.865 461 1,836 709 2,751
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.513 0.315 0.104 830 2,936 830 2,936
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.091 0.367 0.804 823 2,910 823 2,910
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.072 0.451 0.873 612 2,254 612 2,254
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.060 0.492 0.903 444 1,670 444 1,670
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.224 0.285 0.432 1,047 3,647 1,047 3,647
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.277 0.321 0.389 943 3,541 943 3,541
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.207 0.287 0.471 709 2,747 709 2,747
# alcoholic drinks per week
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.092 0.318 0.771 822 521 822 2,925
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.123 0.296 0.678 814 514 814 2,901
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.072 0.358 0.840 607 381 607 2,252
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.450 0.400 0.260 440 281 440 1,673
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.109 0.304 0.721 1,038 647 1,038 3,634
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.574 0.283 0.042 940 595 940 3,532
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.146 0.329 0.657 706 457 706 2,746
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.348 0.317 0.273 539 1,961 822 2,925
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.148 0.297 0.618 533 1,939 814 2,901
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.014 0.403 0.972 373 1,445 607 2,252
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.440 0.522 0.399 247 1,000 440 1,673
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.127 0.301 0.673 713 2,574 1,038 3,634
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.532 0.283 0.060 640 2,465 940 3,532
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.125 0.328 0.703 459 1,832 706 2,746
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.021 0.282 0.940 822 2,921 822 2,921
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.114 0.306 0.709 814 2,897 814 2,897
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.376 0.287 0.190 607 2,248 607 2,248
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.219 0.344 0.525 440 1,670 440 1,670
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.016 0.266 0.952 1,038 3,629 1,038 3,629
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.384 0.228 0.092 940 3,528 940 3,528
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.114 0.257 0.656 706 2,743 706 2,743
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private & Public’. The nearest neighbour and Kernel matching
use Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity
score. Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.08. Stratification
estimates are based on the common support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent
observations asymptotically normally distributed.
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hardly support the presence of anticipatory behaviour because of the small number of
observations used to calculate this estimate (537 of the uninsured from the 884 available,
and 1,518 insured from the 2,539 available). Therefore the absolute differences observed
in the previous section are likely due to positive selection. The change in the number of
cigarettes smoked per day is often significant in the case of Kernel matching between the
reference age 59/60 and Medicare, but rely again on a very limited sample. Although
the estimates suggest that the uninsured increase their cigarette consumption relative to
the insured by the age 63/64 (MDID<0) and relatively decrease it from 65 (MDID>0),
the small number of observations on which these estimates rely provide little support
for the existence of anticipatory behaviour.
Finally, we find little evidence of a change in the relative trends of the probability
to drink daily. The few significant results again come from Kernel matching and rely on
a small number of observations. However, when we analyse the relative changes in the
number of alcoholic drinks per week, uninsured individuals significantly decrease their
consumption when receiving Medicare relative to age 63/64 compared to the insured.
As these estimates capture the direct effect of insurance as well as the possible indirect
effect proposed by Dave and Kaestner (2009), it provides support to the existence of a
beneficial effect of insurance on the previously uninsured. In order to disentangle the
direct and indirect effects, we now turn to the classical DID approach using regression
methods.
2.7.3 Linear and non-linear regression methods
In this section, we present the results of the linear and non-linear regression methods.
We first estimate equations (28) and (31) using linear FE models for comparis-
ons with previous results in the literature. Given the distributions of the dependant
variables, we then focus on non-linear models with flexible doctor indirect effects. For
binary dependant variables, we use pooled probit and fixed effect logit, and for count
variables we use negative binomial and fixed effect negative binomial. We use robust
and clustered standard errors. For the count variables, we started with Poisson estim-
ation but after testing for over-dispersion, we reject the assumption of equi-dispersion
and believe that negative binomial regressions are more appropriate given the shape of
the data.61 For the non-linear models, we report the average marginal effect. Although
the fixed effect logit and negative binomial are preferable in the sense that they account
61The null hypothesis of equi-dispersion is V ar(y|x) = E(y|x) against the hypothesis of over-
dispersion of the form V ar(y|x) = E(y|x) + α2E(y|x). Therefore, we test H0 : α = 0 against
H1 : α > 0 (Cameron and Triverdi (2005), p.561). The test indicating the presence of consider-
able over-dispersion for all the count variables and any uninsured definition, we assumed a variance of
the form V (y|µα) = µ(1 + αµ) (Negative Binomial 2).
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for fixed unobserved heterogeneity and better model the dependant variable, they drop
individuals for who we have just one observation of the dependant variable or no change
in the dependant variable.
The results for the “Private & Public” definition are presented in more detail
than for the two other definitions. Table 14 presents the regressions for the binary
outcome variables and Table 74 in Appendix C contains the full set of coefficients for
these regressions.
Before analysing in detail the coefficients of interest, it is informative to have a
look at the various controls used in the regressions presented in Table 74 in Appendix
C.4. The full set of coefficients is reported only for the most flexible models, i.e.
columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 74 correspond to columns 2,3 and 4 respectively in Table
14. As expected, a good physical health is significantly positively correlated with the
probability to have some vigorous physical activity at least three times a week. Men are
more likely to exercise, whereas Hispanic are less likely. The marital status as well as
the education does not play a significant role. Individuals working full-time or part-time
are less likely to exercise, whereas the self-employed are more likely to keep a healthy
lifestyle. Having a job that requires some physical activity significantly increases the
probability of reporting exercising three times a week or more but probably because
the respondent includes this type of activity when answering the question about her
lifestyle.62 Richer individuals are also more likely to have a regular physical activity,
and LTC insurance is positively correlated with the probability to exercise. One could
argue that individuals who care about their health in the future also invest today in
healthy lifestyle.
The probability to quit smoking is negatively correlated with good health whereas
cigarette consumption is positive correlated with good health once we take into account
the fixed effects. Individuals living in partnership are less likely to have a healthy
lifestyle in terms of cigarette consumption. Working individuals, self-employed and
richer individuals are more likely to quit smoking or to smoke less. Similarly to exercise,
individuals with LTC insurance also smoke less.
Alcohol consumption is also positively associated with good health, and males
are significantly more likely to drink alcohol frequently. Assets are strongly associated
with high alcohol consumption. Finally, individuals with high alcohol consumption are
more likely to have a life insurance but less likely to have a LTC insurance.
We now turn to the analysis of the effect of insurance on lifestyle and look in
detail at Table 14. The first regression does not allow doctor visits to have a different
62As example of vigorous physical activity in the questionnaire, physical labour on the job and sports
were mentioned.
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effect on the uninsured once being insured by Medicare, whereas the other ones allow for
different doctor effects on the insured and uninsured before and after 65. The insured
individuals generally do not show any age trend, only in the case of simple fixed effects;
after 65 the insured become more likely to exercise compared to age 59/60. With the
receipt of Medicare, it is possible that they visit a different doctor who encourages a
more healthy lifestyle. This result appear in the case of the “Private & Public” and
“Private Only” definitions.
The uninsured become significantly less likely to exercise compared to the in-
sured from 63/64 years old. When we allow for doctor visits, the difference remains
significantly large until age 67/68 and is the largest just after receiving Medicare at age
65/66 (between 4 to 22 percentage points in the case of “Private & Public” definition).
Those results suggest that, once we take into account the possible indirect effect of
doctor visit, we find an anticipatory EAMH effect and a larger classical EAMH effect
from 65. The effects based on the FE logit are smaller but lead to the same conclusion.
The first regression provides an overall doctor effect of 3 percentage points on
the probability to exercise three or more times a week. However, when we allow the
effect to vary by insured and uninsured before and after 65, individuals who are insured
and see a doctor before 65 are between 1 to 7 percentage points more likely to exercise,
but visiting a doctor after 65 is negatively associated with the probability to exercise.
The effect ranges from -1 to 7 percentage points. For the uninsured, the effect is the
other way around. Seeing a doctor before 65 is associated with a reduction of 1 to 10
percentage points with the probability to exercise, but after 65, doctors have either no
effect or a positive effect on the probability to exercise based on the FE logit. These
effects are in line with Dave and Kaestner’s assumption of an indirect effect of insurance.
In order to better characterise the relative change in the trends of the uninsured
and to understand when the relative change appears (the DID estimates are all relative
to age 59/60), we now compare the relative changes over two consecutive interviews.
Table 15 presents the p-values of Wald and one-sided tests for the pairwise comparison.
Between 61/62 and 59/60 years old, and between 63/64 and 61/62 years old, the trends
diverge, but we cannot exclude that they diverge at the same rate (Wald tests cannot
reject the null). Between 65/66 and 63/64, the relative changes become significantly
larger suggesting the presence of EAMH possibly with some anticipatory behaviour.
After this age, the relative changes remain constant. Therefore, we conclude that there
is EAMH that appears just before or at 65 years old.
We compare this result to the ones obtained with the two other definitions. The
results are reported in Tables 76 and 78 for the “All Types” and “Private Only” defini-
tions, respectively. The “Private Only” results support the same conclusion: uninsured
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individuals become less likely with age to have some vigorous physical activity and the
change appears from 63/64 years old and becomes the largest between 63/64 and 65/66.
When using the “All Types” definition, we find similar effects but much less significant,
which may be due to the small number of observations in the FE logit.
In conclusion, the analysis of the probability of vigorous physical activity at least
three times a week exhibits a pattern in line with the one predicted by anticipatory
EAMH. Uninsured individuals reduce more their investment in this healthy lifestyle
before the age 65, but then the difference between the two groups remains relatively
stable. There is no significant change in behaviour at, or just after, the age of 65 as
predicted by classical EAMH (if any, it is rather positive in terms of lifestyle). Therefore,
EAMH exists but mainly before the exogenous change in health insurance.
We now look at smoking behaviour in terms of the probability to quit smoking
and the number of cigarettes smoked per day (Tables 14 and 16 in the case of “Private
& Public” definition). The probit regression suggests that the insured individuals are
more likely over the ages to quit smoking (up to 40 percentage points more likely at the
age 67/68 compared to age 59/60), however, the age trend for the insured disappear
when we account for a fixed effect. The effect of Medicare on the uninsured is generally
insignificant and rules out the existence of EAMH. Seeing a doctor in the last 24 months
when insured and younger than 65 is positively correlated with the probability to quit
smoking but there is no significant doctor effect for the uninsured. The analysis of the
number of cigarettes smoked per day leads to very similar results: the insured reduce
their cigarette consumption over the years relative to the uninsured, but the effect
almost disappears once we take into account the fixed effects. When we look at the age
trend of the uninsured in the DID regressions, there is no change relative to the insured,
rejecting the assumption of EAMH. However, the pairwise analysis of consecutive DID
reveals that the number of cigarettes smoked per day significantly increases between
65/66 and 67/68 years old suggesting the presence of classical EAMH. This change does
not appear in the regression because the decrease in cigarette consumption between
59/60 and 65/66 and the increase between 59/60 and 67/68 are not different from
zero, but the change between 65/66 and 67/68 is large enough to be different from
zero. Therefore, it only provides weak evidence of EAMH. The other two uninsured
definitions lead to similar conclusions.
The analysis of drinking behaviour rejects the assumption of EAMH, but suggests
the existence of positive selection. The probability to drink daily is higher for the
uninsured and does not differ between the two groups once we take into account the
fixed effects, which is also supported by the pairwise analysis of the coefficients. The
number of drinks consumed by the uninsured is significantly larger than the insured.
80
Once we take into account the fixed effects, i.e. the possible positive selection, the
uninsured reduce their consumption more than the insured relative to age 59/60. This
result is also supported by the pairwise analysis of the coefficients. The other two
definitions provide similar results.
2.7.4 Double-Robust Approach
In this section, we present the DR, DRDID and DRDIDID results.
The DR estimators combine the PS with regression methods. The PS is the
same as the one used in Section 2.7.2.3. We estimate the regression models in equa-
tions (33) and (34) separately for the uninsured and insured using logit if the dependent
variable is binary and negative binomial if it is a count variable. The set of controls
is the same as the one used to estimate the propensity score but additionally includes
the number of insurance plans reported at each interview to account for the gener-
osity of insurance. The DR estimates of the differences at each age DRD(a) (equa-
tion (32)), the difference-in-differences DRDID(a, a′) (equation (36)) and the triple
differences DRDIDID(a, a′, a′′, a′′′) (equation (37)) are presented in Table 18. The
DR estimates are the differences in lifestyle between the uninsured and the insured,
DRDID(a, a′) estimates assess the differences in the slopes of the two trends, and
DRDIDID(a, a′, a′′, a′′′) estimates identify a change in the relative trends. If EAMH
with or without anticipation is present, we expect to see a change in the relative trends
as illustrated in Figure 1. A positive DRD(a) indicates that the uninsured have a more
healthy lifestyle on average than the insured at age a in the case of healthy lifestyles
such as exercise or the probability to quit smoking, or a less healthy lifestyle in the
case of daily drinking, the number of cigarettes per day or the number of alcoholic
drinks per week. A positive (negative) DRDID(a, a′) implies that the uninsured and
insured trends are diverging (converging) if DRD(a) > 0, or converging (diverging) if
DRD(a) < 0. Finally, the DRDIDID(a, a′, a′′, a′′′) indicates how much the relative
trends change between ages a′′ and a′′′ compared to a and a′. Figure 2 plots the estim-
ated lifestyle differences DRD(a) between the uninsured and insured at different ages,
adjusted for observable confounding factors.
Results using the “Private & Public” definition are presented in Table 18, whereas
results using the “All Types” and “Private Only” definitions are presented in Tables 80
and 81 respectively in Appendix C.5. For each estimate, we report the ATE, the
analytical standard errors, the p-values assuming that the errors are asymptotically
normally distributed, and the number of observations used.
In the case of vigorous physical activity, the ATE is negative from 61/62 un-
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til 65/66. The difference is the largest at 63/64 and reduces afterwards and become
positive by 67/68. Between 59/60 and 63/64, the uninsured trend falls relative to
the insured DRDID(a, a′) < 0. At 63/64, just before receiving Medicare, the unin-
sured are 7 percentage points less likely to exercise than the insured (significant at the
1% level). Controlling for systematic differences, the DRDID(a, a′) estimate between
61/62 and 63/64 also identifies a reduction in the probability to exercise in the unin-
sured group relative to the insured group of 4.2 percentage points. After 63/64, the
DRDID(a, a′) estimates are positive and significant suggesting that the trends con-
verge and the DRD(a) estimates are no longer significant. In summary, the uninsured
become less likely to exercise at 63/64, and after this age the differences between the
two groups diminish again and are not significantly different from one another. If this
is due to anticipatory EAMH, the DRDIDID(a, a′, a′′, a′′′) estimates should identify a
change in relative trends. The differences in trends between 63/64 and 65/66 relative
to 59/60 and 61/62, and also between 63/64 and 65/66 relative to 61/62 and 63/64
are positive and significant, indicating that the trends are diverging before 63/64 and
converging afterwards. The largest DRDIDID(a, a′, a′′, a′′′) estimate is equal to 11.3
percentage points, which represents the change in the uninsured probability to exercise
relative to the insured between 63/64 and 65/66 relative to their relative change between
61/62 and 63/64.63 It is approximately twice the absolute values of the DRDID(a, a′)
estimates (0.070 and 0.042), suggesting that the rate of divergence just before 63/64
is equivalent to the rate of convergence just after 63/64, which is in line with the in-
significant differences we observe before and after 63/64. We therefore conclude that
we observe EAMH with anticipatory behaviour at 63/64. As predicted by our theoret-
ical model, the effect appears to be gradual as it is smaller if we compare the reduced
differences between 63/64 and 65/66 to the earlier increasing differences between the
two groups (10.5 percentage points relative to 59/60 and 61/62). The reduction in the
differences between the two groups after 63/64 is potentially due to a positive impact of
insurance on the lifestyle of the uninsured, perhaps because Medicare increases doctor
visits for the previously uninsured and doctors advise a healthier lifestyle (Dave and
Kaestner, 2009). This conclusion is supported by all the uninsured definitions with the
difference significantly negative at the age 63/64 ranging between 6 to 8 percentage
points.
63In other words, if the relative fall in the trend of the uninsured between 63/64 and 65/66 would have
remained of -4.2 percentage points (DID(61/62,63/64)), the uninsured would have had a probability
to exercise of 12.2 percentage points lower than the one we observe at 65/66. It is much larger than
the D(a) and DID (a,a’) estimates as it measures the decreasing differences between 63/64 and 65/66
(DID (63/64,65,66 = 0.057) compared to the increasing differences we observe between 61/62 and
63/64 (DID (61/62,63/64) = -0.065 and thus DIDID (61/62,63/64,63/64,65/66) = 0.122 = 0.057–
(-0.065) ).
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The DRD(a) estimates measure the overall differences between the two groups
with all the observable covariates held constant. After we control for the selection on the
observables, the uninsured and insured groups significantly differ in their smoking be-
haviour. The DRD(a) estimates suggest positive selection as the uninsured individuals
are generally less likely to quit smoking (between 4.3 to 11.1 percentage points) and to
smoke more cigarettes per day (between 0.3 to 0.9 cigarettes) over the years compared
to the insured, and the difference is increasing over the years. This is confirmed by
the DRDID(a, a′) estimates which are not significant, suggesting that these differences
remain constant over the years, and the DRDIDID(a, a′, a′′, a′′′) are also not signi-
ficantly different from zero suggesting no change in relative trends. The “All Types”
definition support the same conclusion with the positive selection being even stronger.
The DRDID(65/66, 67/68) is negative suggesting the presence of the classical EAMH
in addition to the positive selection. This is further supported by the significant and
negative DRDID(59/60, 61/62, 65/66, 67/68), however the presence of EAMH in the
case of smoking is not supported for the three uninsured definition.
Finally, alcohol consumption measured in terms of daily alcohol consumption
and the average number of alcoholic drinks per week generally does not differ between
both groups rejecting the hypothesis of selection or EAMH.
2.8 Conclusion: Ex Ante Moral Hazard
Most of the previous research on EAMH has found little evidence of the phenomenon.
We postulate here that this may be due to the natural experiments in most of the
literature: in the case of Medicare, the exogenous change in insurance status for the
uninsured at the age of 65 is known and expected. If individuals believe that there
is a lag before getting the benefits of healthy lifestyle and if, in their early 60s, they
anticipate that they will soon be covered, then they may reduce their effort to invest in
healthy lifestyles before receiving health insurance. If this is true, it may explain why
past research has failed to identify EAMH.
In this chapter, we have first discussed the evidence on the impact of insurance
on primary and secondary prevention in order to better understand the possible im-
plications of insurance coverage on certain types of prevention. Although insurance
generally increases the demand for secondary prevention, there is no consensus in the
case of primary prevention, i.e. for classical EAMH. Second, we have proposed a simple
theoretical model that explains how insurance influences behaviour if it is anticipated
and if the benefits of lifestyle are not immediate. Finally, we have applied different
identification methods. First, we have estimated our model using matching methods,
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comparing the lifestyle of insured and uninsured individuals at different age ranges, but
also the changes between these ages.
We also tested our model’s predictions by distinguishing between possible direct
and indirect effects of Medicare. We have estimated the models using the classical linear
DID approach to compare our results to past evidence but then adapted them to the
shape of the data and estimated them using probit and negative binomial models for
binary and count variables respectively. As these methods rely on specific assumptions
that often cannot be tested and as it is not clear which method is the most adequate,
we estimated the effects using double robust methods that are robust if either the
propensity score or the regression framework is correctly specified.
The results based on propensity score matching are similar for the nearest neigh-
bour and Kernel matching with Mahalanobis metrics, and stratification. They suggest
the presence of anticipatory EAMH in the case of physical activity around the age
63/64, and of positive selection in the case of cigarette consumption as the two groups
are significantly different at most of the ages at which they are observed. On the con-
trary, the two groups are generally not significantly different at all the observed ages
in the case of alcohol consumption. Conversely, the matching DID approach did not
yield clear results for any activity, probably due to the small number of observations
matched at different ages.
The results based on DID using linear and non-linear regressions support the
presence of anticipatory EAMH in the case of vigorous physical activity. The regression
coefficients identify some significant differences between the two groups from age 63/64,
and Wald tests and one-sided tests of pairwise comparisons of coefficients suggest that
the two trends diverge significantly around 63/64 but that the differences between the
two groups remain constant after that age which corresponds to the period covered
by Medicare. Accounting for a positive effect of doctor visits generally increased the
EAMH effect in the case of physical activity. In the case of cigarette consumption,
the two groups do not appear to differ over time as the DID estimates are generally
not significantly different from zero. The uninsured seem more likely to drink over the
years, though the pairwise tests of coefficients suggest an increase from the baseline age
59/60 with respect to all the future observations. However, this result is not robust
across all the specifications.
Finally, our last method is our preferred approach as it analyses the relative
simple, double and triple double-robust differences between the two groups to account
for the unobserved linearly time-variant differences. In the case of physical activity,
the three different definitions to characterise the uninsured group lead to very similar
conclusions. The changes over time in the probability to exercise at least 3 times a week
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differs between the two groups as predicted by anticipatory EAMH. The difference be-
comes significantly larger from 63 years old and increases up to 66 and then remains
fairly constant. The DRDIDID estimates also support the existence of a change in
relative trends over this period. The results for smoking behaviour, measured by the
probability to quit smoking, and the number of cigarettes smoked per day, are incon-
clusive on the presence of EAMH. Only in the case of “All Types” insurance definition
we observe a significant change in trends after receiving Medicare relative to the trends
observed between 59/60 and 61/62 for the probability to quit smoking, but this result
is not supported by the other two uninsured definitions. With the “Private & Public”
insurance definition, the smoking habits of the two groups appear to differ over time.
This could be due to anticipatory EAMH before 59, or to positive selection if the unin-
sured are less and less likely to quit smoking and more and more likely to smoke more
than the insured over time without a significant change in relative trends. Without
more years of observations, it is not possible to disentangle both phenomena. Finally,
the results on drinking habits provide some weak evidence of anticipatory EAMH just
before receiving Medicare in terms of the probability to drink daily but this result is
not supported for the three uninsured definitions. The number of drinks per week do
not differ between the two groups at all the observed ages.
In summary, we only find evidence of the presence of anticipatory EAMH in the
case of physical activity and neither in the case of smoking nor drinking. A possible
explanation is that these latter two lifestyles are subject to addiction. The incentives
created by the granting of Medicare may not be strong enough to affect a 60 years
old person who has been smoking or drinking all her life. It is possible that physical
activity is less subject to addiction and that the anticipation of Medicare reduces the
motivation to exercise regularly.
There are three potential weaknesses in our analysis using the granting of Medi-
care at age 65 to test for EAMH. Our identification strategy accounts for observables
and time-invariant characteristics affecting lifestyle and the insurance status. The
DRDIDID estimates additionally account for unobserved linear time-variant estimates
that are different between the two groups, resulting in different trends. For example, the
insured may have a stronger preference for exercise than the uninsured. If this difference
remains constant, it does not bias the DRDID estimates. However, if this preference
decreases with age and more rapidly for one group than the other, the DRDIDID es-
timates remain unbiased as long as the preference decreases only linearly. Therefore,
the only remaining bias in the DRDIDID estimates is due to time-variant unobserved
factors that do not vary linearly with age. Second, there is a great variety of health
insurance package in the US and Medicare coverage after 65 is likely to be different
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from the coverage provided by private and public insurances available before 65 (Card
et al., 2004). However, the similarity of our results estimated using three different defin-
itions of insurance status implicitly comparing different groups with different degrees
of coverage suggests that our results are robust to definitions of insurance. The last
main issue is the retirement decision around 65. Reduced social security benefits are
available from the early retirement age of 62, and full benefits are given for normal
retirement between 65 and 66 depending on the year of birth. Although we control for
the retirement status, we cannot rule out the possibility that our estimates are affected
by the anticipation of social benefits that may be valued differently by the insured and
uninsured. We have shown that even when we allow for anticipatory changes in beha-
viour and adopt estimation methods combining propensity score and regression, there
is at most a small effect of insurance on prevention. From a policy point of view, this
suggests that a potential incentive effect on lifestyles due to exogenous insurance may
be minor.
Care should be exercised in attempting to generalise to different wider popula-
tions. Although in some approaches we have considered the whole sample, descriptive
statistics suggest that those with and without insurance before 65 are quite different.
Matching methods focus on the treated group (uninsured before 65) and try to find
similar controls but disregard individuals that are too different. In the parametric ap-
proaches, the common support does not seem to be a major issue as the distribution
of the covariates is similar between the two groups. Our identification relies on the as-
sumption that, after controlling for gender and race (White, Black, Hispanic), marital
(married, partnered, divorced, widowed) and employment (works full-time, part-time,
retired, unemployed, self-employed) status, number of years worked, education (went to
high-school, college, finished college or more), household assets and its square, health
(SAH and a mobility index), some proxies for risk aversion (long-term care and life
insurance), time-invariant and linear time-variant unobserved differences, any changes
in relative trends are due to the granting of Medicare at 65. The robustness of the
results are improved compared to previous studies, first by the use of propensity score
that adjusts for observable differences 6 years before receiving Medicare. Second, the
results are estimated using a method that combines propensity score and regression
methods and that is robust to the misspecification of either the propensity score or the
regression. Finally, we analyse the differences between the insured and uninsured us-
ing difference-in-differences and triple differences to disentangle positive selection from
EAMH by identifying a change in the relative trends between the two groups.
Our results are in line with past evidence on classical EAMH: the phenomenon
may exist from 65 years in some cases and is larger if we account for the indirect effect of
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Medicare. But the main effect seems to appear before receiving Medicare, possibly due
to anticipatory behaviour. The classical theoretical framework should be reformulated
to account for possible anticipatory behaviour and, possibly as well, for the existence
of positive selection. Moreover, access to care and doctor advice should be taken into
account as they are likely to influence primary prevention (Dave and Kaestner, 2009).
A better understanding of these phenomena is necessary for future empirical research.
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Chapter 3
Parenting Style and Children’s Health
3.1 Introduction
How do parents shape their children’s life? Infants’ outcomes have recently received an
increasing amount of attention not only because of the observed persistence of physical
health, mental health and cognitive ability in adulthood, but also because of their long-
term impacts on other important outcomes such as labour outcomes.64 The economics
literature has focused on the role of socio-economic factors as determinants of children’s
health and abilities, which are well understood (Currie, 2009, Allin and Stabile, 2012,
Machin and Vignoles, 2004, Anger and Heineck, 2010). Children from healthy, wealthy
and educated parents have a distinctive advantage that is observed from childhood
throughout their whole life cycle. The main framework that economists have used to
explain these relationships is the family investment model, proposed by Becker (1981,
1993). It postulates that the socio-economic factors are associated with positive child
outcomes by allowing the families to choose and purchase the goods that benefit their
children. Although this economic theory enables to explain the observed relationships
between socio-economic factors and children’s outcomes, it does not explicitly identify
the pathways supporting these relationships.
The link between socio-economic factors and children’s outcomes is mostly in-
direct (e.g. Propper et al., 2007). It is not the money per se that affects the child, but
the investment decisions of each parent and thus the child’s health inputs that makes
the difference. Genetic health and cognitive ability inheritance certainly are the excep-
tions, but do not alter the relative importance of socio-economic factors (Davey Smith
and Ebrahim, 2003, Anger and Heineck, 2010, Fletcher and Lehrer, 2009, Crawford
et al., 2010). Understanding the pathways from socio-economic factors to the child
outcomes is an important research question and crucial from a public health point
of view (Hoghughi, 1998). If educated parents have healthier children, should policy
makers send parents back to school, or should they try to understand what parenting
practices improve the children’s health and how they are correlated with the different
socio-economic variables? A better understanding of the possible pathways will have
important implications on the choices of interventions and could be more effective in
64For example see Smith (2009), Case et al. (2005), Case and Paxson (2010) in the case of early
physical health and later life outcomes; Case et al. (2005), Contoyannis et al. (2004) on the persistence
of health; Heckman and Carneiro (2003), Ermisch (2008) in the case of cognitive and non-cognitive
outcomes.
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reducing early years inequalities that persist over time.65
The interest in understanding the possible pathways between socio-economic as-
pects and children’s outcomes is only recent, and this literature generally refers to the
role of parents in the development of children’s social capital, that is their skill and
behaviour (e.g. Dooley and Stewart, 2007). The distinction between social capital and
parenting style is not very clear as argued by Pong et al. (2005). Some insight on the
role of family structure in determining children’s health and life chances can be found in
the psychology literature, but most of the studies have focused on children’s behavioural
outcomes and school performances (e.g. Aunola and Nurmi, 2005, Denham et al., 2000,
Spera, 2005, Astone and McLanahan, 1991, Martin et al., 2007). In economics, Cunha
and Heckman (2008) and Cunha et al. (2010) have recently borrowed behavioural con-
cepts from this literature, which has permitted to gain valuable understanding of how
to measure behaviours and to incorporate them in a more comprehensive framework.
In this chapter, we focus on the role of parenting style on the child’s physical
and mental health, and his cognitive achievements. While the psychology literature
has been on this track for a long time, identifying all sorts of significant correlations
between socio-economic factors, parenting style, and children’s outcomes, an economet-
ric approach can make a significant contribution on various aspects. First, evidence
in the psychology literature generally relies on very small samples with hundreds of
participants at most. Second, possible reverse effects from the child to the parent and
parenting style have generally not been accounted for. Third, unobserved heterogen-
eity in the child circumstances likely to be correlated with parenting behaviour and the
child outcomes has not been thoroughly analysed. Finally, they provide estimates of
the association between parenting style and children’s outcomes, although ultimately
it is the causal effect for policy that matters.
We first review the existing literature on parenting style and children’s outcomes,
with an emphasis on the psychological literature. Second, we use the Millennium Cohort
Study to first describe existing associations between parenting style measures, socio-
economic variables and children’s outcomes. Third we present an economic investigation
of the relationship between parenting style and child outcomes, and we describe different
specifications and formulate each method’s benefits and weaknesses.
In our economic investigation, we implement various empirical methods to ana-
lyse how sensitive the results are when we progressively attempt to control for endogen-
eity and reverse causality. We propose a mother’s behavioural model to explain the role
of socio-economic factors and mother’s preferences. It allows us to derive a joint model
65For example, Contoyannis and Jones (2004a) find that accounting for lifestyle reduces the role of
socio-economic factors in the health production function.
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of parenting style and children’s health that accounts for unobservable heterogeneity
in the population. We exploit the longitudinal data to estimate a recursive model of
parenting style and children’s health which is specified as a structural equation and
estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL).
Finally, we perform numerous robustness checks on our econometric models.
First, in order to account for the problem of reporting bias as the child’s main outcomes
and mother’s parenting style are reported by the mother, we repeat our analysis using
measures of physical and mental health that are not reported by the mother. Second,
we analyse the main outcomes and their relationship with parenting style reported
by the siblings. Third, although the main results focus on the role of the mother,
we specifically analyse the role of the mother’s partner in relation to their parenting
involvement. Fourth, we split our sample in boys and girls to understand how the effects
vary by gender. Finally, we interact parenting style with indicators of high education
or high income to analyse what socio-economic aspects matter the most.
Our results suggests that the physical health of the child is moderately affected
by parenting style, and that endogeneity is not an issue when analysing this relationship.
The mental health of the child is worsened by strictness methods. Cognitive ability is
lower when parents are too involved or strict. Unobserved heterogeneity may be an
issue with models of mental health outcomes.
Finally, while parenting style has a significant impact on the child’s outcomes,
the effect of socio-economic factors is not influenced by parenting style, except in the
case of externalising behavioural problems.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Parenting styles in the psychology literature
3.2.1.1 Definitions and measures of parenting styles
Parenting style refers to parents’ child rearing practices, mainly the demands and rules
set by parents as well parent’s response to their children’s needs and their involvement
in the child’s evolution. The role of parenting style in the course of the child’s evolution
has primarily interested psychologists. They have analysed the associations between
parenting style and various outcomes in children. This literature, summarised in Tables
21 and 22, supports the idea that parenting plays a significant role throughout the whole
development of the child and that significant associations are also observed later in life.
Furthermore, recent literature in economics has emphasised the cumulative process of
the child’s development (e.g. Cunha and Heckman, 2006; Todd and Wolpin, 2003),
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emphasising the importance of inputs at early ages but also of the production process.
In a review of the dimensions of parenting, Maccoby and Martin (1983) report
that the first two dimensions identified in the literature were warmth/hostility and
control/autonomy (Schaefer, 1959, Becker, 1964). These concepts have been modified
subsequently as the age range of children analysed has increased. The main evolution
has been the replacement of warmth by responsiveness (Ainsworth et al., 1971). This
aspect is related to warmth, but refers specifically to reinforcement, that is “when
parents respond contingently, they may be seen as providing children with control
over their environment, and thus fostering the development of efficacy as distinct from
helplessness” (Maccoby and Martin, 1983, p. 38-9). This dimension refers to parents’
sensitivity and adaptation to the child’s signals and needs. In the same spirit, Lamborn
et al. (1991), after observing about 4,100 families of 14-18 years-olds, propose instead
to focus on acceptance/involvement.
The control/autonomy dimension has also undergone some refinements with, for
example, Lamborn et al. (1991) referring to it as strictness/supervision. Some other au-
thors have introduced the distinction between behavioural (discipline, monitoring) and
psychological control (emotions and behaviour affected through psychological means,
see for example Barber (1996)), but the two general ideas behind the involvement and
strictness dimensions remain identical.
Over the years, some authors have suggested further refinement of these two cat-
egories. Grusec and Davidov (2010) propose five domains of parent-child interactions
that matter to understand the evolution of the child socialisation process (protection,
reciprocity, control, guided learning, and group participation). This definition emphas-
ises the role of parents’ involvement rather than control. These multiple dimensions
assume that the parent-child relationship is actually much more complex and varies
depending on the age of the child, his mental and physical conditions. However, all
these further refinements are generally covered by the controlling versus responsiveness
dimensions and the rest of the literature review covers the main evidence with this
classification in mind.
Based on involvement/affection and demandingness/strictness, first three, then
four categories of parenting style have been defined. First, based on the observation
of three and four years-olds, Baumrind (1966) proposed three types of parents that
are considered as the foundation of the modern analysis of the role of parenting:66
the permissive, the authoritarian, and the authoritative (Baumrind, 1966, 1968). The
first categories refers to parents that are non-punitive and respond affirmatively to the
child’s impulsive desires and actions. Permissive parents make few demands to the
66See Maccoby (1992) for an historical overview of the parenting concepts over the last century.
94
Table 19: Four types of parenting style
Involvement / Affection
high low
high Authoritative Authoritarian
low Permissive Neglectful
Demandingness / 
Strictness
Notes: The way the literature refers to these dimensions varies. High involvement is also referred
to as warmth, accepting, responsive, or child-centred parenting style, whereas low involvement is
also referred to as hostile, rejective, unresponsive, parent-centred parenting style. The definition of the
demandingness definition also vary in the literature, and highly demanding parents can also be referred
to as restrictive, or controlling, whereas the opposite is referred to as permissive or low controlling.
child and let her auto-regulate her behaviour and activities. Authoritarian parents are
the opposite and have standards of conduct and impose them favouring forceful and
punitive measures. They do not want to enter in a discussion with the child as they
believe she should accept their word for what is right. Authoritative parents are similar
to authoritarian in the sense that they also exert control and hold their position, but
are loving and conscientious in handling their children. They attempt to direct the
child’s behaviour but allow for a discussion on the rational of their requests. Parents
recognise the child’s needs and interests, and try to adopt their own upraising standard
on the child best interest. This last category is sometimes referred to as democratic
parenting.
Extending Baumrind’s typology, Maccoby and Martin (1983) propose to classify
parenting style along two dimensions: the amount of control parents impose on their
child, and the quantity of affection and involvement. The former dimension comprises
consistency in enforcing rules and willingness to influence the child. The latter refers
to the ability to recognise the child’s need and to respond to them. The interactions of
these two dimensions yield four parenting styles, adding the neglectful type of parents
to Baumrind’s classification. These parents are characterised by acceptance toward the
child’s impulses, use little punishment as well as avoid as much as possible imposing
control or restriction. They make few demands for a mature behaviour and allow the
child to regulate her own behaviour and schedule. The four categories are summarised
in Table 19.
These four categories are associated with different types of child behaviour that
are summarised in Table 20. Despite these clear-cut categories, one has to bear in
mind that the evidence varies widely, depending on the setting of the measurements,
the child’s age and the methods of assessment. The table only represents the conclu-
sions found in the majority of studies, as in almost all cases, contradictory evidence
has been found in the literature. We now review in greater details the association
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Table 20: Four types of parenting style and children’s outcomes
Involvement / Affection
high low
high
low
Demandingness / 
Strictness
independent, polite, socially 
responsible, self-confident, high self-
esteem, higher school performances
lack of spontaneity, affection and 
curiosity, shyness and quarreling with 
peers, socially withdrawn, low in adult 
role taking, low intellectual 
performances
impulsive, lack independence and the 
ability to take responsibility
impulsive, aggressive, delinquent, 
noncompliance
Sources: Maccoby and Martin 1983, and other references cited in this review.
between each category of parents defined by the two dimensions of parenting style and
child’s behaviour, cognitive ability, physical and mental health. The main references
are summarised in Tables 21 and 22.
3.2.1.2 Parenting style and child conduct
The majority of evidence on parenting style relates to the child’s conduct and social-
isation development. Studies have considered children from very young ages reflecting
the assumption that “childhood is a particularly malleable period, and it is the period
of life when enduring social skills, personality attributes, and social orientations and
values are laid down” (Maccoby, 1992). Baumrind (1966) argues for the imposition of
authority even against the child’s will during the first years of the childhood (defined
as the Authority Inception Period, that lasts until about 6 years old). She argues that,
during those years, the parents’ authority is perceived as legitimate by the child. She
believes that parents have the ability to provide the child at this age with the resources
she needs at a time at which the child will be the most grateful and parents will be
successful at enforcing their rules. Authoritative parents have then the ability to af-
fect the child’s development. By the early adolescence, she recommends limited use of
authority as the child is now capable of forming his own opinions.
Observations of children made by Baumrind support the claimed benefit of early
parental authority, but only when it is combined with parental involvement. Based
on structured observation of three and four years-old middle-class American children
in nursery school and at home, and based on parents’ interviews, Baumrind (1967)
find the following associations: children with authoritarian67 parents are socialised and
independent. Children with authoritative parents are significantly less happy, more
insecure, and less affiliated with peers, and more likely to be hostile under stress.
Finally, children from permissive parents exhibit lack of self-control and self-reliance.
67The use of “authoritarian, authoritative, and permissive” only appears in Baumrind (1966) and
afterwards, but the three groups of parents defined in her article correspond to this classification.
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Table 21: Summary of the psychology literature
Reference Outcomes Children Parenting style Methodology Conclusion
Correlations  
Regressions  
Aunola and 
Nurmi (2005) 
Internalising and 
externalising problem 
behaviour assessed 
by means of 
structured interviews 
performed by trained 
investigators
5 to 6 years old 
children 
(N=191), 
observed 6x 
between 1999-
2002, Finland
Mothers’ and fathers’ 
affection, behavioural 
control, and 
psychological control, 
captured by mailed 
individual questionnaire
Latent growth 
curve modelling
* Internal problem behaviour significantly increases with high 
level of maternal psychological control and affection
* Children’s external problem behaviour is significantly 
associated with high level of behavioural and psychological 
control, as well as maternal affection combined with high level 
of psychological control 
* Fathers’ parenting had only a marginal role
Abar et al. 
(2009)
Student academic 
self-regulation and 
academic 
achievement based 
on questions asked to 
the student
African-
American 
youth attending 
a parochial 
college (N=85)
authoritativeness, 
authoritarianism, and 
permissiveness, each 
based on 10 questions 
asked to the student
* Significant positive association between maternal authoritative 
parenting and study skills
* highly authoritarian maternal parenting are associated with 
poorer academic skills
Astone and 
McLanahan 
(1991)
6 measures of success 
in secondary school 
(educational 
aspirations, grades, 
school attendance, 
positive attitude 
toward school, stayed 
continuously in 
school until 
graduation, diploma 
or GED by 1986)
15-16 years 
when reported 
parenting style 
in 1980 
(N=10,438), 
US
Analyse individually 5 
school-related parenting 
style (parental college 
aspirations, mother and 
father monitoring of the  
student's progress, parent 
supervision, parents 
spend time talking to the 
student weekly) 
Regressions (OLS 
and logit), 
bivariate probit
* Children from non-intact (single parent or step parent) families 
have parents with lower educational expectation, less monitoring 
of school work by mothers and fathers, and less overall 
supervision of social activities than children from intact families. 
An exception is children in single-parent families who spend 
significantly more time talking to their parents than children in 
two-parent families 
* Children from single-parent families and step parent families 
are more likely to exhibit signs of early disengagement from 
school
* Differences in parenting style are significantly related to 
differences in children's school commitment up through the 
senior year, parenting practices explain less than 10 percent the 
difference in graduation between children from intact and non-
intact families
Belsky et al. 
(2006) 
Average of the child 
health at ages 6.6 and 
7 years old reported 
by the mother on a 4-
point scale
First 7 years of 
life (N=1,041)
Mothers' warmth, 
negativity and positive 
control measures created 
by averaging scores 
across ages provided by 
raters on the basis of 
tasks observed at ages 6, 
15, 24, 36 and 54 months 
Multiple 
regression 
analyses 
(hierarchical, 
logistic) with 
statistical testing 
of mediational 
processes
* Warmth and positive control are positively correlated with 
child health, whereas negativity has the opposite correlation 
* Warmth only is significantly positively correlated with health, 
but once socio-economic variables are included, the coefficient is 
no longer significant
Bush et al. 
(1987)
Students reported 
grades
High school 
students 
(N=7,836), US
Authoritative, 
authoritarian, and 
permissive based on 25 
questions asked to the 
teenagers, the grouping 
of questions being an 
arbitrarily choice of the 
authors
* Both authoritarian and permissive parents are negatively 
associated with grades
* Authoritative parents is positively associated with grades
Chan and Koo 
(2011)
Subjective well-being 
and self-esteem, 
health and risky 
behaviour, and  
academic 
achievement and 
school enrolment
15 year old 
interviewed 
between 1994 
and 2001 
(N=1,456), 
Youth Panel of 
the BHPS, UK
Authoritative, 
authoritarian, and 
permissive based on 3 
questions related to 
strictness and 3 to 
closeness. 
Latent class 
analysis, 
regressions (OLS, 
logit and 
multinominal 
logit)
With respect to authoritative parents children with authoritarian 
and permissive parents are: 
* significantly less happy and have less self-esteem
* significantly more likely to have ever smoked, fight with others 
and have friends who use drugs
* significantly less likely to have good school results, and more 
likely to be employed than being in full-time education at the age 
of 17
Denham et al. 
(2000)
Externalising 
problems reported by 
the mother and the 
teacher
4 to 5 years old 
(N=80), 
outcomes 
reassessed at 7 
and 10 years 
old, US
Supportiveness, 
happiness, anger, 
hostility, restrictivity,... 
Mother-child and father-
child interactions 
assessed in a laboratory 
environment
Correlations and 
regressions
* Externalizing problems exhibit continuity between the various 
years of observations
* A mixture of supportive parents and clear instructions and 
limits predicted fewer behaviour problems over time, after 
controlling for initial problems
* Parental anger was positively associated with behavioural 
problems, but no association were found between positive 
emotion and child behavioural problem
Gibson et al. 
(2007)
BMI (z-score, age 
and gender specific) 
measured at the 
interviews
6-13 years old 
(N=329), 
Australia
Laxness, over-reactivity 
and verbosity derived 
from 30 questions asked 
to mothers or fathers
Univariate and 
multivariate linear 
regression
* No association is found between the different parenting style 
measures and the child BMI
Huppert et al. 
(2010)
Psychological well-
being  at age 52 years 
(Ryff's scales of 
psychological well-
being)
Women from 
the 1946 
British birth 
cohort study 
(N=984), UK
Retrospective parenting 
practices with 
instructions to consider 
the period up to the age 
of 16 years collected at 
age 43 years (Parental 
Bonding Instrument)
Factor analytic 
models in Mplus,
Structural equation 
modelling
* Higher levels of parental care were associated with higher 
psychological well-being
* Higher parental non-engagement or control were associated 
with lower levels of psychological well-being
* Well-being of adult women was affected by their father as well 
as their mother, particularly in terms of non-engagement and 
control
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Table 22: Summary of the psychology literature (continued)
Reference Outcomes Children Parenting style Methodology Conclusion
Regressions  
Physical health
BMI  
Kiernan and 
Huerta (2008)
Cognitive 
development, tested 
via the Bracken Basic 
Concept Scale, 
internalising and 
externalising 
behaviour, reported 
by the mother – the 
raw scores of the 
different questions 
were added up
3 year-olds 
(N=13,877), 
Millennium 
Cohort Study, 
UK
Family’s reading 
activities, mother's 
affection and strictness, 
reported by the mother  – 
the raw score of the 
different questions were 
added up
Structural equation 
modelling
* Cognitive score is significantly associated with reading 
activities and positive mother-child relationship
* Externalising behavioural problems are lower with higher 
family's reading activity and good mother-relationship, but 
higher with disciplinary practices
* Internalising behavioural problems are negatively associated 
with good mother relationship and higher with disciplinary 
practices 
Lamborn et al. 
(1991) 
Psychosocial 
development, school 
achievement, 
internalized distress, 
and problem 
behaviour measured 
by different scores
14-18-year-
olds 
(N=4,081), US
Authoritative,authoritaria
n, indulgent, or 
neglectful based on 
adolescents' ratings of 
their (both if possible) 
parents on 2 dimensions:
acceptance involvement 
and strictness/ 
supervision
Exploratory factor 
analyses using an 
oblique rotation to 
define the 
parenting style 
categories, and 
four-way 
multivariate 
analysis of 
variance 
* Authoritative parents had adolescents with highest measures of 
psychosocial competence and lowest measures of psychological 
and behavioural dysfunction
* Authoritarian  parents had adolescents with good measures of 
obedience, with but with poorer self-conceptions than other 
youngsters
* Adolescents from indulgent homes have a strong sense of self-
confidence but report higher frequency of substance abuse and 
school misconduct and are less engaged in school
* Neglectful parents had adolescents that were the opposite to the 
ones with authoritative parents
Pong et al. 
2005
Grade-point-average 
(GPA), is the 
arithmetic mean of 
the self-reported 
grades in math, 
science, and English
Adolescents 
(N=17,996), 
first wave of 
the  National 
Longitudinal 
Study of 
Adolescent 
Health (Add 
Health), US
Demandingness, based 
on six decisions (choice 
of clothing, amount of 
TV, etc.) and whether the 
decision is unilaterally 
made by the parent, the 
child or both (reported by 
the parent)
Responsiveness is the 
average of a score given 
by the child to parent's 
warmth, closeness and 
type of relationship
* Hispanic 1st generation families are generally more strict than 
White 3rd generation families, but Asian families do not different 
significantly from the White 3rd generation
* 1st generation Asian tend to be closer than White 3rd generation, 
this is however not the case with Hispanic
* There is no differences between ethnicity whether parents have 
dinner with children, however Asian and Hispanic 3rd generation 
tend to have more social talk with their children than 3rd 
generation White
* Parenting style, once socio-economic background is taken into 
account, cannot explain ethnicity-generation differences in 
school grades among Hispanic and Asian adolescents
Rhee et al. 
(2006)
Overweight defined 
as BMI measured 
during laboratory 
visits ≥95th 
percentile of the US 
National Center for 
Health Statistics 
growth curves 
54 months old 
(N=872), US
Authoritative, 
authoritarian, permissive, 
and neglectful defined on 
the basis of maternal 
sensitivity to the child’s 
needs coded by observers 
in laboratory and 
expectations for self-
control derived 32 
questions asked to the 
mother, and the cutoffs 
were based on the 
medians
Multivariate 
logistic regression 
analysis
* Children of authoritative mothers are the less likely to be 
overweight
* Authoritarian parenting style is associated with the highest risk 
of having overweight children
* Children of permissive and neglectful mothers are twice as 
likely to be overweight, compared with children of authoritative 
mothers 
Stewart-
Brown et al. 
(2005) 
Outcomes 
measured at 
age 43 for the 
1946 cohort 
(N=3,254), 33 
for the 1958 
cohort 
(N=7141), and 
26 for the 1970 
cohort 
(N=4,493), UK
1946 cohort: mistreated 
by parents, asked at age 
43
1958 cohort: how get on 
with father and mother at 
age 16
1970 cohort: parental 
relationship at age 16 
captured in 11 points and 
analysed individually 
Logistic regression 
and multinomial 
logistic regression
* Subjective perceptions of the quality of parent–child 
relationships predict physical health experience in later life, 
independently of social class and gender
Wake et al. 
(2007)
4-5 years old 
(N=4,983), 
Longitudinal 
Study of 
Australia
Authoritative, 
authoritarian, permissive, 
and disengaged defined 
on the basis of internal 
warmth and control 
tertile cut points and 
based on fathers and 
mothers self-reported 
parenting style
Univariate and 
multivariable 
ordinal logistic 
regression 
* Mothers’ parenting  style is not associated with their children's 
BMI
* Higher father control scores are associated with lower odds of 
the child being in overweight or obese
Wickrama et 
al. (1997)
Poor adolescent 
physical health, sum 
of 12 physical 
complaints (e.g. 
headaches, sore 
throats) 
Median age of 
12 in 1989, and 
interviews 
repeated in 
1990, 1991, 
1992, 1994 
(N=310), US
Supportive parenting 
constructed as the sum of 
scores based on mother'; 
and fathers' warmth and 
low hostility behaviour 
for a series of tasks, 
evaluated by external 
coder
Perceived parental 
support is the sum of 
score of a series of 
question asked to the 
adolescent
Latent growth 
curve analysis
* Level of and change in observed parental support are linked to 
the level and changes of adolescents physical health, 
respectively, through the adolescents' perception of their parents' 
support 
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Other studies suggest that parents’ involvement is equally important as control,
if not more. But for both dimensions of parenting style, contradictory evidence can
be found. For example, in their review of the literature, Aunola and Nurmi (2005)
find that authoritative parenting style, with high behavioural or psychological control,
is associated with child’s pro-social behaviour, whereas parental affection alone has a
more ambiguous effect. In their own research, Aunola and Nurmi analyse 191 children
aged 5 and 6 years old and followed up six times from kindergarten to the second
grade. They investigate the combination of mothers’ and fathers’ parenting style in
terms of affection, behavioural and psychological control. Their empirical approach is
a latent growth curve modelling to investigate intra-individual changes over time in the
variables of interest. The analysis of individual parenting style measures reveals that
only affection is associated with an increase in child’s external problems. A further
analysis including interaction terms of the parenting style measures suggests first that
internalising and externalising problems are increasing with high level of affection and
psychological control, and second, that externalising problems are also increasing with
high level of behavioural and psychological control. A possible explanation for the
first result is that affection reinforces the communication of guilt and psychological
restrictions. It may also reflect a problem of unobserved heterogeneity.
Kiernan and Huerta (2008) use the Millennium Cohort Study to investigate the
role of reading activities, positive relations, and disciplinary practices on the child’s ex-
ternalising and internalising behaviour at the age of three, taking into account mother’s
depression and economic deprivation. They use factor analysis and structural equation
modelling and find that reading activities are significantly negatively correlated with
externalising behavioural problems but not with internalising problems. On the con-
trary, disciplinary practices is associated with a significant increase in both types of
behavioural problems, whereas a positive mother-child relationship reduces both types
of negative behaviour.
More robust evidence is essential to support families in their attitude with respect
to their children, especially because continuity of the behaviours appear to be strong
(Campbell and Ewing, 1990). However, Denham et al. (2000) show that parenting
style can still affect the child’s behaviour, even after controlling for initial problems.
They observed both mothers and fathers interacting with their children in a variety of
representative contexts, and child outcomes were assessed at the ages 4.6, 7 and 9.7
years over 60 participants in the three waves. Based on correlations and regressions,
their results indicate that proactive parenting, defined as supportive and setting clear
rules, predicts fewer behaviour problems over time, after controlling for initial problems;
the converse was true for parental anger.
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Despite the sometimes contradictory evidence, the combination of parental in-
volvement and rules appears to play a crucial role on the child’s behaviour, and probably
suggests that a distinction between moderate and extreme authoritarian parenting style
is necessary to better understand the role of involvement and strictness individually and
in combination.
3.2.1.3 Parenting style and child mental health
Evidence on the role of parenting style on child mental health, which is often defined
in the literature to cover both behavioural and emotional problems, is more limited.
For three-year old children, Kiernan and Huerta (2008) find no association between
mothers’ involvement and children’s emotional problems broadly measured as the sum of
questions on whether the child is often unhappy, often complains of headaches, has many
worries, is nervous or clingy, and has many fears. Yamauchi (2009) adopts a broader
framework and investigates the role of parental educational attainment and mental
health on their children’s mental health. Her results, based on the 2004 Longitudinal
Study of Australian Children and 4,898 children aged four to five years old, show that
more educated and mentally healthier parents have also mentally healthier children.
This appears to be partially due to the fact that more educated parents engage more
frequently in educational activities with their children. At the same time, mentally
healthy parents exhibit a more disciplined parenting style.
Chan and Koo (2011) use the Youth Panel of the British Household Panel Survey
to explore the association between parenting style and indices of child self-esteem and
happiness. Parenting style is reported by the 15-years-old teenagers and the parenting
style indices sum up their answers. The authors use latent class analysis to identify
three types of parenting style, namely authoritative, authoritarian and permissive. They
find that teenagers’ self-esteem and happiness is not associated with family structure
(single-parents or step-families), nor social class. Authoritarian and permissive parents
are significantly more likely to have teenagers who are happier or have high self-esteem
compared to children from authoritative parents. These results suggest therefore that
the lack of parents’ involvement may play an important role in the adolescent’s mental
health equilibrium (Peterson et al., 1991).
The effect of control on the child’s mental health is more ambiguous. Although
Chan and Koo (2011) do not directly test the difference between the authoritarian
and permissive coefficients, it is also relatively large, suggesting that the absence of
rules accentuates the detrimental effects (Lamborn et al., 1991). However, if the lack
of control is bad for children, it has also been shown that excessive level of control
tends to undermine the child’s self-expression and self-esteem, which in turns increases
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depressive symptoms (Kaslow et al., 1994, Hill et al., 2003).
It is important to note that, in the case of mental health, differences between
genders are observed, even after controlling for parenting style. Typically, girls are more
likely to show some depressive symptoms (Peterson et al., 1991). Furthermore, Huppert
et al (2010) find a long term effect of parenting style on wellbeing. They consider 984
women in the 1946 British birth cohort study and analyse the link between psychological
wellbeing at the age of 52 and reported retrospective parenting style at age 43 referring
to age 46. They identify three relevant dimensions of parenting style using factor
analytic models: care, non-engagement, control, and analyse the relationship between
adults’ well-being and adolescent’s parents using structural equation modelling. Higher
level of psychological well-being were significantly associated with parental care and
negatively with control and non-engagement. Although this suggests that parenting still
persists well into adulthood, the results may be affected by the retrospective parenting
style which is likely to be affected by current well-being. Adults who feel good might
be less likely to remember bad parents, whereas less happy adults might be more likely
to blame their parents for their lack of well-being.
3.2.1.4 Parenting style and child physical health
Although it is plausible that parenting style has an important role on the child health by
affecting the child vulnerability to illness or risk of accidents (Hoghughi, 1998), evidence
on the role of family practices on child health is scarce. More is known on the correlation
between parenting style and child health-related activities. For example, Ornelas et al.
(2007), Hennessy et al. (2010), and Jago et al. (2011) find that physical activity is
the highest among the children of permissive parents and the lowest among children
of uninvolved parents. Similar results can be found in the case of fruit consumption
(Kremers et al., 2003), whereas parents’ rules and involvement reduce smoking initiation
or adolescents’ smoking probability (Hill et al., 2005, Chassin et al., 2005) as well as
substance abuse (Kosterman et al., 2000, Adalbjarnardottir and Hafsteinsso, 2001).
Belsky et al. (2006) use the first six years of the National Institutes of Child
Health and Human Development Study of Early Child Care, a longitudinal study ini-
tiated in 1989, that collects videotaped semi-structured interaction tasks at the child
ages 6, 15, 24, 36 and 54 months and coded by raters to derive three measures of parent-
ing (warmth, negativity and positive control) calculated as average scores across ages.
Based on the sample of 1,041 women, they estimate OLS models of the child’s health
captured as the sum of health reported by the mother at the child ages 6.6 and 7 years.
Their limited set of socio-economic variables (mother’s years of education, mother’s age,
partner presence and races) are not significantly correlated with the child’s health in an
101
OLS regression, apart from mother’s education that is positively correlated with child
health. The inclusion of parenting style variables in the child health equation suggests
that the presence of a partner in the household is significantly correlated with child
health, but the parenting style variables are not significant in the equation. However,
as the R-square is improved, the authors argue that parenting is a partial mediator
of the impact of SE factors on child health. The coefficients’ standard errors are also
reduced, but the standardised coefficients remained virtually unchanged. Among the
parenting style measures, warmth has the largest positive effect on the child’s health
despite being non-significant.
Wickrama et al. (1997) use a five-year interview panel of 310 adolescents in Iowa
to investigate the effect of parental support on adolescent physical health measured
as a sum of 12 common complaints (e.g. headache, skin rashes, vomiting, etc.). Par-
ental support is measured by an external coder based on interaction tasks between the
adolescent and the parents. Additionally, the authors also ask the child to report per-
ceived parental support. Using latent growth curve modelling, the authors find that
supportive parents reduce their adolescent risk for physical health problems, through
adolescent perceived parental support. However, the strictness dimension is ignored in
this study.
Stewart-Brown et al. (2005) use three UK national birth cohort studies to invest-
igate the role of parent-adolescent relationship on physical health in adulthood. In the
1946 cohort, health is measured at 43 years old and parental mistreatment in childhood
is asked at the same age. In the 1958 cohort, 16 years old cohort members responded
to a self-completion questionnaire to whether it was true or not that they were getting
on well with their mother and father separately, and health is measured at age 33. Fi-
nally, in the 1970 cohort, 16 years old interviewees could choose a statement that best
described their relationship with their parents, and health is measured at 26 years old.
Using logistic regression for the oldest cohort and multi-nominal logistic regressions for
the others, the authors find that reports of neglect (1946 cohort), poor quality relation-
ship with parents (1958 cohort), and a negative relationship (1970 cohort) predicted
reports of three or more health problems in adulthood.
If most research finds a significant association between parents’ involvement and
their children health,68 the scarce evidence available in the case of child obesity is more
ambiguous. For example, Gibson et al. (2007) analyse 329 children aged 6–13 years find
that childhood obesity is not associated with adverse maternal or family characteristics
such as maternal depression, negative life events, poor general family functioning or
68See also Swanson et al. (2011) in a sample of 240 predominantly Mexican American early adoles-
cents.
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ineffective parenting style. Wake et al. (2007) analyse the role of father and mother
parenting style separately and jointly on the BMI of 4,983 4 to 5-year-old children of
the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children. They find that, mothers’ parenting
style was not associated in any model with higher odds of children being in a heavier
BMI category, whereas higher father control scores were associated with lower odds of
the child being in a higher BMI category. Rhee et al. (2006), in a study of 872 children
aged of 54 months, find that children of authoritarian mothers were the most likely
to be overweight and the authoritative ones had the lowest risk of being overweight.
This result suggests that involved mothers can play a role in reducing their children
probability of being overweight. von Hinke Kessler Scholder (2008) studies the timing
of mothers’ employment on children’s obesity, and she finds that mother’s employment
around mid-childhood (age 7) is the most detrimental for the child’s later weight as
opposed to earlier or later mother’s employment.
3.2.1.5 Parenting style and child cognitive ability
Chan and Koo (2011) find that authoritative parents are more likely to have teenagers
scoring better at the GSCE and less likely to be unemployed compared to authoritarian
and permissive parents who are more likely to have children who have left full-time
education at the age of 17. This conclusion is the most commonly found in the literature
(see for example Abar et al., 2009).
By contrast, authoritarian parents tend to have children with lower academic
achievement (Abar et al., 2009). Dornbusch et al. (1987) extend Baurmind’s analysis
to adolescents and control for ethnic group, age, gender, single-parent family, and par-
ents’ education. They find that authoritative parents, as reported by the adolescent,
are associated with children with better school performance. The same analysis made
separately by ethnic groups reveals that this is particularly true for Whites and Hispan-
ics, but the correlations is not significant for Asians and Hispanics.69 This association
is also found by Lamborn et al. (1991) based on approximately 4,100 14-18 year old
teenagers. The parenting style is reported by the teenagers, and the authors undertake
a multivariate analysis of variance. In their study, children from authoritarian parents
score lower than authoritative family children, but better than neglectful or permissive
ones.
Astone and McLanahan (1991) consider specific school-related parenting style
on a sample of 10,438 children aged 15-16. They separately analyse six measures of
success in secondary school (educational aspirations, grades, school attendance, posit-
69This is probably due to the small proportion of Asians and Hispanics in their sample.
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ive attitude toward school, stayed continuously in school until graduation) using OLS
regressions. The role of parenting style is very moderate. Parents’ aspirations have
often the largest and strongest correlation with the outcomes, but specific parenting
practices are less correlated with the outcomes. Mother or father’s monitoring as well as
general strictness are more strongly associated with successful outcomes, than actually
talking to the child on a weekly basis.
These results support the idea that school performance is mainly affected by
parents’ strictness instead of parents’ involvement, although contradictory examples
exist. Kiernan and Huerta (2008) find that involvement matters more than disciplinary
practices in the case of children at the age three. The results are also not consistent
across ethnicity (African American, Hispanic, and Asian) as noted by Spera (2005) in
his review on parenting style and adolescent school achievement. Pong et al. (2005),
in a regressional analysis using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health
finds differences in parenting practices by ethnicity (White, Hispanic and Asian) but
they are not large enough to explain differences in average grades scores.
3.2.1.6 Parenting substitution
The role of the father, and the role of any other types of maternal parenting style
substitution such as grand-parents or nursery, have received very little attention in
the literature. With more families separating, and mothers being more involved in
the labour market over the years, it is crucial to understand the role that fathers
play in rearing their children. Reviews of the literature generally do not distinguish
between parenting style measured only by the mother or both parents. Although the
conceptual framework of parenting style refers to parents in general, most of the studies
limit their attention to the mother. This relies on the implicit assumption of perfect
substitution, that is that the parents-child relationship would not depend on the gender
of the parent involved with the child (Maccoby and Martin, 1983), nor the possibility
of complementarity between the two parents. However, it is very likely that both the
mother and the father play a salient role in the child’s evolution that may not be fully
interchangeable.
The evidence on parents’ substitution is mixed. Based on 196 children, Aunola
and Nurmi (2005) finds that father’s parenting style only plays a marginal role but this
may be due to too few father’s observations (about 76% of the 196 children had obser-
vations for the father), or because they do not account for parents’ time or occupation.
On the contrary, Averett et al. (2005) show that father care for infants is as good as
other types of arrangements, but that toddlers in non-paternal modes of child-care have
slightly better cognitive outcomes, although the possible reasons explaining this result
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are not clear. Parental practices may also vary by parents. For example Lundberg
(2005) reveals that fathers tend to be more involved when they have boys.
The literature does not account for further types of care substitution such as child
care. Although our analysis also focuses on mother’s care only, it is worth mentioning
that parents unable to be involved but willing the best for their offsprings may substitute
their presence by good quality of care which may bias our results. For example, Felfe
and Lalive (2011) investigate how centre-based care compared to mother care affects the
child’s development. They find that there is only a marginal gain of child care for the
average child, but that it is much more beneficial to children from low socio-economic
background. Chetty et al. (2010) find that better quality kindergarten improves non-
cognitive outcomes and increases long-term earnings.
The last important issue to mention that has received very little attention in
the literature is the difference not only of the effects of parenting style on boys and
girls, but also the different parenting style adopted by parents depending on their child
gender. In a country like India where boys are generally preferred over girls, Barcellos
et al. (2012) show that boys receive significantly more time than girls, are more likely to
be breastfed longer, and to be given vaccinations and vitamin supplementation, despite
these differences not being due to greater needs. Among Arab adolescents, Dwairy
(2004) finds that parenting style with regard to boys tends to be less authoritative and
less authoritarian than with regards to girls. In order to address this issue, we also
model boys and girls separately.
3.2.2 Economic approach of the role of parenting style on chil-
dren
The role of parenting style in the production process has generated much less interest in
economics. Parenting style has been implicitly considered as one of the numerous inputs
affecting the child’s health and behaviour. From the seminal work of Becker (1991) the
main focus has been on income as a means to buy the investment in the child. However,
parenting style is potentially endogenous which suggests that the estimated correlations
may be biased estimates of the causal effect (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983).
Economics can make major contributions to the analysis. The first is a the-
oretical framework for the analysis of the parent-child relationship. This permits a
clarification of the different effects and interactions, an explicit exposition of the pos-
sible dynamics, the formulation of assumptions related to the actors motivations, and
an explicit acknowledgement of omitted factors. The second contribution is an applied
econometrics approach that accounts for confounding factors, with specific methods to
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account for the influence of unobservable factors, modelling endogeneity and reverse
causality. In the psychological studies summarised above, the main focus is generally
on overall correlations without much interest for the relationship with socio-economic
characteristics, unobserved, reverse and endogenous effects, making it impossible to
obtain estimates of the causal effect of parenting style on children outcomes.
The economics literature is much smaller than the psychology literature but
does provide a framework to examine the effect of child rearing practices on the child’s
development. Burton et al. (2002) propose a theoretical model where the child is a parti-
cipant in the development process. They model the parent-child interactions as a game
where the child has a utility function increasing in praise received by the parents, but
decreasing in effort. The parent maximises a family welfare function depending upon
her own current well-being, the child’s current utility, and the child’s future well-being.
The equilibrium effort and praise level depends on the child’s type, the parent’s praise
and the child’s behaviour. This is modelled empirically using a simultaneous system
of equations for the child’s conduct disorder score and a parental score, and estimated
via three-stage least squares (3SLS) using the 1994 National Longitudinal Survey of
Children and Youth. When taking into account endogeneity compared to simple OLS
regressions, the parenting score and child conduct variables are much stronger predictors
respectively of child conduct and parenting score.
Based on who establishes three limits at home (stay out at night, TV shows
child may watch, and who the child is allowed to go out with), Cosconati (2009) defines
three types of parenting style: strict limits (parent decides), permissive (parent and
child’s decision), and permissive (child’s decision). He proposes a model of parent-
child interaction where the parents can place limits to the child’s leisure time, and
thus encouraging him to spend more time studying. The author tests his structural
model using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1997. His results indicate that
strictness of parenting style varies with how much the child values human capital.
Children who have initially a high level of human capital, measured by the time spent
doing homework, would benefit more of less strict parents, whereas children with a low
initial level of human capital would achieve a higher level of human capital with strict
parents. This article illustrates that optimal parenting style is a function of the child’s
characteristics, but is weakened by the lack of the child’s ability measure to better
capture effects of the child’s studying efforts.
Cunha and Heckman (2006) propose a model to explain the dynamic comple-
mentarity of cognitive and non-cognitive skills taking into account parental investment.
The model is estimated using the male children of the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth born in 1979 in the US, and parent investments is measured by number of
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books available to the child, whether the child has a musical instrument, whether the
family receives a daily newspaper, whether the child receives special lessons, how often
the child goes to museums, and how often the child goes to the theatre. They use a
dynamic factor model to construct an index of the latent parental investments. Using
measures of cognitive and non-cognitive skills at ages 6/7, 8/9. 10/11, 12/13, they find
that these skills develop over the child’s life cycle with an important role of parental
inputs on cognitive skill formation at an early age, and on non-cognitive skill at a later
age. Their approach however does not identify which parent input matters.
Dooley and Stewart (2007) study the relationship observed between income and
child outcomes. They assess the causal effect of income on the child, taking into account
the role of parenting style. They use three waves (1994-5, 1996-7, 1998-9) of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth to implement different strategies aiming
at estimating the possible endogeneity bias, postulating that parenting style is one
source of heterogeneity that may induce bias. Their strategy does not allow fully for
unobservable effects but provides some insight on the extent of possible bias. First, they
analyse how the relationship between income and child behavioural–emotional outcomes
varies for outcomes reported by the teacher, a parent, and by the children when aged
above 10. Then they incorporate four aspects of parenting style: positiveness, hostility,
consistency, and punitiveness, which are measured as the sum of scores received on
the answers to four to eight questions. They consider children aged four and up to
11, and income is measured as permanent income which is proxied by the average
income over the three waves. As permanent income may be affected by change in
household composition, they include only families that remained with the same two
parents and same single mother across the period of study. The outcomes of interest are
the sum of scores based on hyperactivity disorder, conduct disorder, emotional disorder,
and property offence scores, which are themselves also measured as the sum of scores
received from the answers asked to the three different respondents. They start with an
OLS model, then estimate the model with separated child and a family fixed effects to
take into account unobserved heterogeneity constant over time. Then, they estimate
the outcomes relationship in wave two with income and parenting style measured in
waves two and three. The aim of this strategy is first to check whether parents have
better information about their past income than the future one, and second, to test
whether past parenting style has a stronger impact on child outcomes than the future
one. Their last empirical specification applies only to the income effect. Their estimate
of the income effect is in the range of what has been previously estimated: a unit
increase in the log of income is associated with a decrease of about 0.15–0.10 of a SD in
the outcomes indices. The authors conclude that the exclusion of parenting style does
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not bias the income effect, but parenting style has a consistent impact on behavioural-
emotional problems, with positive parenting having generally a negative effect on the
outcome, hostile parenting a positive one, consistency and punitive parenting a non-
significant one, although the quantitative effects vary substantially depending on who
reports the outcome.
Violato et al. (2011) also examine the relationship between child outcomes and
parental income, but using the MCS data. In order to identify pathways through which
income translates into child’s behaviour70 and cognitive development,71 they adopt as
their main econometric strategy a “mopping-up” approach. This method exploits the
richness of the MCS data by including as many confounding factors as possible in or-
der to “mop-up” the residual heterogeneity in the income-child outcomes relationship
and minimise the omitted variable bias. The authors distinguish four types of control
variables: standard socio-economic variables (e.g. birthweight, gender, parental educa-
tion), parental stress variables that are a mix of parental views and parenting practices
(e.g. what the mother does when the child is naughty), parental investment variables
(e.g. home atmosphere, activities with the child), and other family-related pathways
(parents’ health and lifestyle, and grand-parents’ socio-economic status). This grouping
comes from various economic theories in family behaviour (see Violato et al. (2011) for
more details) and does not relate to the demandingness and involvement classifications
used in the psychology literature. As the authors do not aggregate their various meas-
ures, we can summarise the effects of the variables related to demandingness and/or
involvement. Child outcomes are measured at 3 and 5 years old, and, in order to limit
reverse causality, the time-varying controls that they use are measured one interview
before the one at which each outcome is measured.
The association between income and child outcomes is significantly reduced once
they take all the controls into account. In some cases, even the correlation between
income and child outcomes is no longer significant. Child cognitive outcomes are mostly
explained by parenting style and parental investment. The lack of strictness, measured
by whether the mother tells off a naughty child and whether rules are strict in the family,
are detrimental to the child’s cognitive ability. Similarly, the lack of reading to the
child, either from the mother or the father, is associated with lower cognitive outcomes.
By contrast parental strictness is detrimental to the child behaviour, whereas going
frequently to the library is associated with fewer behavioural problems. The results are
70Child’s behaviour is measured as the sum of parents’ answers to the Strengths and Difficulty
Questionnaire. This questionnaire combines questions on externalising and internalising behavioural
problems.
71The appendix of their article also looks at the child’s temperament, but this is only measured at
9 months.
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supported by family fixed effects models. Violato et al. (2011) repeat their analysis for
two-parent and single-parent families in order to analyse the role of the father. The
main father’s effect is through reading with the child which is positively associated with
cognitive outcome.
In summary, their analysis support the role of parenting style in the child (men-
tal) health production function, but contrarily to Dooley and Stewart (2007), the au-
thors find that the income-child outcomes relationship is mostly indirect and that it
can be captured by four groups of mediating factors. The authors justify their choice
of mediating factors by referring to the parental investment and parental stress the-
ories, but they do not discuss the involvement and strictness dimensions used in the
psychology literature. Their choice of controls appears to be more guided by what is
available in the data than specific dimensions that they want to capture. The parenting
style variables used are likely to be biased by unobserved heterogeneity; for example,
in using the question about whether the mother tells off the naughty child, one should
also consider whether the child is naughty, otherwise answers are also picking up child
behaviour as well as parenting style.
Our approach differs in several ways. First, because these dimensions have
been claimed to capture the main aspects in the child-parent relationship, and to
have comparable results to the existing literature on parenting style, we clearly distin-
guish between parental strictness and involvement. The inclusion of so many correlated
variables also makes the interpretation of these variables difficult due to collinearity.
Second, we modify the parenting style variables so that we do not measure whether
the child is actually naughty, but what the mother does when the child is naughty (see
Section 3.3 for more details). Third, it is difficult to assess the role of the father in
Violato et al. (2011)’s article as the single-parent and two-parent families regressions
are run on two different samples. It would have been better to have the results for the
two-parent family sample without and with the father variables so that we could assess
the impact of the father. This is what we do in this chapter. Finally, some of their
results such as the significant positive correlation between the time the father spends
with the child and the child’s behavioural problems suggest that unobserved hetero-
geneity is still present in the data. Even if the father’s involvement comes from the
pervious interview, this result seems to suffer from reverse causality. We address this
problem by allowing the parenting style and child outcomes to be subject to unobserved
heterogeneity using a recursive specification.
Waldman et al. (2012) investigate the health consequences of early childhood
television watching using a natural experiment to account for the possible problem of
reverse causality. They use the proportion of children’s cable stations between 1972 and
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1992 in California and Pennsylvania counties to understand the relationship between
television watching, mental retardation and autism. They find that, for children below
three, there is a positive correlation with autism diagnosis rates. However, for mental
retardation, the correlation is negative, in contrast to early studies that only investigate
correlations without accounting for possible reverse causation.
Aside from parenting style, other factors that have important effects on children
outcomes have been identified in the economics literature. If these factors are correlated
with parenting style but not accounted for in the regressions, there is an endogeneity
bias. For example, mother physical and mental health play an important role. Using the
Millennium Cohort Study, Kiernan and Huerta (2008) analyse the association between
children economic circumstances, including mother’s mental well-being, and children’s
cognitive development and behaviour problems at age three. Using structural equation
modelling, they show that mother’s depression is significantly correlated with their
parental practices although depression only has a direct effect on children’s behaviour
but not cognitive development.
In summary, the literature suggests that children from neglectful families have
worse outcomes, and children with authoritative parents are the most healthy, physically
and mentally, and report the highest test scores. However, little attention has been given
to possible unobserved heterogeneity bias, and to the specific parental rearing practices
rather than overall measures of involvement and demandingness. In this chapter, we
analyse the role of mother’s parenting style on child health and cognitive ability, taking
into account unobserved heterogeneity. We measure parenting style as overall indices to
capture quantity, and as specific measures to capture quality. The next section presents
the data, Section 3.4 introduces the estimation approaches, and Section 3.5 presents
the results.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
We use the Millennium Cohort Study. The initial sample was nearly 19,000 babies born
between 1 September 2000 and 31 August 2001 in England and Wales, and between 22
November 2000 and 11 January 2002 in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Information
has been collected from parents when the children were aged nine months and has
been repeated when the children were three (sweep 2), five (sweep 3) and seven (sweep
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4) years old, interviewing as well partners, school teachers, and older siblings.72 The
sample was a random sample of electoral wards.
We restrict the sample to families where the main carer is the natural mother.
We exclude twins and triplet since their birth weights and other health outcomes are
not comparable to singletons. Furthermore, parenting style is likely to differ with more
than one child of the same age. Finally, we exclude children with birth weight in the
first and last percentiles.
3.3.1.1 Outcome variables
We focus on physical health and mental health which is captured as externalising and
internalising behavioural problems. The outcomes variables are summarised in Table
23.
Physical health Child physical health is based on the following question asked to the
mother in sweeps 3 and 4: “In general would you say your child’s health is: excellent,
very good, good, fair, or, poor?”. We code the answer from 1 to 5, with 5 being excellent,
and dichotomise the answers with 1 meaning that the child is in good, very good or
excellent health, and 0 if the mother reports poor or fair health. 97% of the children
are in good or better health.
Mental health To capture externalising behaviour, we compute indices of external-
ising behaviour problems and of hyperactivity. The indices are based on the following
questions asked to the mothers in sweeps 3 and 4: over the last six months, the child
• often fights with other children or bullies them
• often has temper tantrums or hot tempers
• often is generally obedient, usually does what adults request (coded the other way
around)73
• often co-operates with requests (coded the other way around)73
• often is considerate of other people’s feelings (coded the other way around)73
• is restless, overactive, cannot stay still for long
72The main child carer and his/her partner were interviewed at all the sweeps. The school teachers
were interviewed in the 3rd sweep in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland only, and in the 4th sweep
across the UK. The older siblings were interviewed in the 2nd and 3rd sweeps in England only.
73The original coding ranges from 1 “not true” to 3 “certainly true”. We have replaced the score 1
by 3 and the score 3 by 1.
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• is constantly fidgeting or squirming
• is easily distracted, concentration wanders
• sees tasks through the end, good attention span (coded the other way around).73
The possible answers are not true (1), somewhat true (2) or certainly true (3). The
externalising behavioural problem index sums up the first four questions and the hy-
peractivity index the remaining ones of the above list.74 The externalising behaviour
index ranges from 5 to 15 and is on average 7. The hyperactivity index ranges from 4
to 12 and is on average 6.
Internalising behaviour problems, also called emotional problems, are captured
in an index that sums up the following aspects: over the last six months the child
• is often unhappy, down-hearted or tearful
• often complains of headaches, stomach-aches or sickness75
• has many worries, often seems worried
• is nervous or clingy in new situations, easily loses confidence
• has many fears, easily scared.
The possible answers are the same as for the externalising aspects.76 The index ranges
from 5 to 15 and the average is 6.
As these variables are reported by the mother, as well as the parenting style
measures presented in Section 3.3.1.2, which induces a possible reporting bias problem,
we also consider other physical and mental health measures that are not reported by
the mother.
Body mass index As another proxy for physical health, we look at the child’s body
mass index (BMI). The child’s height and weight is measured by the interviewer and
the BMI is computed as the weight in kilo divided by the height in squared centimetres
(kg/cm2).77 In our sample, the BMI ranges from 9 to 33 at the age of 7.
74Our approach is the same as Kiernan and Huerta (2008) who used the equivalent questions available
at the age of three to create externalising and internalising behavioural problem measures.
75This variable should be viewed as a psychosomatic measure.
76Again, similarly to Kiernan and Huerta (2008)’s approach.
77The NHS recommends to interpret the child’s weight in relation to their height, age and sex, and
the adults’ bounds for under- or over-weight cannot be directly applied to child’s BMI. However, child’s
BMI can be used to analysis how it is affected by parenting style.
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Mental health reported by the child As an alternative measure to the mother
reported mental health of the child, we use an index of mental health reported by the
child. At the age of 7 (sweep 4), the child is asked to fill a questionnaire with the
following questions:
• how often do you feel happy (coded the other way around)78
• how often do you get worried
• how often do you feel sad
• how often are you quiet
• how often do you like to be alone
• how often do you laugh (coded the other way around)78
• how often do you lose your temper (coded the other way around)78
The child can choose one of the following options: never (1), some of the time (2) or
all of the time (3). We sum up the child answers to get an index of the child mental
health defined by himself. The index ranges from 0 to 12 and is on average 4.
Mental health reported by the school teacher In the last wave (sweep 4),
teachers in England are also interviewed. They are asked whether specific problems
apply to the MCS child, including “behavioural problems/hyperactivity” and “mental
illness/depression” to which they answer by yes or no. Based on the teachers’ reports,
about 22.4% of the children have some hyperactivity problem but only 1% of them
appears to suffer from depression. Because of the very low proportion with depression,
we only analyse the hyperactivity reported by the teacher.
Cognitive ability reported by the teacher As an important and related aspect to
the child’s development, we investigate the role of parenting style in the child’s cognit-
ive ability. The child’s teacher is asked to rate the child, based on her/his experience,
in relation to all children of this age on the following aspects: speaking and listening,
reading, writing, science, math and numeracy, physical education, information and com-
munication technology, expressive and creative arts. For each of these eight categories,
the teacher can chose: well above average, above average, average, below average, well
below average. We gave a score from 1 for the lowest evaluation, up to a score of 5. We
78The original coding ranges from 1 “never” to 3 “all of the time”. We have replaced the score 1 by
3 and the score 3 by 1.
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Table 23: Descriptive statistics: outcome variables by sweeps
Count Mean Std. dev. Min. Median Max.
Physical health
Child overall heath (S3) 10,280 4.347 0.842 1 5 5
Child overall heath (S4) 7,063 4.483 0.780 1 5 5
Child in good health (S3) 10,280 0.963 0.188 0 1 1
Child in good health (S4) 7,063 0.971 0.167 0 1 1
BMI (S3) 10,184 16.379 1.848 10.27 16.11 42.80
BMI (S4) 6,990 16.665 2.299 8.74 16.21 32.56
Externalising behavioural problems
Externalising behavioural problems (S3) 9,992 7.025 1.744 5 7 15
Externalising behavioural problems (S4) 6,915 6.838 1.772 5 6 15
Hyperactivity index (S3) 9,898 6.280 2.035 4 6 12
Hyperactivity index (S4) 6,871 6.463 2.204 4 6 12
Hyperactivity reported by teacher (S4) 735 0.224 0.418 0 0 1
Internalising behavioural problems
Internalising behavioural problems (S3) 9,840 6.251 1.461 5 6 15
Internalising behavioural problems (S4) 6,811 6.443 1.696 5 6 15
Inter. behavioural pbs reported by child (S4) 6,489 4.307 1.626 0 4 12
Depression reported by teacher (S4) 711 0.010 0.099 0 0 1
Cognitive ability
Cognitive ability reported by teacher (S4) 4,478 25.988 5.456 8 26 40
Notes: S3: sweep 3, S4: sweep 4.
then sum up all the categories to obtain an index of the child’s cognitive abilities. The
cognitive ability index is available in sweep 4 only for England and ranges from 8 to 40
with an average of 26.
3.3.1.2 Parenting style variables
Parenting style is often referred to as a general measure, but it is important to under-
stand how it is captured and what it measures.
Some studies in the psychology literature on parenting style capture it by direct
observation (e.g. Wickrama et al., 1997, Belsky et al., 2006, Rhee et al., 2006). Parents
are examined pursuing different tasks and their attitude is evaluated by independent
and trained raters. However, more commonly, studies use parenting style reported by
the parents, by the children themselves, or by the siblings of the children analysed.
The main advantage of studies using reported variables is that they have generally a
much larger number of observations. However, when parenting style is reported by the
parents, it may create a bias that is related to the outcomes of interest.
In the MCS, parenting style is mainly reported by the mother. A few aspects are
also asked to the father or mother’s partner, and some more general questions about
the rules in the family are asked to the older sibling. In order to test for potential bias
in the mother’s responses, we also reestimate our main models using the partner and
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sibling reports.
There are many ways to measure parenting style. The most common method
in the psychology literature is to combine questions on related aspects into an index,
either by taking the mean (e.g. Dornbusch et al., 1987) or the sum of items (e.g.
Kiernan and Huerta, 2008). Others have used factor analysis (e.g. Huppert et al.,
2010) or latent class models (e.g. Chan and Koo, 2011). In psychology, the indices
are generally constructed to measure the main two dimensions of parenting style: ac-
ceptance/involvement and strictness/supervision. However, in the economics literature,
there is a greater variety of parenting style measures. For example, in Burton et al.
(2002), the parent score sums up how often parents calmly discuss the problem, raise
their voices, scold or yell, use physical punishment, describe more acceptable alternat-
ives. These questions can be viewed as a mixture of the two classical parenting style
dimensions.
We have performed both cluster and factor analysis in an attempt to reduce
the number of different possible measures of parenting style. The results are reported
in Appendix A. While cluster analysis allows us to obtain parenting style categories
that are similar to the ones in the literature, the results are very sensitive to the selec-
ted specification. Factor analysis results did not lead to clear or readily interpretable
combinations of variables.
We decided to pursue our main analysis by entering the parenting style vari-
ables separately which enables us to identify the separate effects of parenting style. In
addition, in order to have results that can be compared to what has been previously
done in the literature, we distinguish between measures that can be considered either as
involvement or strictness, and construct two summary indices for the two main dimen-
sions of parenting style (involvement and strictness) by summing up the parenting style
variables. Finally, we also consider measures described below that proxy the child’s
lifestyle imposed by the parents to connect our research to the health economics liter-
ature which has focused on the lifestyle’s role as an important determinant of health
(Kenkel, 1995, Contoyannis and Jones, 2004a, Balia and Jones, 2008).
The distinction between quality or quantity of time is not discussed in the liter-
ature, although this might be an important aspect affecting children’s outcomes. This
issue is briefly reviewed by Hsin (2009) in the case of cognitive abilities. The author
concludes that on average, maternal time, both total quantity and type of activities,
is uncorrelated with the child’s outcomes. As we have seen in the literature review
strictness rather than involvement is what matters the most to improve child cognitive
ability, which may explain Hsin’s conclusion. In our analysis of parenting style, we
distinguish between specific parenting style measures that characterise strictness and
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supervision, and total ruling and strictness measures to address the distinction between
quantity and quality. We estimate these effects in separated regressions.
In this chapter, we focus primarily on the role of the natural mother, mainly
due to data availability. We then include in our analysis the father’s parenting style
variable available to see how the results change. We now describe the parenting style
measures in our analysis.
Involvement The interviewer has a list of activities and for each of them, the mother
is asked whether she does each activity with the child every day (score of 5), several
times a week, once or twice a week, once or twice a month, or less often (score of
1). The different activities with the child include (i) reading, (ii) telling stories, (iii)
playing music, (iv) drawing, painting or making things, (v) playing sports or physically
active games outdoors or indoors, (vi) taking the child to the park or to an outdoor
playground, and (vii) playing with toys or games indoors. In order to avoid collinearity
as some of these aspects are very similar, we group them by taking the maximum of
reading and telling stories, of playing music and drawing, painting or making things
together, and of playing sports and going to the park.79 As the question on playing
games with the child has no similar question, it is left how it is.
If certain mothers have a tendency to over-report for example, the involvement
magnitudes will be biased. Therefore, in order to know what mother’s practice mat-
ters the most, we transform each of the four variables by dividing them by the most
undertaken involvement measure. This gives us for each parenting style the propensity
of each practice with respect to the most frequent activity undertaken by the mother
at each sweep.
As the psychological literature has generally focused on total involvement, we also
construct a total involvement index which is the sum of the four measures analysed.
It captures the quantity of mothers’ involvement, but might be biased by systematic
over-reporting.
Table 24 summarises the magnitude measures, the propensities and the index.
The first four variables represent the different mother’s practices once we have taken
the maximum of similar activities. The averages ranges from 3.07 for physical activities
to 4.27 for reading literary activities. The four next ones are the proportions. Based on
the median, reading and having some artistic activities with the child are undertaken
by the majority of mothers. Having some physical activity with the child is what the
mothers do the least relative to the other activities. The last row represents the overall
79The new variables represent what the mother does the most between the two activities. As the
possible answers are categories that are not proportional, it would not be correct to take the average
or the sum.
116
Table 24: Descriptive statistics: involvement measures
Count Mean Std. dev. Min. Median Max.
Involvement magnitude
Reads/tells stories with child 17,342 4.27 0.95 0.00 5.00 5.00
Plays music/paint with child 17,343 3.88 1.12 0.00 4.00 5.00
Does sport with child/takes to park 17,338 3.07 1.03 0.00 3.00 5.00
Plays game with child 17,343 3.31 1.19 0.00 3.00 5.00
Propensities
Mostly reading 17,334 0.92 0.16 0.00 1.00 1.00
Mostly art (music/painting) 17,334 0.84 0.21 0.00 1.00 1.00
Mostly physical activities (sport/park) 17,334 0.67 0.22 0.00 0.60 1.00
Mostly games 17,334 0.72 0.25 0.00 0.75 1.00
Index
Total involvement 17,334 14.52 2.95 1.00 15.00 20.00
Notes: The variables are summarised over sweeps 3 and 4.
mother’s involvement ranging from 1 to 20. The majority of the mothers are fairly
involved with an index of 15. In our analysis, we focus on the propensities and total
involvement.
Strictness The punitive practices of the mother are measured by asking the frequency
at which the mother resorts to different methods of punishment when the child is
naughty. These include telling off the naughty child, ignoring him, reasoning with him
and shouting at him. For each method, the mother can report whether she does it daily
(score of 4), often -about once a week or more-, sometimes -about once a month-, rarely,
or never (score of 0). These variables capture not only the mother’s punitive strategy,
but also how naughty the child is. In order to understand what punishment methods
matter irrespectively of how naughty the child is, we create a propensity measure of
strictness as the share of the most frequently used method by each mother.80
The strictness variables are summarised in Table 25. The first panel reports
the original variables, where reasoning with the child is the most frequent punitive
measure used, and ignoring the naughty child is the least used on average. The second
panel reports the strictness propensities for the different variables defined as the ratio
of the different strictness measure relative to the most frequently undertaken strictness
activity by sweep. Finally, the last row reports the strictness index that is the sum of
the original strictness measures and ranges from 1 to 16 with an average of 8.
For the involvement and strictness measures, we drop 55 observations where the
mother reports that she never does anything with the child nor imposes any rules or
punishment.
80The propensities are constructed as follows: pjia =
mjia
max{m1ia,m2ia,m3ia,m4ia} for child i at age a where
mjia represents the strictness magnitude j for j = telling off, . .., shouting.
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Table 25: Descriptive statistics: strictness measures
Count Mean Std. dev. Min. Median Max.
Strictness magnitude
Reasons with naughty child 17,301 2.67 0.93 0.00 3.00 4.00
Shouts at naughty child 17,320 2.13 0.91 0.00 2.00 4.00
Takes away treat from naughty child 17,305 1.78 0.88 0.00 2.00 4.00
Ignores naughty child 17,263 1.45 1.06 0.00 1.00 4.00
Propensities
Mostly reasons with naughty child 17,182 0.91 0.22 0.00 1.00 1.00
Mostly shouts at naughty child 17,182 0.74 0.27 0.00 0.75 1.00
Mostly takes away treats from naughty child 17,182 0.62 0.30 0.00 0.67 1.00
Mostly ignores naughty child 17,182 0.50 0.35 0.00 0.50 1.00
Index
Total 'rules' methods 17,182 8.03 2.49 1.00 8.00 16.00
Notes: The variables are summarised over sweeps 3 and 4.
Child health related activities The psychology literature has focused on two di-
mensions that characterise parenting style, namely involvement and strictness. Coming
from a health economics perspective, it appears relevant to also consider the child’s
lifestyle imposed by the parents as an additional parenting style aspect given the clear
benefits of a healthy lifestyle on health established in this literature (Contoyannis and
Jones, 2004b). The first results of the analysis are extended to include the following
measures of lifestyle: the number of days per week the child usually has breakfast, and
whether on weekdays during term-time, the child goes to bed at a regular time. For
the latter, the possible answers are: “no, never or almost never” (0), “yes, sometimes”,
“yes, usually”, or “yes, always” (4).
These variables are summarised in the first two rows of Table 26 pooled over
sweeps 3 and 4. The majority of children have breakfast every day and go to bed at a
regular time.
Parenting style measures reported by siblings For the robustness check on
reporting bias, we use parenting style reported by siblings. Up to two older siblings,
aged between 10 and 15, are interviewed in England in sweeps 2 and 3. They are asked
to complete a questionnaire which includes questions about their parents. If more than
one sibling is interviewed, we first keep the sibling who reported the largest number
of answers, and if equal, the youngest of the two, assuming that the parenting style
adopted with this sibling will be more similar to the MCS child. The questions are
not the same as the ones asked to the parents but serve as proxies to capture the same
aspects. We use the following questions:
• Do your parent/s set any limits on the kinds of TV programmes you can watch?
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Table 26: Descriptive statistics: other parenting style measures
Count Mean Std. dev. Min. Median Max.
Child lifestyle
Nb. of breakfast per week (s34) 17,342 6.76 1.00 0 7 7
Goes to bed at regular time (s34) 17,344 2.49 0.77 0 3 3
Siblings reported parenting style
Parents set limit to TV watching (s23) 1,136 0.65 0.48 0 1 1
Tells parents where goes when out (s23) 1,134 2.74 0.55 0 3 3
Has been out after 9pm without parents knowing (s23) 1,136 0.07 0.25 0 0 1
Child only decides what eats at home (s23) 1,145 0.17 0.37 0 0 1
Parents are strict with household chores (s23) 1,137 0.49 0.50 0 0 1
Parents check how doing in school (s23) 1,099 0.54 0.50 0 1 1
Partner's presence
Partner looks after child (s34) 17,338 2.20 1.68 0 3 5
Notes: we report in brackets sweeps (s) at which these variables are available (sweeps 2, 3 and/or 4).
Yes (1), no (0)81
• When you go out, do you tell your parent/s where you are going? Always/nearly
always (4), sometimes (3), hardly ever (2), never (1). We create a dummy equal
to one if the child says sometimes, nearly always or always.
• In the last few weeks, have you been out after nine o’clock at night without your
parent/s knowing where you were? Yes (1), no (0)
• Who usually chooses what you eat at home? We create a dummy equal to one if
the child reports that she does, and equal to zero if someone else does it for her,
or they do it together.
• Are your parent/s strict about making you do household chores? For example,
washing up or tidying your bedroom. Yes (1), no (0)
• Which statement best describes the way your parent/s check how you are doing
at school? They watch what I am doing very closely (1), they prefer me to be
independent (0)
Table 26 summarises the parenting style reported by the sibling in sweeps 2 and/or
3. These variables suggest that the majority of the sample has involved parents with
relatively strict rules: siblings have rules to watch TV, they always tell the parents
where they go when they go out, the sibling does not decide alone what she eats,
parents are strict about household chores and check how the sibling is doing at school.
Table 27 reports correlations between the parenting style measures reported by
the parents and the ones reported by the siblings for the third sweep. In the literature,
81We set this variable to missing if the household does not have a television.
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only two articles have parenting style rated by the children as well as someone else (the
parents or an external rater), and the correlations between these two measures vary
widely between the two surveys. In Wickrama et al. (1997), parenting style is evaluated
by an external coder and is significantly associated with parenting style reported by the
adolescents themselves in a latent growth curve modelling analysis. Cosconati (2009)
uses how the decision to set the curfew is made among the family. Only in 66% of the
cases, parents and children agree on the person who sets the limit. With respect to the
decisions concerning TV watching and who they are allowed to hang out with, parents
and children disagree in 56.45% and 58.69% of the cases, respectively.
In the MCS, parents who set limit on TV watching as reported by the siblings
are significantly more likely to have physical activity with the MCS child, to be more
involved in general, and to impose a regular bed time. Siblings who tells parents where
they go out are more likely to have mothers who reason with the MCS child when
naughty (correlation of 8%). Parents who do not know where the siblings go out at
night are less likely to exercise with the MCS child, to impose rules and a regular
bed time to the MCS child. Children who decide what they eat at home have their
MCS sibling less likely to have breakfast every day and to go on time to bed. Parents
who are strict with household chores are less likely to play, more likely to take away
treats from naughty children, and more likely to be strict as well in terms of bed times.
Finally, parents who are involved in their children school activities are more likely to
be also involved with their younger MCS child and to take away treats when the child
is naughty. While the sibling and parent reported parenting style are not the same,
these correlations suggest that siblings responses are in line with the parents reported
parenting style.
Parenting style of the father In the MCS, the partner of the mother, who is not
necessarily the child’s father, is interviewed if living with the mother. Questions related
to his parenting style focus on his involvement with the MCS child but nothing is asked
about his strictness. In order to test how sensitive our results are to the inclusion of
the partner’s parenting style, we use as a proxy for partner involvement the question
asked to the partner “How often do you look after the child on your own?”. We code
the answer from 0 (not at all) to 5 (every day). This variable is summarised in the last
row of Table 27. The majority of the partners look after their child more than once or
twice a week (score of 2).
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Table 27: Correlations between parenting style reported by the mother and the sibling
Sibling reported
Mother reported
Prop. to read with child 0.032 0.044 -0.007 -0.046 0.007 0.025
Prop. to do art with child 0.033 -0.012 0.046 0.016 0.039 0.032
Prop. to do physical act. with child 0.070** 0.013 -0.075** -0.002 0.033 0.017
Prop. to play with child 0.037 0.037 -0.021 0.003 -0.064** 0.068**
Total 'involvement' practices 0.076** 0.027 0.002 -0.016 0.013 0.060**
Prop. to reason naughty child -0.021 0.080*** 0.016 -0.031 -0.052* -0.029
Prop. to shout at child -0.009 -0.037 -0.002 -0.010 0.011 0.001
0.033 -0.050* -0.033 -0.010 0.108*** 0.083***
Prop. to ignore naughty child -0.001 -0.028 -0.003 0.017 0.010 0.020
Total 'strictness' practices 0.029 -0.018 -0.052* 0.000 0.034 0.035
Goes to bed regularily (0-3) 0.056* -0.001 -0.054* -0.130*** 0.070** 0.032
Nb. of breakfast per week -0.024 0.030 -0.043 -0.130*** 0.030 -0.006
Observations 1,078
Parents set 
limit to TV 
watching
Tells parents 
where goes 
when out
Has been out 
after 9pm 
without parents 
knowing
Child only 
decides what 
eats at home
Parents are 
strict with 
household 
chores
Parents check 
how doing in 
school
Prop. to take away treats from 
naughty child
Notes: Sweep 3. The columns represent the parenting style reported by the sibling, and the line by
the mother. Stars convention: * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
3.3.1.3 Socio-economic variables and other controls
Table 28 summarises the different control variables measured at sweep 3 that we use in
our analysis for the overall sample and by the child’s physical health status in sweep 4.
The last column reports t-tests for the equality of means between the children in poor
health and the ones in excellent health. Strong gradients are already present at seven
years old. Children were born with an average weight of 3.4kg and 19.2% of them at
the age of 5 already have longstanding illnesses. 70% of the mothers tried breastfeeding
at birth and they stopped on average at 6.6 weeks. Mothers are on average 34 years
old when the MCS child is 5, and 87.3% of them are in good health. Children in better
health have mothers in good health and with no longstanding illness. 76.2% of the
mothers did not smoke during pregnancy, and at the child’s age of 5, still 72.2% do not
report smoking. 78% of the children have both their parents in the household, including
adoptive fathers, and 70% of the mother’s partners are the natural father of the MCS
child. Partners’ interviews, whether they are the child’s father or not, are available in
73.8% of the cases.
In terms of the family’s socio-economic characteristics, the majority of the moth-
ers are married (67%) and children are more likely to be in better health when parents
are married. The marital status changes relatively little: between sweeps 3 and 4, 4.1%
of the mother became married, 3.4% separated, 5.3% divorced and 0.3% became widow.
The largest household income group has an income between £3,100 and £20,800, with
mainly children in fair health. The 59.1% of sample that are above that income range
tend to have children in better health. Average household size is of 4.2 persons, includ-
ing the parents and the MCS child, but is not associated with a child health gradient.
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Table 28: Descriptive statistics: socio-economic characteristics and other controls, over-
all and by child health
Overall Poor Fair Good Very good Excellent Poor /Excellent
Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD ttest
Child's age (Y) 5.219 5.189 5.220 5.222 5.214 5.216 -
(0.246) (0.286) (0.242) (0.248) (0.240) (0.247)
Child is a boy 0.511 0.600 0.572 0.559 0.524 0.505 -
(0.500) (0.500) (0.496) (0.497) (0.500) (0.500)
Weight at birth (kg) 3.399 3.112 3.275 3.333 3.382 3.412 ***
(0.513) (0.514) (0.523) (0.516) (0.506) (0.512)
Child has longstanding illness 0.192 0.800 0.572 0.423 0.261 0.116 ***
(0.394) (0.408) (0.496) (0.494) (0.439) (0.320)
M. has tried breastfeeding 0.703 0.720 0.604 0.657 0.669 0.703 ** 
(0.457) (0.458) (0.491) (0.475) (0.471) (0.457)
Age stopped breastfeeding (w) 6.595 11.258 4.351 5.678 6.371 6.911 -
(13.799) (17.690) (11.374) (12.787) (13.681) (13.982)
M.'s age (year) 34.067 33.200 32.075 32.743 33.853 34.236 ***
(5.771) (5.370) (6.211) (5.824) (5.728) (5.702)
M. is in good health 0.873 0.560 0.686 0.812 0.850 0.906 ***
(0.333) (0.507) (0.466) (0.391) (0.357) (0.292)
M: currently pregnant 0.051 0.000 0.050 0.045 0.056 0.050 -
(0.221) (0.000) (0.219) (0.208) (0.230) (0.219)
M. has longstanding illness 0.240 0.480 0.409 0.304 0.261 0.214 ***
(0.427) (0.510) (0.493) (0.460) (0.440) (0.410)
M.'s depression index 4.449 6.042 5.471 4.818 4.533 4.296 ***
(1.994) (3.605) (2.733) (2.257) (1.967) (1.872)
M. didn't smoke pregnant 0.761 0.720 0.629 0.726 0.745 0.789 ***
(0.426) (0.458) (0.485) (0.446) (0.436) (0.408)
0.450 0.576 0.746 0.530 0.488 0.384 ***
(0.899) (1.038) (1.098) (0.969) (0.924) (0.839)
M. does not smoke 0.722 0.560 0.572 0.642 0.692 0.732 ***
(0.448) (0.507) (0.496) (0.480) (0.462) (0.443)
M. smokes other tobacco products 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.004 -
(0.057) (0.000) (0.079) (0.061) (0.058) (0.062)
M.'s alcohol cons. (scale 0-6) 2.241 1.520 1.629 1.923 2.110 2.359 ***
(1.522) (1.475) (1.376) (1.469) (1.492) (1.509)
Both parents are in HH 0.780 0.640 0.635 0.719 0.768 0.797 ***
(0.414) (0.490) (0.483) (0.450) (0.422) (0.403)
M.'s partner is child's father 0.703 0.640 0.579 0.649 0.685 0.726 ***
(0.457) (0.490) (0.495) (0.478) (0.465) (0.446)
Partner interviewed 0.738 0.720 0.648 0.707 0.718 0.756 ***
(0.440) (0.458) (0.479) (0.455) (0.450) (0.430)
M. is single 0.241 0.480 0.340 0.323 0.266 0.230 ***
(0.428) (0.510) (0.475) (0.468) (0.442) (0.421)
M. became single 0.011 0.040 0.025 0.015 0.010 0.009 * 
(0.106) (0.200) (0.157) (0.122) (0.101) (0.096)
M. is married 0.670 0.520 0.516 0.598 0.649 0.683 ***
(0.470) (0.510) (0.501) (0.491) (0.478) (0.465)
M. became married 0.041 0.040 0.063 0.053 0.046 0.039 ** 
(0.198) (0.200) (0.244) (0.223) (0.210) (0.194)
M. is separated 0.034 0.000 0.069 0.039 0.038 0.030 ** 
(0.180) (0.000) (0.255) (0.195) (0.190) (0.172)
M. became separated 0.026 0.000 0.044 0.034 0.030 0.024 ** 
(0.159) (0.000) (0.206) (0.181) (0.170) (0.153)
M. is divorced 0.053 0.000 0.069 0.036 0.045 0.053 -
(0.225) (0.000) (0.255) (0.186) (0.207) (0.225)
M. became divorced 0.024 0.000 0.031 0.011 0.021 0.024 -
(0.153) (0.000) (0.175) (0.106) (0.144) (0.152)
M. is widowed 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 ** 
(0.052) (0.000) (0.079) (0.061) (0.053) (0.053)
M. became widowed 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.002 -
(0.036) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.024) (0.041)
Financial means index 4.368 4.000 3.830 4.137 4.341 4.458 ***
(0.849) (0.866) (0.943) (0.984) (0.854) (0.793)
Nb. rooms in house 6.049 5.720 5.434 5.720 5.945 6.173 ** 
(1.699) (1.487) (1.276) (1.530) (1.633) (1.708)
Whether own the house 0.702 0.560 0.528 0.597 0.679 0.742 ***
(0.458) (0.507) (0.501) (0.491) (0.467) (0.437)
M.'s nb of cigarettes during preg. 
(log)
Notes: The first column summarises the socio-economic characteristics at sweep 3. The next five
columns summarises the same variables by the child health measured at sweep 4. The last column
reports the differences between the variables when the child is in bad health vs. excellent health, and
the stars reports the ttest for equality of the means between the two groups. Stars convention: * for
p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 29: Descriptive statistics: socio-economic characteristics and other controls, over-
all and by child health (continued)
Overall Poor Fair Good Very good Excellent Poor /Excellent
Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD ttest
Annual income <£1600 0.009 0.000 0.013 0.014 0.005 0.011 ***
(0.095) (0.000) (0.115) (0.117) (0.074) (0.104)
Annual income [£1600-£3100] 0.134 0.217 0.221 0.193 0.142 0.110 ***
(0.341) (0.422) (0.417) (0.395) (0.349) (0.313)
Annual income [£3100-£10400] 0.266 0.391 0.403 0.319 0.283 0.238 ** 
(0.442) (0.499) (0.492) (0.466) (0.451) (0.426)
Annual income [£10400-£20800] 0.244 0.087 0.255 0.231 0.261 0.252 ** 
(0.430) (0.288) (0.437) (0.422) (0.439) (0.434)
Annual income [£20800-£52000] 0.239 0.130 0.107 0.181 0.230 0.259 ***
(0.426) (0.344) (0.311) (0.386) (0.421) (0.438)
Annual income >£52600 0.108 0.174 0.000 0.062 0.078 0.130 -
(0.310) (0.381) (0.000) (0.242) (0.277) (0.341)
Nb. people in HH 4.228 3.880 4.333 4.220 4.186 4.186 -
(1.142) (0.881) (1.310) (1.221) (1.094) (1.116)
Nb. siblings in HH 2.322 2.120 2.516 2.313 2.291 2.289 -
(0.988) (0.666) (1.124) (1.010) (0.937) (0.993)
Nb. natural siblings 1.233 1.160 1.277 1.266 1.231 1.236 -
(0.423) (0.374) (0.449) (0.442) (0.422) (0.425)
Grand-parents in the HH 0.032 0.040 0.031 0.047 0.039 0.026 -
(0.177) (0.200) (0.175) (0.212) (0.193) (0.160)
Freq. sees grand-parents (0-5) 3.299 3.360 3.535 3.340 3.374 3.333 -
(1.335) (1.524) (1.377) (1.402) (1.316) (1.290)
M. has A level 0.110 0.200 0.094 0.068 0.111 0.117 -
(0.313) (0.408) (0.293) (0.251) (0.314) (0.321)
M. has diploma in higher educ. 0.106 0.040 0.044 0.090 0.101 0.114 -
(0.308) (0.200) (0.206) (0.287) (0.301) (0.318)
M. has first degree 0.160 0.120 0.050 0.103 0.136 0.180 ***
(0.366) (0.332) (0.219) (0.304) (0.343) (0.385)
M. has higher degree 0.047 0.000 0.013 0.043 0.044 0.051 -
(0.212) (0.000) (0.112) (0.203) (0.205) (0.221)
M. has job 0.607 0.320 0.421 0.535 0.614 0.646 ***
(0.488) (0.476) (0.495) (0.499) (0.487) (0.478)
M. hours works per week 14.567 7.240 9.981 12.998 14.528 15.860 ***
(14.416) (11.399) (13.705) (14.458) (14.297) (14.380)
M.'s life satisfaction (1-10) 7.628 6.609 7.098 7.279 7.467 7.804 ***
(1.852) (2.518) (2.012) (1.915) (1.824) (1.773)
P. has job 0.682 0.680 0.553 0.619 0.661 0.712 ***
(0.466) (0.476) (0.499) (0.486) (0.474) (0.453)
P. hours works per week 29.287 29.200 25.032 25.976 28.103 30.672 ***
(21.814) (22.011) (24.219) (21.848) (21.739) (21.279)
White 0.894 0.800 0.836 0.839 0.891 0.920 ***
(0.308) (0.408) (0.371) (0.368) (0.311) (0.272)
Asian 0.048 0.080 0.082 0.086 0.052 0.031 -
(0.214) (0.277) (0.275) (0.281) (0.223) (0.174)
Black 0.018 0.080 0.025 0.026 0.017 0.016 -
(0.133) (0.277) (0.157) (0.160) (0.127) (0.124)
Other background 0.040 0.040 0.057 0.049 0.040 0.033 ***
(0.196) (0.200) (0.232) (0.216) (0.196) (0.180)
England 0.607 0.720 0.566 0.614 0.595 0.603 -
(0.489) (0.458) (0.497) (0.487) (0.491) (0.489)
Wales 0.163 0.120 0.195 0.156 0.169 0.171 -
(0.369) (0.332) (0.397) (0.363) (0.374) (0.376)
Scotland 0.129 0.000 0.094 0.122 0.128 0.131 * 
(0.335) (0.000) (0.293) (0.328) (0.334) (0.338)
Northern Ireland 0.101 0.160 0.145 0.109 0.109 0.096 -
(0.301) (0.374) (0.353) (0.312) (0.311) (0.294)
Observations 1,0280 25 159 533 1,756 4,209
Notes: The first column summarises the socio-economic characteristics at sweep 3. The next five
columns summarises the same variables by the child health measured at sweep 4. The last column
reports the differences between the variables when the child is in bad health vs. excellent health, and
the stars reports the ttest for equality of the means between the two groups. Stars convention: * for
p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, and *** for p<0.001.
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As grandparents may play a important role in the child’s development, we control
for the frequency at which they see the MCS child. The variable ranges from 0 for not
at all or dead, to 5 for almost every day or everyday. Only 3.2% of the grandparents live
in the same household as the MCS child but the children in the sample still see their
grandparents more than once or twice a week (score of 3 on average). Grandparents’
presence is not associated with difference in child health.
A higher educational degree than a first degree is only held by 4.7% of the
mothers and their child is more likely to be in a very good health. 16% of the sample
have a first degree and similarly are more likely to have children in better health. By
contrast, mothers with an A-level, who represent 11% of the sample, are more likely to
have a child in poor health. 60.7% of the mothers currently have a job, but work on
average 14.6 hours per week. Mother’s life-satisfaction is on average of 7.6 on a range
from 1 to 10, and it is positively correlated with the child health.
68.2% of the mothers have a partner who has a job. The majority (89.4%) of the
MCS children is White, among which 92% are in excellent health. Other background,
including Asian, Black and any mix origins, are more likely not to be in excellent health.
Children in England and Northern Ireland tend to be in worse health than children in
Wales and Scotland.
3.3.2 Unconditional correlations
We start by presenting some simple correlations between the outcomes of interest, the
different parenting style measures and the socio-economic variables.
3.3.2.1 Child outcomes and socio-economic variables
The literature has shown associations between income and various children’s outcomes.
For example, parents with higher income have children who perform better in school,
and have better mental and physical health (Currie, 2009, Currie and Stabile, 2003).
Figure 4 illustrates that similar associations are found in our data in terms of parents’
financial means.82 In the first graph (A), we see that the proportion of healthy children
as reported by the parents is much higher in the wealthier group. The wealthier parents
are also associated with a higher children’s distribution of the cognitive ability score
(graph B), lower externalising behavioural problems (graph C) and child emotional
symptoms (graph D).
82We construct an indicator of financial means as the positive answers to: the child has a waterproof
coat, the child has at least two pairs of shoes, family can afford holiday, mother has some money left
to spend for herself, and she has money for special occasions. Child Parents belong to the wealthy
group when their financial means index is 4 or above.
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Figure 5 represents the relationship between the mother’s education and the
same children outcomes. Mothers with a high educational degree, defined as having a
diploma in higher education or more, have children in better physical health (graph E),
who perform better in school (graph F), less externalising behavioural problems (graph
G), and slightly less emotional symptoms (graph H).
3.3.2.2 Parenting style and socio-economic variables
We start by describing how our parenting style measures are correlated with the main
socio-economic measures. The correlations are reported in Table 30.
First, marital status is significantly correlated with certain measures of mother’s
involvement. For example, married mothers are more likely to read with the child,
but less likely to have some artistic activities with the child. Divorced and separated
mothers have the opposite correlations. Married mothers are also more likely to reason
with a naughty child and less likely to ignore him. Finally, they are also more likely
to impose regular breakfast and bed times. Divorced mothers are generally less likely
to be involved with the child nor to supervise him. Second, financial means is signific-
antly positively associated with all the involvement measures, except artistic activities.
Higher financial means is positively associated with reasoning with a naughty child,
and negatively associated with all the other punishment methods. Similar to married
mothers, household with higher financial means are also associated with a healthier life-
style for their child. Third, working mothers, similar to mothers with some educational
degrees, are more likely to spend time reading to their child. However, working mothers
are less likely to be involved with their child in general. However, there is no significant
correlations between a working mother, or the amount she works, and strictness. Forth,
White women are more likely to be involved and strict. Finally, non-smoking mothers
are more likely to reason with naughty children, but less likely to be very strict, and are
more likely to impose a healthy lifestyle to their child. Similarly, mothers who consume
alcohol are also more likely to reason with a naughty child and to impose a healthy
lifestyle.
3.3.2.3 Parenting style and children outcomes
As emphasised in the psychology literature, strong correlations exist between parenting
style and children outcomes. These are reported in Table 31. For example, children in
better health are more likely to have involved parents, and less likely to have parents
using numerous punishment measures. BMI is however not correlated with parenting
practices. Externalising behavioural problems are associated with restrictive parents,
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and only reasoning with a naughty child appears to be negatively related with those
problems. Contrarily, internalising problems reported by the child are significantly cor-
related with the lack of the mother’s involvement with her child, and mothers who
ignore their naughty child increase their malaise. Finally, cognitive ability reported by
the teacher is significantly positively correlated with the propensity of the mother to
read with her child, but negatively with the other involvement measures such having
some artistic activity or physical activity with the child. Reasoning with the child
instead of taking away treats from him, as well as healthy lifestyle, are positively asso-
ciated with the child’s cognitive abilities.
Table 31: Correlations of parenting style and child outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Hyperactivity
Prop. to read with child 0.050*** -0.001 -0.095*** -0.091*** -0.025* -0.008 0.109***
Prop. to do art with child -0.013 0.008 -0.001 0.011 0.030* -0.027* -0.032*
Prop. to do physical act. with child 0.036** 0.009 0.008 0.005 -0.026* -0.036** -0.038*
Prop. to play with child 0.032** -0.001 -0.016 -0.028* -0.000 -0.040** -0.008
Total 'involvement' practices 0.038** 0.020 -0.081*** -0.050*** 0.007 -0.065*** 0.006
Prop. to reason naughty child 0.042*** -0.018 -0.050*** -0.045*** -0.050*** 0.020 0.083***
Prop. to shout at child 0.001 0.012 0.124*** 0.073*** 0.022 0.008 0.000
-0.006 -0.003 0.113*** 0.090*** 0.007 -0.006 -0.059***
Prop. to ignore naughty child -0.031* -0.034** 0.128*** 0.069*** 0.058*** 0.029* -0.025
Total 'strictness' practices -0.028* -0.011 0.295*** 0.219*** 0.117*** 0.066*** -0.017
Goes to bed regularily 0.063*** -0.061*** -0.094*** -0.089*** -0.055*** 0.018 0.110***
Nb. of breakfast per week 0.060*** -0.072*** -0.079*** -0.070*** -0.079*** 0.001 0.103***
Observations 10,281
Child 
health
BMI 
(interviewer)
Externalising 
behaviour
Internalising 
behaviour
Internalising 
behaviour 
(child rep.)
Cognitive 
ability 
(teacher)
Prop. to take away treats from 
naughty child
Notes: Correlations reported for sweep 3. Child health is a binary variable equal to 1 if the child is in
good, very good or excellent health, and 0 otherwise. Stars convention: * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01,
and *** for p<0.001.
3.4 Estimation Methods
Our objective is to understand the role of parenting style in the child’s development, par-
ticularly of physical and mental health. We start with a simple child health production
function to understand the correlations between parenting style and the different out-
comes of interest. Second, we want to understand the role of unobserved heterogeneity
and reverse causality in this relationship. We therefore investigate different specification
to see how sensitive our results are. Third, we investigate the robustness of the results
to possible reporting bias by replacing mothers reported outcomes and parenting style
by measures reported by someone else. We use child’s health outcomes reported by the
teacher and the child, and parenting style reported by the siblings. Fourth, we include
in our main specification the partner’s presence to get some estimates of the effect of
the role of the male figure. Finally, as we have assumed that parenting style may be
a pathway through which socio-economic factors affect the child’s health, we compare
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how the effect of socio-economic factors varies over the different methods, and how it
varies within different socio-economic subgroups.
3.4.1 Ordinary least squares and probit cross-section models
We start with a simple model where a mother choses her parenting style Pia to maximise
at age a her current utility U(Pia, H(Pia, XHia , µHia), XUia, µUia) which depends on the child’s
health Hia, Pia, and some observable XUia and unobservables exogenous factors µUia. The
child’s health is affected by his mother’s parenting style Pia as well as observable XHia
and unobservables µHia covariates. In this simple framework, everything is measured
simultaneously at the age a for child i.
When the mother solves her maximisation problem, her optimal parenting style
Pia = P
∗(XHia , X
U
ia, µ
H
ia, µ
U
ia) is a function of all the observables and unobservable covari-
ates, and the child’s health Hia = H(P ∗ia(XHia , XUia, µHia, µUia), XHia , µHia) can be expressed
as a function of the current optimal parenting style. The child’s health production
function can then be estimated as
Hia = β
OLS
0 + P
∗
iaβ
OLS
P +X
H
iaβ
OLS
X + µia (42)
where the outcome H represents physical health, mental health, or behavioural prob-
lems and is measured for the child i at age a.83 We first estimate equation (42) for ages
a = 5, 7 using ordinary least squares (OLS). This approach gives us an idea of the dif-
ferent conditional correlations between the parenting style measures and the outcomes
captured by the βOLSP . As we separately analyse total mother’s involvement and punit-
ive measures, and specific measures of parenting style, Pm is either a two-dimensional
vector that reports the total of mother’s involvement and rules or a vector of eight84
specific mother’s rearing practices.
The child physical health is captured by a binary variable which is equal to one
if the child is in good, very good or excellent health, and zero otherwise. We define the
underlying child health as
H∗ia = β
latent
0 + P
∗
iaβ
latent
P +X
H
iaβ
latent
X + µia (43)
where H∗ia is the continuous latent child physical health. As we observe Hia = 1 if
83We also analyse the role of parenting style on cognitive ability in which case H represents cog-
nitive ability, but as our main focus is health outcomes, we present the regressions in terms of health
production functions.
84Or ten when including the lifestyle related parenting practices.
130
H∗ia > 0 or Hia = 0 if H∗ia 6 0 we can estimate
Pr(Hia = 1) = Pr(β
latent
0 + P
∗
iaβ
latent
P +X
H
iaβ
latent
X + µia > 0) (44)
= F (βlatent0 + P
∗
iaβ
latent
P +X
H
iaβ
latent
X ) (45)
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of −µia. We assume that it follows
a standard normal distribution.
3.4.2 Unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality
From a policy point of view, it is important to know whether and to what extent these
effects can be causal. The identification of the causal effect is difficult using survey
data. Unmeasured variables, such as parental skills may be correlated with the child’s
outcomes as well as parenting style. If these unobservable variables are not accounted
for, the estimated effects will be biased estimates of the true causal effect. Therefore, we
progressively control for these unobservable confounding factors to get closer to causal
estimates.
The unbiasedness of the βOLSP coefficients relies on strong assumptions. The error
term can be decomposed such that µia = εia + ηi where εia contains the time-varying
unobservable characteristics such as abilities, and ηi the unobservable time-invariant
characteristics such genetic endowment. We refer to ηi as the family effect, but as we
observe one child by family and natural mothers only, it is equivalent to a child’s or
mother’s fixed effect. Equation (42) can be expressed as
Hia = β
FE
0 + P
∗
iaβ
FE
P +X
H
iaβ
FE
X + ε
H
ia + η
H
i . (46)
If the fixed component of the error term is correlated with the parenting style
variable Pia, the estimated coefficients βOLSP will be biased. One can think of various
reasons for which this would be the case, such as genetic endowment, or mother’s
or child’s characteristics that affect the mother’s parenting style and the outcomes.
Family’s beliefs or other family’s characteristics could also be an issue like a residence
close to a noisy road could affect the mother’s parenting style, and at the same time
the noise could have a detrimental effect on the child. Depending on the direction of
the effects, the coefficients over- or under-estimate the causal effects.
We allow for fixed unobserved heterogeneity by using a fixed effect (FE) model
that removes the fixed effects by taking the first age differences. We performed Hausman
tests that rejected the null hypothesis that the random effect model provides consistent
estimates. For the child physical health that is measured as a binary variable, we use
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a FE logit that can be estimated using the conditional maximum likelihood estimator
(Cameron and Triverdi, 2005). FE probit cannot be estimated due to the problem of
incidental parameters (Neyman and Scott, 1948).
The FE approach is common and straightforward to implement, but has three
major weaknesses. First, it does not allow us to estimate the coefficients of the variables
that are constant over time (e.g. gender), as it removes these variables from the equation
when taking the first differences. Second, it cannot be estimated if there is too little
variation in parenting style or in the child’s outcome. Finally, simultaneity and reverse
causality are potentially still an issue.
Very little attention has been given in the parenting style literature to simultan-
eity. The bulk of the studies on the parent-child relationship has been conceptualised as
a flow from the parents to their children. It is unlikely however to be a uni-directional
process, but rather a process where the children are also active agents (see Maccoby
and Martin, 1983, Kuczynski, 2003 among others). For example, a disciplinary correc-
tion is often triggered by a child’s inappropriate behaviour. Research such as Cunha
and Heckman (2008) and Cunha et al. (2010) emphasise the importance of unobserved
child-specific endowments that affect the inputs’ effects. Based on five parenting style
domains, Grusec (2010) illustrates that the optimal parenting style to favour the child’s
socialisation process should be in response to the child’s behaviour. This bidirectional-
lity of the relationship creates an endogeneity problem.
The simultaneity problem is reduced if we assume that parenting style does not
have an immediate effect on the child’s health, but only in the next period so that the
health production function is now H(Pia−1, XHia , µHia). Optimal parenting style, given
sufficient separability in preferences, is now Pia = P ∗(XHia+1, XUia, µHia+1, µUia) so that the
mother chooses her parenting style as function of the current covariates that affect her
utility as well as the anticipated factors that affect her child’s health.
With parenting style assumed to have only a lagged effect on the child’s health,
the estimated health production function becomes
Hia = β
LAG
0 + P
∗
ia−1β
LAG
P +X
H
iaβ
LAG
X + µ
H
ia (47)
where a is measured at the age of 7 (sweep 4) and a− 1 at the age of 5 (sweep 3).
The unbiasedness of equation (47) relies among others on the assumption that
there is no unobserved factor affecting the child health at age a and parenting style at
age a− 1. If this assumption is violated, this possible unobserved heterogeneity can be
taken into account either using a two-step approach that exploits exogenous variation in
the parenting style variables that are independent of the children’s future outcome, or by
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estimating jointly the parenting style and the health production function. The former
approach requires instrumental variables to estimate in a first step the optimal parenting
style. However, the validity of instrumental variables requires that they do not influence
the child’s health apart from an indirect effect via parenting style. For example, a good
instrument would be whether the mother has attended parenting classes that discuss
the benefit of certain rearing practices. However, such information is not available in
the data, and related variables such as the presence of the mother’s mother to help her
in her household management could have a direct effect on the child’s wellbeing. As it
is difficult to find a variable that is a robust instrument, we implement the approach
that relies on identification on the structural form. This identification strategy has
been introduced by Contoyannis and Jones (2004a) and further developed by Balia and
Jones (2008) to disentangle physical health, morbidity, mortality and lifestyle. Parallels
can be drawn to disentangle here parenting style and children’s outcomes.
Contoyannis and Jones (2004a) show that the model can be empirically specified
in a recursive form with a reduced form equation for parenting style (lifestyles in their
case), and a structural form for the child’s production function (the individual’s health
production function in their case). In this specification, the endogeneity of parenting
style comes from unobservable heterogeneity, and not from a direct effect of child’s
outcome on parenting style as parenting style is assumed to have a delayed effect on
the outcome. To illustrate the unobserved heterogeneity problem, let us formulate the
child’s health production function and the parenting style equation as
Hia = β
REC
0 + Pia−1β
REC
P +X
H
iaβ
REC
X + µ
H
ia (48)
Pia−1 = αREC +XPia−1α
REC
X + µ
P
ia−1 (49)
As before, the child’s health Hia is either a measure of physical or mental health.
Parenting style Pia is a vector of two dimensions when we analyse total involvement
and total strictness, or a vector of eight measures of parenting style when we look at
the specific practices, or of ten when we include two parenting style aspects related to
the child’s lifestyle. By estimating the system of equations jointly, we are able to take
into account the the unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of the parenting
style measures in the health equation.
Depending on the health outcome of interest, the dependant variable Hia can
either be cardinal (e.g. hyperactivity index) or binary (e.g. whether the child is de-
pressed as reported by the teacher). The errors terms of the equations have a mul-
tivariate normal distribution µi ∼MVN(0,Σ) where Σ is the correlation matrix of the
multivariate normal. As only the final stage, that is the health outcome equation (48),
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is fully specified, the system of equation can be estimated by maximum simulated like-
lihood, and the evaluation of the multidimensional integral can be implemented using
the Geweke–Hajivassiliou–Keane (GHK) simulator (Hajivassiliou et al., 1996).85
Identification only requires variations in the set of exogenous regressors and
exclusion restrictions are not necessary, so that identification is by functional form.
Nevertheless, as the identification relies on the assumption of multivariate normality
and exclusion restrictions are often used to improve identification (Jones, 2006), we
include additional covariates in the parenting style equations that are summarised in
the Appendix B.1 in Table 82. First, we include variables related to the mother’s life
experience before she had the MCS child (whether her own parents have ever lived
together, whether they divorced, and whether she left home before age 17). We assume
that these events could have an effect on her character and thus her parenting style,
but not directly on her child’s health. Second, we include more information on the
type of work she does (whether she is self-employed, whether she is a manager or a
supervisor at work, whether she works from home or at night, the number of days per
week she works, whether she works at night), controlling for whether the mother works
and the number of hours she works in both equations. The same type of information
is included for the partner if he is present assuming his level of stress also affects the
mother’s parenting style (whether he is self-employed and whether he is a manager or a
supervisor at work). The argument, similar to Burton et al. (2002), is that if a mother
works, she will have less time to take care of her child which directly influences his
health. However the type of works she does, such as being an employer, a manager
or self-employed, certainly affects her attitude at home and thus her parenting style.
Third, we include information on the mother’s personality traits such as whether she
spends time with friends, has a religion and attends religious meetings, as these aspects
may affect her values and thus her parenting style. Finally, we also control for whether
the mother and partner disagree on child’s related issues.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
3.4.3.1 Reporting bias
The main measures of child health and parenting style used to estimate the health
production functions are reported by the mother. However, the mother may introduce
a systematic reporting bias. In order to estimate the importance of the bias, we use
alternative outcomes of the child’s physical and mental health that are not reported
by the mother. For physical health, we consider the child’s BMI measured the by
85In practise, we implement the regressions in STATA using the “cmp” command.
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interviewer, and for the mental health, we analyse measures reported by the school
teacher. Similarly, we use parenting style reported by the older siblings.
3.4.3.2 Role of the father
Most of the literature on parenting style has focused on the mother’s parenting style,
and very little is known about the role of the father. However, it is important to know
whether the father’s parenting style also plays a role in the child’s health production
function. We are not able to distinguish between a complementary or substitute role
of the father to the mother’s parenting style because of the lack of information on the
father within the family, but can assess the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of
the father’s role. We replicate our results (equations (48) and (49)) to account for the
involvement of the mother’s partner. Our system of equations becomes:
Hia = β
PAR
0 + P
∗
ia−1β
PAR
P +X
H
iaβ
PAR
X + Partneria−1β
PAR
X + µ
H
ia (50)
Pia−1 = αPAR +XPia−1α
PAR
X + µ
P
ia−1 (51)
where Partneria−1 captures the father’s role in the health production function (this
variable is described in the last part of Section 3.3.1.2). Although all our results ac-
count for the presence of a partner, whether this partner is the child’s father, and his
working status to proxy his available time for the family, the inclusion of the partner’s
involvement allows us to see whether the effect of the mother’s parenting style depends
on the partner’s role.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Mother’s parenting style and children’s outcomes
For each estimation method, we present in the first column the results using the total
involvement and total strictness indices. This allows us to capture parenting style in
the same way as it has been done in the literature. Then, in the following columns of
each estimation approach, we use the specific measures of parenting style. For each of
the physical and mental health outcomes, we present the results of the pooled probit or
OLS (equation (42)). Then, we attempt to account for unobserved heterogeneity using
FE in columns 3 and 4 (equation (46)) for the same measures of parenting style.86 In
86For the child physical health measured as a binary variable, the recursive system of equations,
which is our most robust method, can only be estimated using a probit specification. Therefore, all
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columns 5 and 6, we start by addressing the problem of simultaneity using parenting
style reported at age 5 and the child’s outcome at age 7 (equation (47)). Finally,
we account for simultaneity and unobserved correlations (equations (48) and (49)) in
columns 7-9. Column 7 and 8 report the results using indices and the different measures
of parenting style, respectively, and controlling for the parenting style related to the
child’s lifestyle but assuming they are exogenous (frequency of breakfast per week, and
going to bed regularly). Finally, column 9 includes the child health related activities as
additional endogenous parenting style measures. We describe each outcome in details
below. We refer to the mother as “she” and to the child as “he”.
In each estimation of the health production function, we control for the child’s
age and gender, his weight at birth, whether he has any longstanding illness, whether the
mother tried breastfeeding him and at which age (in weeks) she stopped, mother’s age
and age squared, whether she reports having a good health, whether she is currently
pregnant, whether she has any longstanding illness or is depressed, the number of
cigarettes she smoked during pregnancy, whether she currently smokes cigarettes or any
other tobacco products, her frequency of alcohol consumption, whether both parents
live in the household and whether the mother’s partner is the MCS child’s father, the
mother’s marital status and any change since last interview, the household income range
and whether they own their house, the mother’s highest educational degree, her and
her partner’s job status, the size of the household and the presence of grandparents,
the mother’s life satisfaction, the child’s origin, where they live in the UK, and a sweep
dummy for the last interview when we pool the data over sweeps 3 and 4.
In the models for parenting style, we control for the same regressors, as well
as the additional variables (working responsibilities, previous life experiences, religious
views, quality of relationship between parents) described in details at the end of Section
3.4.2 to improve the identification of the recursive system of equations.
3.5.1.1 Physical health
The analysis of parenting style and the child’s probability to be in good health is
reported in Table 32, and the full set of results with the whole set of covariates for
some of the selected health regressions is presented in Appendix B in Tables 83 and 84.
The models are estimated using probit and logit fixed effect and the average marginal
effects are reported.86
the other methods use probit for comparison, except the FE model which can only be estimated using
FE logit.
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Table 32: Child physical health (probability to be in good health)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit FE Logit Probit Recursive specifications (P)
PS S3,4 PS S3,4 Health S4, PS S3 Health S4, PS S3 
0.000 0.006 0.000 -0.003
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.004)
Prop. to read with child -0.001 -0.132 -0.001 0.201 0.222
(0.005) (0.381) (0.005) (0.530) (0.276)
Prop. to do art with child -0.003 0.032 -0.004 0.386 0.268
(0.004) (0.098) (0.004) (0.738) (0.241)
0.009** 0.089 0.006 -0.327 -0.335
(0.004) (0.242) (0.003) (0.760) (0.341)
Prop. to play with child 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.124 0.161
(0.003) (0.070) (0.003) (0.485) (0.278)
Total 'rules' actions 0.000 -0.016 0.000 0.005
(0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.004)
0.002 0.048 0.002 0.086*** 0.011**
(0.003) (0.135) (0.003) (0.519) (0.227)
Prop. to shout at child 0.001 -0.077 0.005** 0.179 0.079
(0.003) (0.220) (0.003) (0.209) (0.150)
0.004* 0.008 0.006** 0.199** 0.153**
(0.002) (0.060) (0.002) (0.220) (0.141)
-0.001 -0.061 0.001 -0.119 -0.031
(0.002) (0.166) (0.002) (0.174) (0.124)
0.000 0.000 -0.038 -0.025 0.000 0.000 0.018*** 0.009 -0.044
(0.001) (0.001) (0.073) (0.072) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.015) (0.056)
Nb. days has breakfast 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.056 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.004 0.155
(0.001) (0.001) (0.086) (0.087) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.012) (0.064)
N_clust 9,038 9,038 248 248
N 14,944 14,944 496 496 6,546 6,546 12,061 12,061 12,061
r2 0.251 0.253 0.295 0.317 0.281 0.290
Total 'involvement' 
practices
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Goes to bed regularily  
 (0-3)
Notes: S: sweep, PS: parenting style. Child health is dichotomised (0 for poor and fair health, 1 for
good, very good or excellent). The results are the average marginal effects at means for the following
regressions: columns 1 and 2 are estimated using pooled probit over sweeps 3 and 4. Columns 3 and
4 report the results from fixed effect (FE) logit regressions. Columns 5 and 6 regress child health in
sweep 4 on controls in sweep 4 and parenting style in sweep 3 is estimated using probit. The recursive
specifications estimate the child health production function for health measured at age 7 (sweep 4)
and the reduced form of parenting style measured at age 5 (sweep 3) based on probit. Colums 7 and 8
assume that the overall parenting style indices and the specific measures of parenting style, respectively,
are endogenous but not the lifestyle measures. Column 9 allows the parenting style variables as well
as the lifestyle variables to be endogenous. Robust standard errors clustered at the family level are
given in parenthesis. Stars convention: * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.01.
First of all, the mother’s total involvement and strictness is never significantly
correlated with the child physical health in any of the models.
When we look at the specific measures of involvement, first in the naive pooled
OLS over sweeps 3 and 4, only physical activity is beneficial to child health. However,
this seems to be due to endogeneity as all the other following approaches do not find a
significant effect of physical activities on health. The analysis of the specific measures of
strictness in the OLS specification suggests that taking away treats from a naughty child
is beneficial to his health, whereas the other measures are not significantly correlated
with the child physical health. Having breakfast in the morning is positively associated
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with the child’s health whereas having regular bed times is not correlated with the child
physical health.
Theses results are associations and can be quite remote from the causal effects
of parenting style on the child’s health. A way of capturing unobserved heterogeneity is
to keep only the effect of variation around the overall health’s mean and parenting style
measures’ means by including a fixed effect (equation (46)). This is done in columns 3
and 4. The first striking point is that the sample is reduced from 14,944 observations
to 496 observations. This is because FE logit can only be identified for the children
that have a change in their reported physical health between sweeps 3 and 4.
Although fixed effect is attractive as it removes some of the bias associated with
unobservable time-invariant factors, it may not be a good approach to investigate the
role of parenting style on the child’s health. There is not much variation in parenting
style and outcomes over the two sweeps. Table 33 summarises for the measures of
parenting style, physical and mental health the changes between sweeps 3 and 4. The
child’s overall health improves on average by 0.141 on a range of 1 to 5. However, at
least 80% of the sample experience, if anything, a change of just one point in their
reported physical health. When we look at the change in the probability to be in
good health, similarly at least 80% do not change their health status. This suggests
very small health shocks at these ages and thus makes difficult the identification of the
model using fixed effect.
In order to avoid the problem of simultaneity, columns 5 and 6 present the
results where parenting style is measured at sweep 3 when the child is 5 years old and
the outcome is measured at sweep 4 when the child is 7 years old. This removes the
simultaneity bias if the lagged specification of the health production function is correct.
The various measures of involvement still do not affect the child’s health, however
the analysis of the specific measures of strictness suggests that shouting at the naughty
child and taking away treats may be beneficial for his health. Lifestyle measures are
now insignificant.
Finally, simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity are jointly taken into account
in columns 7-9. The results are based on the recursive system of equations ((48) and
(49)) which incorporates unobservable heterogeneity affecting both the child’s health
and the parenting style. Unobserved heterogeneity includes factors that affects the
mother’s marginal utility of the child’s health and parenting style which may be re-
lated to preferences, beliefs, or family characteristics including genetics. The difference
between this approach and fixed effect is that it allows us to use the overall variation in
the mother’s parenting style on the child’s health, not just the effect of within variation
when estimating the effect of parenting style. At the same time, it also addresses the
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simultaneity problem if the lagged specification of the child’s health is correct.
As previously observed, total mother’s involvement and specific measures of in-
volvement do not affect the child’s health. Reasoning with the naughty child and taking
away treats are beneficial to his physical health, even when we assume that the parents’
lifestyle measures are also endogenous, although the effect is then reduced. There is
a difference of 11 percentage points in the probability to report good health between
a mother who never reasons her naughty child and a mother who does it as her main
strictness measure. The difference is of 15.3 percentage points for taking away treats
from a naughty child, again between a mother who never does it and a mother who does
it most of the time. Going to bed regularly has a positive effect on the child’s health,
but the significant effect of the lifestyle measures disappears once we allow them to be
endogenous.
The importance of the unobserved heterogeneity can be assessed by looking at
the correlation matrix of the error terms of the system of equations. These are reported
in Table 34 for the specification in column 9 of Table 33. There is moderate support for
endogeneity; only unobservables which affect the propensity to take away treats from
naughty children are positively and significantly correlated with unobservables affecting
the child’s health. It explains why the effect of taking away treats from a naughty child
becomes larger once we take into account unobserved heterogeneity. However, having
just this aspect correlated with the child’s outcome suggests only a moderate gain in
estimating the recursive system of equations.
The errors terms in the parenting style equations are strongly related to each
other. For example, unobserved factors positively affecting the propensity to read with
the child are also positively correlated with the propensity to have some physical activity
with the child, to reason with him, ignore or take away treats from the naughty child,
to put the child to bed at regular time to give him breakfast regularly, and significantly
negatively correlated with the propensity to shout at the naughty child. Parents who
have a child who has regularly breakfast in the morning are also more likely to read and
play with their child and have some physical activity with him. They are more likely
to reason with their naughty child and to put him in bed regularly, but less likely to
shout at him or ignore him.
Reporting bias - BMI We now compare these results to the ones obtained when
the child’s health is not reported by the mother. The other advantage of analysing BMI
is that it is also a more objective measure of the child’s overall physical health. We
analyse the same regressions as in the case of the probability to be in good health, but
now use linear models, as the variable is cardinal. The results are presented in Table
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85 in Appendix B.
Before interpreting these results, it is important to note that the estimated effect
of parenting style on BMI specified as such does not allow us to assess the beneficial
effect of parenting style, but just whether there is any association. BMI for children
cannot be directly used to define under-weight or over-weight children, but should be
interpreted relative to peers in terms of age and gender. Moreover, a healthy BMI
has an inverted U-shape which implies that depending on where the average BMI is, a
healthy measure can either be one that reduces or increases the BMI. Therefore, what
we want to see here is whether parenting style has any effect on BMI.
The results suggest that very few aspects of parenting style seem to affect BMI,
apart from the lifestyle related measures. Overall involvement is significantly positively
correlated with the child’s BMI when we take into account unobserved heterogeneity,
but no specific measure of involvement appears to matter more than another. Strictness
generally does not affect BMI. The lifestyle variables have a more consistent effect.
Going to bed at a regular time and having breakfast in the mornings reduce BMI,
although only the latter remains significant in the endogenous specification (column 9).
Its effect is the largest once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account.
The analysis of the correlation matrix in Table 86 in Appendix B suggests that
unobservable factors affecting BMI are also positively correlated with unobservable
factors affecting the mother propensity to read with the child and to reason with
naughty child, but negatively with the propensity to have some artistic activities with
the child. However, while the unobserved heterogeneity seems to be more of an issue
in the case of BMI, there remains little effect of parenting style on the child’s BMI.
In summary, in the case of physical health, the effects of parenting style are
quite weak and endogeneity of parenting style appears not to be a crucial issue. These
results are comparable to Belsky et al. (2006) who find a significant correlation between
parenting style and children’s health at the age of six, but the significance of the results
disappear once they control for the socio-economic factors. The weak association we
find between parent practices and BMI is supported by Gibson et al. (2007) and Wake
et al. (2007) who find no association between childhood obesity and a broad range of
family factors and mother’s parenting style. This may explain why parenting style has
attracted so little attention in the health literature.
Is parenting style a pathway between socio-economic factors and children’s
physical health? The final aspect to analyse is the role of socio-economic factors
and whether accounting for parenting style explains some of this relationship.
Tables 83 and 84 in Appendix B report the average marginal effects of the full set
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of controls when we do not control for parenting style, and for the pooled specification
in columns 1 and 2 in Table 32 when we do. The probability to be in good health
is positively associated with birth weight, and unsurprisingly negatively related to the
presence of longstanding illnesses. The age of the mother is not significant, but her
health is positively associated with her child’s health. The cigarette consumption of
the mother is not associated with the child’s health, but the child is more likely to
be in better health if she smokes another tobacco product than cigarettes. High an-
nual income is positively associated with the child’s health, although owning her own
house is negatively associated with the child’s health. More educated mothers have
children in significantly better health. The three sets of estimates of the effect of socio-
economic variables are almost identical suggesting that parenting style does not explain
the association between socio-economic factors and children’s physical health.
3.5.1.2 Externalising behavioural problems
We now investigate the relationship between rearing practices and externalising beha-
vioural problems. Table 35 reports the results for the various regressions. The results
are robust throughout the different methods. The mother’s total involvement is bene-
ficial to the child and reduces his behavioural problems. Although having some artistic
activity with the child and some physical activity reduce his behavioural problems, only
reading to the child has a consistent effect throughout the different approaches, and its
effect is much stronger once we account for unobserved heterogeneity. A mother who
mostly reads to her child compared to a mother who never does, reports on average a
lower externalising behavioural index of 0.8.
However, many rules increase externalising behavioural problems, and the overall
effect is constant even after allowing for endogeneity. The strictness measures that
matter are shouting at a naughty child or ignoring him. The negative impact of shouting
is twice as big once we take into account unobserved heterogeneity. Mothers who mostly
shout compared to mothers who do not shout at their naughty child have children with
on average an index of externalising behaviour that is 1.234 larger.
Good lifestyle practices improve the child’s behavioural problems. Going to bed
regularly compared to not going to bed regularly decreases the index of 0.189. Ac-
counting for the endogeneity of parenting style practices related to lifestyle (column 9)
suggests that going to bed regularly is even more important in reducing the hyperactiv-
ity problems than when we omit to account for the unobserved heterogeneity.
These results can be compared to those for the hyperactivity index which is
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Table 35: Externalising behavioural problems index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pooled OLS FE Lagged OLS Recursive specifications
PS S3,4 PS S3,4 Health S4, PS S3 Health S4, PS S3 
-0.040*** -0.019** -0.030*** -0.050**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021)
Prop. to read with child -0.411*** -0.102 -0.399** -0.806* -0.748*
(0.096) (0.104) (0.162) (0.436) (0.437)
Prop. to do art with child -0.245*** 0.029 -0.205* -0.138 -0.120
(0.070) (0.083) (0.116) (0.341) (0.339)
0.026 -0.157* 0.115 0.053 0.048
(0.070) (0.081) (0.107) (0.305) (0.304)
Prop. to play with child -0.153** 0.001 -0.064 0.005 0.014
(0.064) (0.076) (0.101) (0.296) (0.295)
Total 'rules' actions 0.257*** 0.134*** 0.189*** 0.257***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.022)
0.337*** 0.169** 0.086 0.393 0.391
(0.069) (0.085) (0.109) (0.302) (0.300)
Prop. to shout at child 0.577*** 0.114 0.554*** 1.243*** 1.234***
(0.053) (0.070) (0.078) (0.229) (0.228)
0.369*** 0.035 0.369*** 0.203 0.225
(0.049) (0.063) (0.070) (0.210) (0.211)
0.639*** 0.263*** 0.400*** 0.792*** 0.776***
(0.042) (0.055) (0.061) (0.186) (0.186)
-0.149*** -0.164*** -0.056** -0.055** -0.120*** -0.125*** -0.118*** -0.124*** -0.189**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.082)
Nb. days has breakfast -0.045*** -0.037** -0.036* -0.035 -0.057** -0.052** -0.053** -0.050** -0.119*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.061)
N_clust 8,918 8,918 8,918 8,918
N 14,582 14,582 14,582 14,582 6,468 6,468 10,251 10,251 10,251
r2 0.263 0.174 0.078 0.049 0.210 0.164
Total 'involvement' 
practices
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Goes to bed regularily  
 (0-3)
Notes: S: sweep, PS: parenting style. Columns 1 and 2 are pooled OLS over sweeps 3 and 4. Columns
3 and 4 report the results from fixed effect (FE) regressions of child health measured in sweeps 3 and
4. Columns 5 and 6 report the results from a regression of the mental health of the child measured in
sweep 4 on controls in sweep 4 and parenting style in sweep 3. The recursive specifications estimate
the child health production function for mental health measured at age 7 (sweep 4) and the reduced
form of parenting style measured at age 5 (sweep 3). Colums 7 and 8 assume that the overall parenting
style indices or the specific measures are endogenous, but not the lifestyle measures. Column 9 allows
the parenting style variables as well as the lifestyle variables to be endogenous. Robust standard errors
clustered at the family level are given in parenthesis. Stars convention: * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and
*** for p<.01.
an alternative measure of externalising behavioural problems.87 The main difference
between Tables 35 and 36 is that the overall index of involvement that is no longer
significant once we take into account unobserved heterogeneity. However, reading with
the child has a beneficial effect on the child’s behaviour in the same proportion as
with the externalising behavioural problems index. The total strictness index still
has a negative effect of about 2.5 on the child’s behaviour. The effect of shouting
remains bad for the child but is less strong than it was on the externalising behavioural
problems index (0.5 on the hyperactivity index vs. 1.2 on the externalising behavioural
index). Ignoring a naughty child also increases his hyperactivity and is stronger once
87See Section 3.3.1.2 for more details on its construction.
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Table 36: Hyperactivity problems index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pooled OLS FE Lagged OLS Recursive specifications (cont)
PS S3,4 PS S3,4 Health S4, PS S3 Health S4, PS S3 
-0.015** -0.006 -0.024** -0.023
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.025)
Prop. to read with child -0.332*** -0.045 -0.454** -1.006* -0.971*
(0.110) (0.116) (0.193) (0.536) (0.538)
Prop. to do art with child -0.108 -0.072 -0.025 0.116 0.124
(0.086) (0.092) (0.140) (0.424) (0.425)
0.127 -0.010 0.057 -0.182 -0.214
(0.084) (0.090) (0.131) (0.372) (0.372)
Prop. to play with child -0.223*** 0.143* -0.341*** 0.113 0.130
(0.079) (0.085) (0.123) (0.363) (0.361)
Total 'rules' actions 0.209*** 0.101*** 0.166*** 0.242***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.026)
0.097 0.164* 0.056 0.218 0.220
(0.085) (0.091) (0.130) (0.367) (0.364)
Prop. to shout at child 0.465*** 0.089 0.319*** 0.512* 0.489*
(0.066) (0.077) (0.096) (0.294) (0.293)
0.390*** 0.098 0.342*** 0.228 0.263
(0.059) (0.070) (0.087) (0.272) (0.270)
0.323*** 0.226*** 0.183** 0.547** 0.535**
(0.050) (0.059) (0.075) (0.246) (0.244)
-0.169***-0.179***-0.052* -0.050* -0.158***-0.158***-0.150***-0.158***-0.340***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.100)
Nb. days has breakfast -0.049***-0.043** 0.005 0.007 -0.058** -0.058** -0.060** -0.057** -0.034
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.063)
N_clust 8,836 8,836 8,836 8,836
N 14,470 14,470 14,470 14,470 6,436 6,436 10,239 10,239 10,239
r2 0.212 0.168 0.037 0.025 0.197 0.170
Total 'involvement' 
practices
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Goes to bed regularily  
 (0-3)
Notes: S: sweep, PS: parenting style. Columns 1 and 2 are pooled OLS over sweeps 3 and 4. Columns
3 and 4 report the results from fixed effect (FE) regressions of child health measured in sweeps 3 and
4. Columns 5 and 6 report the results from a regression of mental health of the child measured in
sweep 4 on controls in sweep 4 and parenting style in sweep 3. The recursive specifications estimate
the child health production function for mental health measured at age 4 and the reduced form of
parenting style measured in sweep 3. Colums 7 and 8 assume that the overall parenting style indices
or the specific measures are endogenous, but not the lifestyle measures. Column 9 allows the parenting
style variables as well as the lifestyle variables to be endogenous. Robust standard errors clustered at
the family level are given in parenthesis. Stars convention: * for p<.1, * for p<.05, and ** for p<.01.
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we take into account unobserved heterogeneity. A strict lifestyle also reduces the child’s
hyperactivity problems, although only regular bed time is significantly beneficial once
we allow for lifestyles measures to be endogenous.
These results can also be compared to the literature. Kiernan and Huerta (2008)
use the MCS and investigate the role of parenting style on children’s externalising
problems at the age 3 using structural equation modelling. They conclude that reading
and good mother relationship, based on mother’s affection, values, etc., reduces exter-
nalising behavioural problems, whereas disciplinary practices increase them. We use
additional controls such as household income and more detailed household’s composi-
tion measures. Our results are similar for children four years older and we are also able
to identify specific strictness practices that are harmful to the child’s behaviour.
The analysis of the correlations of the unobserved error terms for the externalising
behavioural problems index is presented in Table 37. Unobserved factors affecting the
child’s externalising behavioural problems are strongly and positively correlated with
unobserved factors affecting the propensity to read with the child and to put him in
bed at regular time whereas they are negatively correlated with the propensity to have
artistic activities with the child. The presence of these unobserved factors explain why
the results change when we take them into account and suggests that previous evidence
that does not account for unobserved heterogeneity is biased. The analysis of the matrix
also reveals strong correlations between the error terms of the parenting style equations.
These are identical to the ones found in the case of physical health in Table 34 as they
are estimated on the same observations.
Reporting bias - Hyperactivity reported by the teacher We now compare
these results to the ones obtained using the same approach but having as the dependant
variable the hyperactivity reported by teacher. This variable is binary, hence the models
are estimated using probit, and average marginal effects are reported. Hyperactivity
reported by the teacher is available for the last sweep so we only estimate the regressions
where the outcome is measured at age 7 and the parenting style at age 5. The results
are reported in the Table 88 in Appendix B.
Fewer parenting style measures are significant, but this may be due to the small
number of observations for which we have hyperactivity reported by the teacher. The
only robust result is that more strictness increases the probability of the child to be
hyperactive. Surprisingly, once we take into account unobserved heterogeneity, having
regular breakfast increases the probability to be hyperactive from the point of view of
the teacher, but again, due to the small number of observations, these results are not
reliable.
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Is parenting style a pathway between socio-economic factors and children’s
externalising problems? We now compare how the socio-economic variables affect
the child’s externalising behavioural problems and if they vary once we take into account
parenting style. The estimates are reported in Tables 90 and 91 in Appendix B.
The older the child, the less likely he is to have externalising behavioural prob-
lems, but boys are more likely to have some problems. Weight at birth does not play
a role, but children with longstanding illness are more likely to have behavioural prob-
lems. Mothers who tried breastfeeding, and thus possibly mothers who try to be more
involved with their child, are less likely to have children with behavioural problems.
Mothers who suffer from depression are more likely to have children with hyperactivity
problems, but there is no association between mothers with longstanding illnesses and
children’s behaviour. Mother’s smoking seems to matter more if it is during pregnancy.
Alcohol consumption is not related to the child’s behaviour. The presence of a male
figure appears to increase the child’s externalising behavioural problems. Married and
widowed mothers are more likely to have calmer children. Income is not associated
with the child’s behaviour, but owning his house decreases the child’s hyperactivity.
The education of the mother is negatively correlated with the child’s problems. Moth-
ers with higher life satisfaction are also more likely to have children with less problems.
Children with a White or Black background are more likely to have some problems
compared to the Asian or to other mixed backgrounds.
The role of these socio-economic variables changes once we take into account par-
enting style. The largest reductions appear with cigarette’s consumption during preg-
nancy, the presence of a male partner, mother’s marital status, mother’s life satisfaction
and child’s race. However, the role of mother’s education becomes more important.
3.5.1.3 Internalising behavioural problems
The second main aspect of mental health is the internalising behavioural problems. The
results for this index are presented in Table 38. Mother’s total involvement as well as the
specific measures of involvement do not have a robust effect on the child’s internalising
problems. However, as with externalising behavioural problems, the mother’s overall
strictness, and ignoring a naughty child increases internalising problems, and the effects
are much stronger once we take into account unobserved heterogeneity. In addition,
reasoning with a naughty child improves his internalising behavioural problems.
Regularity in health behaviour is also beneficial to the child as it was in the case
of externalising behavioural problems, however the effect of regular breakfast disappear
once we take into account unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 38: Internalising behavioural problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pooled OLS FE Lagged OLS Recursive specifications (cont)
PS S3,4 PS S3,4 Health S4, PS S3 Health S4, PS S3 
0.010* 0.006 0.017** 0.007
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.024)
Prop. to read with child 0.091 0.089 0.300* -0.274 -0.242
(0.087) (0.105) (0.160) (0.475) (0.473)
Prop. to do art with child 0.070 0.092 0.161 0.226 0.235
(0.069) (0.083) (0.119) (0.398) (0.397)
-0.021 -0.010 -0.146 -0.150 -0.177
(0.066) (0.086) (0.116) (0.328) (0.329)
Prop. to play with child -0.111* -0.103 -0.044 0.030 0.045
(0.062) (0.078) (0.108) (0.316) (0.315)
Total 'rules' actions 0.065*** 0.043*** 0.062*** 0.124***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.023)
0.034 0.126 -0.020 -0.776* -0.780*
(0.062) (0.089) (0.116) (0.405) (0.406)
Prop. to shout at child 0.076 0.071 0.048 -0.004 -0.021
(0.051) (0.071) (0.082) (0.270) (0.269)
-0.090* -0.034 -0.116 0.109 0.138
(0.047) (0.064) (0.074) (0.233) (0.231)
0.187*** 0.036 0.142** 0.370* 0.360*
(0.038) (0.053) (0.063) (0.209) (0.209)
-0.063***-0.061***-0.005 -0.003 -0.045 -0.043 -0.051* -0.052* -0.155*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.085)
Nb. days has breakfast -0.069***-0.066***0.001 0.001 -0.069***-0.065** -0.066***-0.066***-0.076
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.064)
N_clust 8,829 8,829 8,829 8,829
N 14,364 14,364 14,364 14,364 5,535 5,535 10,244 10,244 10,244
r2 0.115 0.108 0.034 0.031 0.123 0.117
Total 'involvement' 
practices
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Goes to bed regularily  
 (0-3)
Notes: S: sweep, PS: parenting style. Columns 1 and 2 are pooled OLS over sweeps 3 and 4. Columns
3 and 4 report results from fixed effect (FE) regressions of child’s emotional problems measured in
sweeps 3 and 4. Columns 5 and 6 regress child’s internalising problems in sweep 4 on controls in sweep
4 and parenting style in sweep 3. The recursive specifications estimate the the child health production
function for health measured at age 7 (sweep 4) and the reduced form of parenting style measured at
age 5 (sweep 3). Colums 7 and 8 assume that the overall parenting style indices or the specific measures
are endogenous, but not the lifestyle measures. Column 9 allows the parenting style variables as well
as the lifestyle variables to be endogenous. Robust standard errors clustered at the family level are
given in parenthesis. Stars convention: * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.01.
The amplitude of the unobserved heterogeneity can be assessed by the analysis
of the correlations between the error terms of the different equations reported in Table
87. There exist unobserved factors that are positively correlated with the child’s inter-
nalising problems and the mother’s propensity to read with the child, and negatively
with the mother’s propensity to have some artistic activity with the child as well as
the propensity to ignore her child when naughty. The facts that the estimated ef-
fects are amplified once we allow for unobserved heterogeneity and that the unobserved
factors influencing both the outcome and the parenting style suggest other estimates
not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity are biased.
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Reporting bias - Emotional symptoms reported by the child As for the prob-
ability to be in good health and the externalising behavioural problems, the internal-
ising behavioural problems as well as the parenting style are reported by the mothers.
Therefore we re-estimate our results using as dependant variable the emotional symp-
toms reported by the child himself.88 This variable is only available in the last sweep, we
therefore only estimate the lagged and recursive specifications. The results are reported
in Table 89 in Appendix B.
Although the sample size is larger in the case of the lagged regressions than in
Table 38, the R2 are smaller suggesting that the models are less precisely estimated.
However, based on the lagged OLS regressions, mother’s strictness also increases the
child’s internalising behavioural problems. Mother’s involvement appears to be benefi-
cial for the child, as in previous literature. Once we allow for unobserved heterogeneity,
these effects are not significant, but the mother’s propensity to read with the child
appears to be beneficial.
When internalising behavioural problems are reported by the mother, regular bed
times and breakfasts are beneficial, whereas when internalising problems are reported
by the child going to bed at a regular time increases them.
Is parenting style a pathway between socio-economic factors and children’s
internalising problems? In Tables 92 and 93 we report the full list of coefficients
used to estimate the regressions in columns 2 and 3 of Table 38 as well as the coefficients
of the same regressions but without parenting style. The child’s internalising problems
are much more an issue for girls, and more likely to appear if the child has some
longstanding illnesses. The mother’s physical health does not play a role, but the child
is more likely to have some emotional problems if the mother has some longstanding
illnesses or is depressed. The child’s problems are not affected by the mother’s cigarette
consumption when she was pregnant, but he is more likely to have some emotional
problems if the mother does not smoke, and less like likely to have some problems if the
mother drinks regularly. Higher income households are less likely to have children with
emotional symptoms. The child has fewer emotional problems if the mother works.
Finally, the higher her life satisfaction, the smaller the emotional problems.
When we compare the coefficients in column 1 where we do not include the
parenting style variables to columns 2 and 3 where we include the parenting style
indices and the specific mother’s practices, respectively, we observe very little change
among the significant coefficients. This result suggests that parenting style is not an
88The questions asked to the child are not the same as the ones asked to the mother. See Section
3.3 for more details.
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important pathway that explains the relationship between socio-economic variables and
children’s internalising behavioural problems.
3.5.1.4 Cognitive ability
The cognitive ability of the child, similarly to the health of the child, has long-term
impacts on the individuals. It is therefore interesting to examine the effect of parenting
style on the child cognitive ability. Cognitive ability is only reported in the last wave,
and we therefore limit our analysis to the lagged and recursive specification. This
outcome is reported by the teacher and not by the mother so that there is no potential
problem with reporting bias. Results are reported in Table 40.
In the lagged model, where we only assume that parenting style has a lagged effect
but do not account for unobserved heterogeneity, the total involvement and strictness
indices do not have an impact on the child cognitive ability. However, specific measures
such as mostly reading with the child, reasoning with or shouting at the naughty child
improve the child’s score, whereas mostly having some physical activity with the child
or taking away treats from the naughty child decrease his school performance. Lifestyle
is beneficial to the child’s cognitive ability.
Once we take into account unobserved heterogeneity, the mother’s overall in-
volvement reduces the child’s performance, especially mostly taking the child to the
park or having some physical activity with him. However, a mother who is more likely
to read to her child compared to the other “involvement” activities has a significant
positive effect on his cognitive ability of 4.9 points on average. Overall strictness, that
may simply capture the child’s naughtiness, negatively affects the child’s performance,
but when we analyse the specific measures of the strictness index, no specific meas-
ures appear to be particularly harmful to the child. The lifestyle variables are both
beneficial to the child, but having regular bed times appears to have an important role
once we allow it to be endogenous whereas the number of breakfasts per week becomes
insignificant once we allow for endogeneity.
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Table 40: Cognitive ability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged OLS Recursive specifications (cont)
Health S4, PS S3 Health S4, PS S3 
-0.035 -0.179**
(0.031) (0.079)
Prop. to read with child 1.391** 4.959** 4.913**
(0.542) (1.949) (1.957)
Prop. to do art with child 0.253 -0.604 -0.558
(0.429) (1.569) (1.553)
-0.675* -3.417** -3.372**
(0.399) (1.457) (1.456)
Prop. to play with child 0.194 1.311 1.259
(0.385) (1.463) (1.462)
Total 'rules' actions -0.050 -0.209***
(0.032) (0.080)
0.750* 0.364 0.360
(0.429) (1.196) (1.194)
Prop. to shout at child 0.515* -0.119 -0.040
(0.300) (1.035) (1.036)
-0.520* -0.416 -0.434
(0.269) (0.992) (0.988)
-0.141 0.199 0.155
(0.230) (0.905) (0.908)
0.415*** 0.402*** 0.408*** 0.400*** 0.604*
(0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.358)
Nb. days has breakfast 0.205*** 0.201*** 0.200** 0.208*** 0.051
(0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.232)
N 4,216 4,216 8,395 8,395 8,395
r2 0.187 0.190
Total 'involvement' 
practices
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Goes to bed regularily  
 (0-3)
Notes: S: sweep, PS: parenting style. Columns 1 and 2 regress child cognitive ability in sweep 4 on
controls in sweep 4 and parenting style in sweep 3. The recursive specifications estimate the child
production function for cognitive ability measured at age 4 and the reduced form of parenting style
measured in sweep 3. Columns 3 and 4 assume that the overall parenting style indices or the specific
measures are endogenous, but not the lifestyle measures. Column 5 allows the parenting style variables
as well as the lifestyle variables to be endogenous. Robust standard errors clustered at the family level
are given in parenthesis. Stars convention: * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.01.
We analyse the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in Table 41. Unobserved
factors that affect the child cognitive ability are also positively correlated with the
mother’s propensity to read with the child and to put him in bed at regular times,
whereas they are negatively correlated with the mother’s propensity to have some
artistic activities with the child. These correlations could be explained, for example,
by the mothers’ unobserved cognitive ability. Mothers who are more intellectual may
prefer reading compared to having some more creative activities, and may be more
likely to have a healthy lifestyle as they are more aware of its benefit. These mothers
are therefore more likely to impose these activities on their own children. It suggests
that unobserved heterogeneity should be taken into account when analysing parenting
style and children’s cognitive ability.
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Is parenting style a pathway between socio-economic factors and children’s
cognitive ability? The association between socio-economic factors and children’s
cognitive ability is reported in Tables 94 and 95 in Appendix B. Cognitive ability is
positively associated with the child’s age and mother’s age, but is lower for boys or
if the child has some longstanding illnesses. Weight at birth, as well as whether the
mother tried breastfeeding is also positively associated with his school performance.
Whether the mother is depressed or whether she smoked during pregnancy is negatively
associated with the child cognitive ability. Changes in the mother’s martial status
such as becoming married or divorced is negatively correlated with the child’s school
performance. Household income does not appear to make a difference but whether
the family owns his house is positively associated with cognitive ability. Mother’s
education is also positively associated with the child’s performance. The presence of
the grandparents in the household is beneficial to the child cognitive ability. Children
from White, Asian or Black background perform less well in school than children from
a mixed background. Accounting for parenting style does not change these results.
3.5.2 Sibling reported parenting style
A possible problem is that both the outcomes and the parenting style are reported
by the mother. Our first attempt to address this reporting bias has been to use the
physical and mental health outcome measures that are not reported by the mother. We
here address the problem of parenting style reported by the mother by using parent-
ing style reported by the older sibling. We focus on the outcomes that are the most
affected by parenting style: externalising behavioural problems, hyperactivity, intern-
alising behavioural problems and cognitive ability. We present the lagged specification
as the larger number of observations reported by the siblings is in sweep 3. For each
outcome in Table 42, we report the results for the indices, and then the specific meas-
ures of parenting style, both restricted to the sample for which we have the siblings’
information.
In Table 42, despite the significant drop in the sample size for the externalising
behavioural problems (652 observations compared to 6,468 in the full sample) and
hyperactivity (654 compared to 6,436 in the full sample), the conclusions as regards to
parenting style reported by the mother are similar. Total mother’s involvement reduces
these behavioural problems and total mother’s strictness increases them. The effect of
mother reading to her child and taking away treats are however no longer significant,
but the propensity to play with the child reduces his behavioural problems.
When we compare these results to the ones where parenting style is reported
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by the siblings, we notice first that the beneficial effect of going to bed regularly re-
mains. However, when siblings do not tell their parents where they go, it improves the
MCS child’s externalising behavioural problems suggesting that a too strict parenting
style is bad for the externalising behavioural problems as we found in the main res-
ults. However, without knowing the age of the sibling, this result must be interpreted
cautiously.
When we compare the hyperactivity results between the full and reduced sample
for mother reported parenting style, the main difference is that taking away treats from
a naughty child increases the behavioural problems, whereas in the full sample shouting
at the naughty child and ignoring him are bad for him. The parental practices related
to lifestyle are also no longer significant in the reduced sample for the hyperactivity.
When we analyse the effects of the sibling reported parenting style, siblings with
parents who are strict with household chores have MCS siblings with more hyperactivity
problems. This result supports the conclusion that too much strictness is bad for the
hyperactivity problems.
The results for the internalising problems in the reduced sample of the mother
parenting style are very similar in the case of total involvement and strictness. However
none of the specific measures of parenting style are significant, and this is also an issue
with the parenting style reported by the siblings.
Finally, the reduced sample regressions for the cognitive ability lose all their
significant coefficients compared to the full sample. When analysing the parenting style
reported by the siblings, only being out after 9pm without the parents knowing reduces
the MCS child cognitive ability. This result suggests that not enough strictness is bad
for the cognitive ability as found in our full sample results, but it certainly depends on
the age of the child and the results are only significant at the 10% level.
In summary, parenting style reported by the siblings offers very limited support
to our results. This is may be to be due to the small sample size. Moreover, the sibling
questions about their parents’ parenting style are not identical to the ones asked to the
mothers. Most of them can be considered as measures of strictness and only whether
the parents check how the sibling is doing in school can be considered as an involvement
measure. Furthermore, they refer to the parents in general and not specifically to the
mother. The siblings’ questions are also about the parenting style of the parents with
the sibling, and not the MCS child.
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3.5.3 Role of the partner
So far, we have focused on the role of the mother’s parenting style because the mother
in our sample is the main child carer, and also because there is good information on
her style. The literature has also focused on the role of the mother, but the role of the
father is of interest per se because of possible complementarity or substitution with the
mother. There is little evidence on these issues.
So far, we have accounted for indirect father’s involvement by controlling for
his working status and the type of responsibilities he has (employee vs. self-employed,
whether he has a supervisor role). The MCS data has some but limited information on
the involvement of the partner and we use it to investigate whether the presence of the
father can affect the role of the mother’s parenting style in the child health production
function.
We present in Table 43 the results of the recursive regressions in which we allow
the partner’s involvement to be endogenous as well as the other parenting style measures
(i.e. these regressions are equivalent to the penultimate ones in the main tables but
in addition allow for the partner’s involvement). The first regressions of each outcome
are the same as the recursive ones in the main tables, but we limit the sample to the
observations for which we have the partner’s involvement.
When we analyse the first columns of each outcome, it is important to note that
we lose about 4,477 observations in the case of physical health, 2,683 observations with
externalising behavioural problems, 2,680 observations with emotional symptoms, and
1,014 observations with cognitive ability. The effects of the mother’s parenting style
are similar to the full sample results but a few coefficients lose their significance levels.
On the reduced sample, the probability to be in good health is no longer signi-
ficantly affected by the mother’s propensity to reason with the naughty child, and the
effect even becomes negative in the reduced sample. Only the propensity to take away
treats from the naughty child remains significantly beneficial for the child in the reduced
sample. Once we introduce the partner’s involvement, the results do not change and
partner’s involvement is not significant.
With externalising behavioural problems, the results based on the reduced sample
are very similar to the ones obtained with the whole sample. The inclusion of partner’s
involvement does not affect these results and the role of the partner is not significant.
The same conclusion is reached with the emotional problems.
Finally, the reduced sample also gives us similar results in the case of cognitive
ability compared to the whole sample, and the results are not affected when accounting
for the partner’s involvement.
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Table 44: Differences between boys and girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Prop. to read with child -0.001 0.000 -0.156 -0.510** 2.504*** 0.000
(0.006) (0.003) (0.318) (0.234) (0.836) (0.223)
Prop. to do art with child -0.003 -0.004 -0.012 -0.230 1.229** 0.178
(0.004) (0.003) (0.207) (0.179) (0.596) (0.184)
0.005 0.004 0.255 0.107 -0.382 -0.267
(0.004) (0.003) (0.204) (0.157) (0.603) (0.169)
Prop. to play with child -0.000 0.003 -0.237 -0.186 0.374 -0.180
(0.004) (0.002) (0.197) (0.143) (0.586) (0.151)
0.002 0.003 -0.052 0.222 1.333* 0.008
(0.004) (0.002) (0.235) (0.137) (0.696) (0.150)
Prop. to shout at child 0.006** 0.003 0.035 0.528*** 1.129** 0.140
(0.003) (0.002) (0.156) (0.113) (0.441) (0.114)
0.010*** -0.001 0.414*** 0.338*** -1.080*** -0.077
(0.003) (0.002) (0.143) (0.097) (0.410) (0.099)
-0.001 0.002 0.134 0.216** -0.176 0.113
(0.002) (0.001) (0.119) (0.089) (0.341) (0.091)
-0.002 0.000 -0.211*** -0.052 0.374** -0.033
(0.001) (0.001) (0.053) (0.042) (0.157) (0.045)
Nb. days has breakfast 0.001 0.000 -0.050 -0.062* 0.064 -0.058*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.046) (0.033) (0.127) (0.034)
N 3,401 3,375 3,323 3,145 2,484 3,051
Child in good 
health
Externalising 
behavioural pb.
Emotional 
symptoms
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Goes to bed regularily  
 (0-3)
Notes: Outcomes and control variables are measured at sweep 4, whereas parenting style is measured
at sweep 3. Stars convention: * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.01.
Theses results suggest that the effect of mothers’ parenting style is not affected
by the partners’ involvement in looking after the child. It is important to remember
that we have analysed the involvement of the mother’s partner, and the role of the
natural father’s involvement may be different. Had we had more data on the father’s
parenting style, we would have carried the same analysis as for the mothers but for the
fathers alone which may have lead to different conclusions on the fathers’ role.
3.5.4 Differences between boys and girls
In this section, we examine if the effect of the mother’s parenting style is different for
boys and girls. Table 44 presents the results of the lagged regressions for the main
health outcomes.
The probability of the child to be in good health depends on the mother’s
propensity to shout at naughty child and to take away treats from naughty child in
the whole sample. The analysis of the split sample by gender suggests that these effects
are significant for boys, whereas parenting style style does not affect the physical health
of girls.
When we look at externalising behavioural problems, mainly girls are affected by
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their mother’s parenting style. Apart from the lifestyle measures, the parenting style
effect is generally stronger on the girls’ sample. Boys are also affected by their mother’s
parenting style, but mainly taking away treat when naughty and going to bed regularly
seem to significantly affect their behaviour.
Finally, internalising behavioural problems are positively correlated with the
mother’s propensity to read with her boy, to do some artistic activities, to reason her
naughty boy and to put him in bed regularly, but negatively with the propensity to
take away treats from the naughty child. These effects are not observed in the girls’
sample. Note that these are results may be affected by unobserved heterogeneity. We
did not use however the FE specification because the FE logit likelihood maximisation
did not converge on these reduced samples.
In summary, mother’s parenting style mainly affects boys in the case of physical
health and internalising problems whereas girls are more affected by their mother’s
parenting style in terms of their externalising behavioural problems.
3.5.5 Socio-economic differences
We next investigate whether mothers’ education and household income influence the
effects of parenting style on the mental health and cognitive ability of children. We
do so by alternatively interacting mothers’ education and household wealth with the
parenting style variables.
In Table 45, we report the results for an indicator of high education. The high
education dummy equals one if the mother has a diploma, a first degree or more. It
appears that, in the case of externalising behaviour, the propensity to read with the
child is negatively correlated with the child’s behaviour, whereas shouting, taking away
treats or ignoring the naughty child increase significantly his externalising problems.
The coefficients of these parenting practices interacted with the mother’s education are
not significant suggesting that these effects, which are similar to the ones obtained in
the main specification in Table 35, are not different between the two groups.
Mostly reading with the child when the child has a mother with a low education
level is significantly positively correlated with the child’s cognitive ability, whereas
the propensity to have some physical activity with the child as well as taking away
treats from the naughty child decrease his school performance among children with
low education mothers. As the same parenting style methods are not significant when
interacted with the mother’s education, these practices do not differ between the two
groups. The propensity to play with the child is not significantly correlated with the
child’s cognitive ability among the low income group, but appears to significantly reduce
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Table 45: Parenting style and mother’s education
(1) (2) (3)
Prop. to read with child -0.315* -0.171 1.423**
(0.187) (0.165) (0.567)
0.301 0.272 0.962
(0.294) (0.303) (1.179)
Prop. to do art with child -0.038 -0.146 0.258
(0.156) (0.143) (0.533)
-0.368 0.050 0.009
(0.234) (0.224) (0.823)
0.212 -0.170 -1.008**
(0.139) (0.131) (0.466)
-0.273 -0.072 1.197
(0.240) (0.240) (0.879)
Prop. to play with child -0.139 -0.166 0.746
(0.133) (0.119) (0.469)
0.210 0.082 -1.855**
(0.220) (0.221) (0.817)
Prop. to reason naughty child 0.099 0.114 0.677
(0.135) (0.127) (0.485)
0.030 0.077 0.950
(0.238) (0.235) (0.924)
Prop. to shout at child 0.470*** 0.029 0.582
(0.104) (0.095) (0.366)
0.229 -0.001 -0.371
(0.159) (0.163) (0.605)
0.373*** -0.010 -0.752**
(0.093) (0.086) (0.323)
0.170 -0.104 0.842
(0.150) (0.152) (0.583)
Prop. to ignore naughty child 0.441*** 0.062 -0.061
(0.080) (0.074) (0.277)
-0.184 0.108 -0.362
(0.136) (0.134) (0.492)
High educ. -0.243 -0.229 -0.024
(0.211) (0.203) (0.970)
N 6,436 5,535 4,216
Exter. 
Behavioural 
pb.
Inter. 
Behavioural 
pb. 
Cognitive 
ability
Prop. to read with child x High 
educ.
Prop. to do art with child x 
High educ.
Prop. to do physical act. with 
child
Prop. to do physical act. with 
child x High educ.
Prop. to play with child x High 
educ.
Prop. to reason naughty child 
x High educ.
Prop. to shout at child x High 
educ.
Prop. to take away treats from 
naughty child
Prop. to take away treats from 
naughty child x High educ.
Prop. to ignore naughty child x 
High educ.
Notes: Outcomes and control variables are measured at sweep 4, whereas parenting style is measured
at sweep 3. Stars convention: * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.01.
cognitive ability among children with highly educated mothers.
In Table 46, we present the same approach but with a high household income
indicator interacted with the parenting style measures. A household is considered to
have high income if its income is above £20,800 a year.
Externalising behavioural problems are reduced in the low income families if
the mother mostly reads to the child, does not mainly shout or ignore the child, or
takes away treats from the naughty child. The effects are the same for both groups,
except that mainly ignoring a naughty child is not as bad in the high income group.
Furthermore, mainly reasoning a naughty child significantly increases his externalising
behavioural problems in the high income families.
In the high income households, the propensity to have some artistic activities
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Table 46: Parenting style and household wealth
(1) (2) (3)
Prop. to read with child -0.342* -0.182 1.179**
(0.194) (0.182) (0.596)
0.305 0.446 0.053
(0.266) (0.277) (1.002)
Prop. to do art with child -0.001 -0.272* -0.280
(0.158) (0.151) (0.555)
-0.432* 0.437** 1.262
(0.226) (0.220) (0.811)
0.103 -0.101 -0.865*
(0.143) (0.140) (0.493)
0.123 -0.273 0.723
(0.235) (0.240) (0.846)
Prop. to play with child -0.003 -0.015 0.556
(0.135) (0.128) (0.488)
-0.274 -0.407* -1.016
(0.220) (0.223) (0.796)
0.024 0.217* 0.754
(0.137) (0.130) (0.515)
0.423* -0.205 -0.613
(0.226) (0.248) (0.891)
Prop. to shout at child 0.495*** 0.077 0.653*
(0.104) (0.100) (0.382)
0.146 -0.085 -0.302
(0.158) (0.161) (0.598)
0.487*** -0.026 -0.596*
(0.095) (0.090) (0.342)
-0.156 -0.053 0.246
(0.150) (0.156) (0.571)
0.502*** 0.068 -0.223
(0.082) (0.080) (0.293)
-0.378*** 0.136 0.106
(0.132) (0.131) (0.483)
Rich -0.099* -0.064 0.539**
(0.059) (0.060) (0.216)
N 6,436 5,535 4,216
Exter. 
Behavioural 
pb.
Inter. 
Behavioural 
pb. 
Cognitive 
ability
Prop. to read with child x 
Rich
Prop. to do art with child x 
Rich
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child x Rich
Prop. to play with child x 
Rich
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child x Rich
Prop. to shout at child x 
Rich
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child x Rich
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child x Rich
Notes: Outcomes and control variables are measured at sweep 4, whereas parenting style is measured
at sweep 3. Stars convention: * for p<.1, ** for p<.05, and *** for p<.01.
with the child decreases his externalising problems, but in the high income family,
this significantly increases these problems. Mostly playing with the child reduces his
externalising behavioural problems in the high income family, but not significantly in
the low income families.
Finally, children from high income families are significantly more likely to have
a high cognitive ability despite accounting for parenting style. Certain practices such
as mostly reading with the child are beneficial, but it does not differ between the two
groups.
163
3.6 Conclusion: Parenting Style and Children’s Out-
comes
Understanding the determinants of children’s physical and mental health raise import-
ant questions which research has not yet fully answered. In this chapter, we focus on
the role of the mother’s parenting style, not only as a determinant of children’s health
and cognitive ability, but also as a possible pathway that could explain the observed
relationships between socio-economic factors and children’s outcomes.
Most of the evidence comes from the psychology literature. Although it finds
significant correlations between parenting style and health outcomes, significant prob-
lems such as unobserved heterogeneity and recursivity have not been addressed in this
literature and sample sizes are typically small.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we not only look
at measures of overall involvement and strictness, but also analyse specific measures
of parenting style to understand what practices matter the most. Second, in addition
to the main classical two dimensions of parenting style, involvement and strictness, we
include a third dimension: practices related to the child’s lifestyle (going to bed reg-
ularly and number of breakfasts in a week). Third, we make use of the rich data in
the Millennium Cohort Study to allow for a wide range of potential confounding vari-
ables. Fourth, we explicitly address possible unobserved heterogeneity and recursivity,
comparing results from simple cross-section models, models with family fixed effects,
models with lagged effects of parenting style, and models which allow for child out-
comes and parenting style to be recursively determined. Fifth, we examine whether the
effect of parenting style varies with family socio-economic circumstances. And finally,
we undertake extensive robustness checks for reporting bias.
Our results suggest that physical health is not strongly affected by parenting
style, although some practices such as reasoning with a naughty child or punishing
him by taking away treats are beneficial to his health once we account for unobserved
heterogeneity. Surprisingly, the benefits of healthy practices imposed by the parents
disappear once we take into account parenting style. Unobserved heterogeneity seems
to be only a minor issue in the case of physical health.
Externalising behavioural problems and hyperactivity are reduced when mothers
are involved but worsen when they are very strict. Lifestyle measures, such as going
to bed regularly and having breakfast in the morning, are beneficial and significantly
reduce the child’s externalising behavioural problems. The effects are much larger once
we account for unobserved heterogeneity.
Internalising behavioural problems are increased by mother’s strictness, although
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certain measures such as reasoning with the child are beneficial. In terms of lifestyle,
going to bed regularly is beneficial to the child’s emotional problems. In this case as
well, unobserved heterogeneity appears to be an issue and the effects of parenting style
are larger once we account for it.
Finally, cognitive ability is reduced by mother’s overall involvement and strict-
ness, but going to bed at a regular time is beneficial to the child achievements.
Our results in terms of physical and mental health are in line with the existing
evidence. However, unobserved heterogeneity appears to be an important issue that
suggests that previous evidence that does not account for it may be biased. The results
in the case of cognitive ability differed from the literature; strictness reduces child
achievements, which is the opposite of what the rest of the literature finds.
We pursue two robustness checks. First, because the outcomes are reported by
the mothers as well as the parenting style, we use similar outcomes that are not reported
by the mothers. For physical health, we use BMI measured by the interviewer. For
externalising behavioural problems, we use hyperactivity reported by the teacher. For
internalising behavioural problems, we use emotional problems reported by the MCS
child. With these alternative outcome measures, the results are broadly similar but
generally less precisely estimated.
Our second robustness check is to replace parenting style reported by the mother
by parenting style reported by an older sibling. These sibling reported variables however
have some important drawbacks: first, they refer to the parenting style of the parents in
general and not to the mother specifically. Second, they are about the parenting style
adopted with the sibling who is older than the MCS child. Third, fewer observations are
available. Fourth, the questions are different. Most of the parenting style reported by
the sibling are not significant in our regressions. In the case of externalising behavioural
problems, only going to bed at a regular time reduce the index. Internalising behavi-
oural problems are increased when the parents are strict with the household chores,
supporting the results that too much strictness increases the emotional problems.
Next, as the parenting style measures focus on the mothers, we try to shed some
light on the role of the father. We use the mother partners’ involvement as an additional
parenting style measure and control for unobserved heterogeneity. Most of the effects
of mother’s parenting style remain unchanged, and the partner’s involvement is not
significant.
After analysing the role of parenting style in the child health production function,
we attempt first to understand whether parenting style could be a pathway that explains
the relationship between parenting, and second how parenting style vary with socio-
economic factors.
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Parenting style did not appear to be a pathway in the case of physical health,
emotional problems and cognitive ability, but it reduces the role of mother’s cigarette
consumption during pregnancy, the role of a male’s presence in the household, and the
role of the mother’s marital status in the case of externalising behavioural problems.
We then interact parenting style practices with an indicator of mother’s high
education. For externalising behavioural problems, strictness measures appear to be
the most harmful to children with mothers with a low education level, whereas reading
is positively correlated with the children’s cognitive ability when the mother has a low
educational level.
We also interact parenting style practices with an indicator of household’s wealth.
Children in poor households are more affected by their mother’s parenting style. In this
group, externalising behavioural problems are reduced when mothers read to the child,
and increased when mothers shout at the child when naughty, take treats away, or
ignore the naughty child. Cognitive ability in this group is positively correlated with
mothers who read to the child, or shout at the naughty child. Only a few parenting
practices in rich households are significantly associated with children’s outcomes. For
example, ignoring a naughty child is negatively correlated with the child externalising
behavioural problems.
These results have potential implications for policy makers since they will help
them target their interventions to improve children’s health and wellbeing. However,
some important aspects remain to be addressed in future research. First, we have
assumed that parenting style has a linear effect, but non-linearity should be investig-
ated. Second, we have analysed each parenting style measure separately, but possible
interactions may exist and should be identified. Finally, it is crucial to investigate the
complementary or substitution role not only of the father but also of other types of care
such as nursery care. The family is not the only arena where adults affect the child’s
health and development. Extended family members, school and peer groups also play
an important role that we have put aside in this research to focus on the mother’s
effects. It is not clear however how the identified effects would vary once we take into
account these other influences. The effects are likely to depend on the duration and
quality of exposure, which in turn depends on parents’ socio-economic background and
their own relationship with their child. For example, a working mother with comfort-
able financial means is likely to compensate her lack of time with the child with a school
that provides a good education to the child. Possible heterogeneity in these different
complementarity or substitutive relationships remains an important question for future
research.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
This thesis has applied economic models to examine the effect of incentives on beha-
viour (Chapter 2) and the effect of behaviour on health (Chapter 3). In investigating
both topics we have set out simple models of behaviour, which are extensions of those
previously considered, to suggest possible hypotheses and to guide the empirical ana-
lysis in the light of potential problems suggested by the models. We have exploited
large and complex panel datasets to test our predictions, taking care to construct key
variables that correspond to theoretical concepts. Finally, we have applied appropriate
advanced econometric techniques to analyse possible dynamic effects and unobserved
behaviours.
The first essay focused on the role of health insurance on individuals’ preventive
activity. We discussed the different characteristics of primary and secondary preventive
activities and explained why the effect of insurance may be different for these two types
of prevention. We reviewed the literature on the effects of health care insurance on
prevention. We extended the Ex Ante Moral Hazard (EAMH) model by making two
additional assumptions that explain why available evidence may be misleading. First,
we argued for the existence of a lag before receiving the benefits of current healthy
lifestyle or the consequences of less healthy behaviour. Available evidence does not
account for this dynamic effect. Second, we postulated that previous evidence based
on the granting of Medicare in the USA as a natural experiment should account for
anticipation of insurance. This exogenous change is expected by most of the population;
this has been observed for example in the case of the demand for health care that
tends to be postponed to post 65 (e.g. Lichtenberg, 2002). We incorporated these
assumptions into the classical framework of EAMH, and our model predicted that
uninsured individuals would start reducing their investments in healthy lifestyle before
being insured by Medicare from age 65. We called this effect “anticipatory EAMH”.
We used the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to test the model’s prediction.
The HRS is a representative longitudinal survey of Americans over age 50. We focused
on the individuals aged between 59 and 68 years old, and proposed three definitions
of the uninsured group based on their health insurance coverage reported at the two
interviews before they received Medicare.
As the granting of Medicare is not a randomised experiment, our empirical ap-
proach had to account for selection on observables and unobservables. We started
the analysis of exercising, smoking and drinking using Propensity Score (PS) match-
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ing to account for observable confounding variables. Then, we compared changes in
lifestyle between the insured and uninsured using PS matching to account for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics. We did the same analysis using Difference-in-
Differences (DID) regressions to account for time-variant observable characteristics, and
time-invariant unobservable characteristics. Finally, we combined the two methods into
a double-robust estimate which remains consistent when either model is correctly spe-
cified. As we were interested in the relative change in trends between the insured and
uninsured groups, we computed the double and triple differences of the double-robust
estimates that are robust to unobserved linearly time-variant unobservable factors.
The results indicated the presence of anticipatory EAMH in the case of physical
health about two years before being insured by Medicare. The analysis of smoking
behaviour provided weak evidence of anticipatory EAMH, but suggested the existence
of positive selection. Finally smoking behaviour did not vary as predicted by EAMH
or anticipatory EAMH.
The direct policy implication of this research is that the anticipated introduc-
tion of a universal health insurance in countries which currently do not have one could
temporarily discourage healthy behaviour. In the elderly population, we observe a
reduction of about 5% in physical activity just before becoming insured in those pre-
viously uninsured relative to those previously insured. This difference disappears once
both groups are insured by Medicare, suggesting that easier access to doctors can have
a positive effect on behaviour (Dave and Kaestner, 2009). Our results imply that the
introduction of a universal insurance coverage should happen as soon as possible once
it has been approved to moderate the anticipatory EAMH effect. Otherwise, the re-
duction in healthy activities could increase the future costs of health care for the newly
insured.
Recently, some health insurance policies have started to offer coverage for primary
prevention (lifestyle). In our research we find that the gap in relative trends between
the insured and uninsured is reduced once both groups are insured. However, it would
be an interesting research question to ask whether health insurance covering primary
prevention can encourage even more healthy practices. A great amount of care would
have to be put into dealing with the problem of selection of this type of insurance.
The second essay analysed the role of maternal parenting style on the physical
and mental health, and cognitive ability of children. We first focused on the psychology
literature which has been studying parenting style for decades. We reviewed the main
association found between parenting style, children’s health and cognitive ability. We
then explicitly formulated the relationship between parenting style and the children’s
outcomes in an economic context where the mother maximised her utility as a function
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of the child’s health and her parenting style. We illustrated the problems of unob-
served heterogeneity and recursivity, which suggested that previous evidence that does
not account for these effects cannot be considered as causal effects and only provides
estimates of the correlations.
For our analysis, we used the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), a UK national
longitudinal birth cohort study started in 2000. We analysed the various measures of
parenting style available in this data and attempted various summary measures in terms
of mother’s involvement and strictness as it has been done in the psychology literature.
We also analysed the effects of specific parenting style measures to better understand
which practice mattered, as a proxy for quality.
We mainly exploited the two last sweeps of the MCS when the child is 5 and 7
years old. We started with pooled regressions to have estimates of the conditional cor-
relations. The next approach used fixed effect to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
The third approach estimated a lagged specification which allowed us to account for
recursivity. Finally, we estimated a recursive system of equations that addressed these
two issues at once, and allowed us to obtain estimates of the effect of parenting style
on the child outcomes. These approaches required successively weaker assumptions for
the estimated correlations to be causal.
We replicated these results using child outcomes not reported by the mother
to address the reporting bias problem. We also used parenting style reported by the
child’s elder sibling to test the sensitivity of our results. In addition, we included the
involvement of the mother’s partner to see whether it played a role by itself or whether
it affected the mother’s role. Finally, we analysed the socio-economic factors by asking
first whether the effects of socio-economic factors on child outcomes were affected once
we took into account parenting style. If the effects of socio-economic factors had been
reduced, parenting style could have been a pathway explaining some of the relationship.
Second, we looked at whether the effects of parenting style on child outcomes varied
by socio-economic factors. For that, we interacted parenting style with an indicator of
high mother’s education, and an indicator of high household income.
Our results suggested first that the child physical health was not affected by
mother’s overall involvement or overall strictness, but some specific measures such as
reasoning with the naughty child or taking away treats from him positively affected
his health. In the case of physical health, the endogeneity of parenting style did not
seem to be a major issue, which was also supported by the results using child BMI. The
endogeneity of parenting style was an issue in the case of mental health, measured as ex-
ternalising and internalising behavioural problems. Externalising behavioural problems
were reduced when the mother was involved, and reading to the child was particu-
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larly beneficial. Lifestyle practices such as going to bed at a regular time and having
regularly breakfast in the morning also reduced behavioural problems. By contrast
greater strictness increased the child externalising behavioural problems as reported by
the mother, which was supported by the results using hyperactivity reported by the
teacher. Internalising behavioural problems were increased by the mother’s strictness,
and in particular, ignoring a naughty child increased the child behavioural problems.
Reasoning with the naughty child reduced his internalising behavioural problems. When
we used internalising problems reported by the child, the results suggested instead that
reading was beneficial to the child. Some results for cognitive ability were counterin-
tuitive: mother’s total involvement and strictness reduced the child achievements. It
is possible that children who are particularly gifted are negatively affected by their
mother’s involvement and strictness. The specific measures of parenting style sugges-
ted that cognitive ability was improved when mothers read to the child and when they
imposed regular bed times.
Girls’ externalising behavioural problems appeared to be particularly affected
by the mother’s parenting style, whereas it was the boys’ internalising behavioural
problems which were more affected by mother’s parenting style. When we looked at
how parenting style effects varied by the mother’s education level, strictness measures
worsened externalising behavioural problems and reading with the child was beneficial
to cognitive ability when the mother had a low education level. Children in poorer
households had fewer externalising behavioural problems when the mother ignored the
naughty child or reads with the child.
The partner’s involvement did not affect these results.
Avenues for future research include the use of more flexible models of parenting
style to allow for non-linear effects of parenting style. It is also important to analyse
the interactions of these different parenting style measures with one another. Finally, it
would be interesting to investigate the interaction of the mother’s parenting style with
not only the father’s parenting style, but also the practices adopted by other types of
child care which may be a substitute to the mother’s care. This is however impossible
without more detailed datasets.
In terms of policy recommendations, our research shows that parenting style is
not a major pathway between socio-economic status and children’s outcomes, except in
the case of externalising behavioural problems. As some socio-economic groups appear
to be differently affected by the mother’s parenting style, it suggests that policy to
support the development of the child should be differentiated depending on to whom it
is addressed.
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Chapter 5
Appendix: Anticipatory Ex Ante
Moral Hazard
A Definition of the Variables
A.1 Insurance variables
All the insurance variables come from the RAND version of the HRS data. Informa-
tion about individual governmental coverage is provided by four variables. In all the
waves the individual is asked whether she is currently covered by Medicare, Medicaid,
CHAMPUS/VA, or any government health insurance program. In 2002, CHAMPUS is
replaced by TRI-CARE.
The source of private health insurance is not very specific, except for employer
provided insurance for which we know the source of the coverage (actual or past em-
ployer, spouse employer). We summarise this information in one variable, the employer
insurance indicator, equal to one if the individual has any employer provided insur-
ance. Other types of private insurance are less detailed; a question about “other type
of insurance, other than government, employer-provided, or long-term care insurance”
is asked to respondent inconsistently. The RAND defines it as follow: “Generally, if
R[espondent] indicates that s/he is currently covered by Basic health, Medigap or any
other health insurance programs besides long-term care insurance, and the coverage is
not clearly provided by the government or an employer or union, then we set the vari-
able to yes =(1). If R responds no to questions about these types of insurance coverage
then it is set to no (=0)” (p. 863, HRS codebook J). As recommended by the RAND,
we only use this variable in conjunction with other types of insurance coverage.
Questions about current long-term care and life insurances vary slightly across
waves but the information can be consistently obtained at all the waves.
A.2 Summary of the different definitions of the uninsured group
We illustrate in Table 47 the different definitions of the uninsured group used in this
chapter (Private Only, Private & Public, All Types) and for comparison the uninsured
definitions used by Dave and Kaestner (2006, 2009) (def1, def2 - see Section B for the
definitions). In order to keep things simple, we only consider two governmental health
insurance (Medicaid and any military insurance) and two indicators of private coverage
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Table 47: The different uninsured definitions
Age brackets Different uninsured groups
individuals age 59-60 age 61-62 age 63-64 def1 def2 All Types
1 0 0 1 1 1
2 - 1 1 1 1 1
3 - - 1 1 . . .
4 1 0 0 0 1
5 0 1 . . 1
6 0 0 . . 1
7 0 0 0 0 0
Private 
& Public
Private 
Only
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=1
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=1
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=.
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=1
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=1
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=1
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=1
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=1
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=.
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=1
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=1
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=.
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=1
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=0
Other ins.=.
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=1
Other ins.=0
Medicaid=0
CHAMPUS=0
Empl. ins=1
Other ins.=0
Notes: For simplicity, we have listed here four types of insurance (2 public, 2 privates). 1 indicates
that an individual is considered as uninsured, and 0 if insured. For comparison we have also included
Dave & Kaesnter (2006, 2009) definitions (def1 and def2). Empl. ins.: employer insurance provided
by own employer or spouse’s employer. Other ins.: other insurance includes any other type of private
insurance that is not provided by the employer, "" : not observed at these ages, "." : missing values
(the insurance group cannot be determined).
(employer provided insurance and insurance other than non governmental, employer or
long-term care insurance).
First, it is clear that Dave and Kaestner’s definitions and our three different
definitions classify the individuals very differently. We focus on the insurance status
at ages 61/62 and 63/64 whereas Dave and Kaestner use any information available.
For example, in the case of individual 3, we believe it is not possible to classify this
individual, although Dave and Kaestner assume that she is uninsured. If they had
more information, this individual could have been considered as insured like in case 1.
Second, they do not distinguish between the type of insurance coverage.
Third it is important to note that our definitions ignore the insurance status at
age 59/60. Furthermore in the cases 5 and 6, we are able to determine the private
insurance status as this private insurance coverage is not missing, however, we do not
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know whether the individual is covered by a public insurance at age 61/62 and therefore
the two other insurance status cannot be determined. In case 1, the missing value is
not an issue as we already know that the individual has no insurance coverage at age
63/64. Individual 1 should have been insured in these two waves to be considered as
insured.
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B Replication of Dave and Kaestner (2009)
To check the results in Dave and Kaestner (2009) and to ensure that we have correctly
constructed our database, we replicate Dave and Kaestner (2009)’s paper. We have
been able to qualitatively replicate all of their estimates. Some numerical differences
exist due to the lack of details on the samples they used. We first describe our steps
in detail to replicate their results and discuss the possible reasons for the remaining
differences. Then we comment their approach and suggest possible improvements.
B.1 Description of their sample
In their paper, Dave and Kaestner (D&K) use the first eight waves of the HRS and
restrict their sample to “individuals who are between the ages of 60 and 69 [...]. Dis-
abled persons and those on Medicare prior to age 65 are excluded from the analysis.
The sample is further restricted to adults who have not completed high school” (p.8).
Disabled are dropped on a wave-to-wave basis.89 They obtain 9,782 person-wave ob-
servations for 3,396 persons. Their descriptive statistics are reported for the pre-age
65 with less than high school education, and the number of observations represents the
maximum sample size for the pre-age 65 group with non-missing information on doctor
visits.
D&K consider two types of uninsured individuals. The individuals who have
been continuously uninsured during all the waves prior to 65 (we refer to it as def1 ),
and the individuals who have been uninsured more than half of the time prior to age
65 (we refer to it as def2 ). At each wave, the insured indicator is equal to one if the
“individual reports being covered by health insurance under any governmental program
including Medicare or Medicaid, under his own current or previous employer, under
his spouse’s current or previous employer, or under any other supplemental insurance”
(p.9).90 The descriptive statistics that they present in their paper are only presented
for the two groups separately based on def1 and only for the individuals before 65.
In the descriptive statistics presented in Table 48, we present D&K estimates in
columns 1 and 2, and our estimates in columns 3 and 4. Both results are fairly similar,
the only major difference is the number of cigarettes smoked per day that is higher in
our sample for the insured individual. The number of observations varies significantly
between the two samples. Our final sample has 102 additional observations, with our
89Information obtained in a correspondence with the authors.
90In a correspondence with the authors, Prof Dave adds that the insurance indicator is also equal
to one if the respondent reported that her physician expenses were at least partially covered since last
wave (this question is however only asked from the 5th wave).
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uninsured group being much larger (636 compared to 470). Although some differences
could be explained by the released version of the data that we have used, this gap cannot
be reduced in the absence of more detailed information about their sample definition.91
An important aspect that remains unclear is the classification of the individuals
who were insured by Medicare prior 65: in the definition of their sample, these indi-
viduals seem to be excluded from their sample, but D&K take this information into
account when defining the insurance indicator. In our results presented below, we have
dropped these individuals from the analysis. Another issue is at which step D&K define
their uninsured groups: is it on the whole sample or on the restricted sample? This
could a be a problem for example for disabled individuals: if D&K define the uninsured
status before excluding the disabled on a wave-to-wave basis, then these individuals will
probably appear as being insured as they may be receiving Medicaid or Medicare, but
if the uninsured status is defined after dropping them on a wave-to-wave basis these
individuals will be considered as uninsured. It would have been useful to have the
descriptive statistics for the whole sample as well as the total number of observations,
and the total number of individuals.
B.2 A preliminary step: the demand for doctor visits and hos-
pital stays
D&K analyse first the impact of receiving Medicare on the demand for medical services.
The purpose of these regressions is to show that Medicare is associated with a significant
increase in health care use.92
As measures of health care utilisation, D&K use the indicators of any doctor
visit, of any hospital stay, and the number of physician visits. These questions cover
the two years before the interview, whereas the insurance questions refer to the actual
insurance status. In order to have that medical care and insurance coverage referring to
the same period, D&K assign the health care utilisation variables “to the respondent’s
mean age between the prior and the current wave” (p.9). In a correspondence with the
authors, they suggest redefining the cutoff point not at the age of 65 but after 65. This
is the adjustment we use in our results presented in Table 50.
D&K use OLS regression for the “any doctor visit” and “any hospital stay” vari-
ables, and Poisson regression to estimate the number of doctor visits. They control for
91We have exchanged various emails with the authors, but there are some aspects that they could
not clarify.
92We only briefly discuss this part as first, this is an ex post moral hazard problem and thus out
of the scope of this chapter, and second, the HRS data are not directly appropriate for this kind of
analysis as the questions related to medical visits refer to the period since last interview whereas most
of the other variables refer to the current period.
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Table 48: Descriptive Statistics: Dave & Kaestner (2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D&K Results Our Sample
Variables Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured
Age 61.807 61.926 61.82 61.82
Male 0.454 0.412 0.456 0.397
White 0.772 0.752 0.782 0.705
Black 0.167 0.138 0.165 0.150
Other Race 0.061 0.110 0.0529 0.145
Hispanic 0.192 0.404 0.185 0.385
Married 0.685 0.571 0.693 0.528
Divorced 0.139 0.131 0.104 0.104
F-t Employment 0.332 0.321 0.336 0.301
P-t Employment 0.080 0.115 0.0808 0.0999
Retirement 0.345 0.220 0.347 0.237
Partial Retirement 0.073 0.049 0.0730 0.0584
Unemployed 0.012 0.033 0.0116 0.0291
HH Size 2.530 2.878 2.520 2.830
Parents Alive 0.276 0.290 0.270 0.315
Assets 100909.8 57803.5 144601.8 75414.2
Any Dr Visit 0.857 0.663 0.873 0.618
Nb of Dr Visits 7.793 4.414 8.020 4.211
Any Hospital Stay 0.200 0.097 0.205 0.104
Vigorous Physical Activity 0.355 0.386 0.386 0.374
Daily Cigarette Consumption 0.272 0.323 0.180 0.239
Number of Cigarette (D) 7.032 12.008 11.63 12.28
Quit Cigarette 0.585 0.474 0.606 0.423
Daily Alcohol Consumption 0.060 0.077 0.0571 0.0604
Alcohol Participation 0.276 0.237 0.277 0.265
Number of Observation 4,166 470 3,898 636
Notes: D&K report assets in 1982-84 dollars, whereas we report them in 1992 dollars. All means are
weighted by the sampling weight.
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Table 50: Demand for Doctor Visit - Dave and Kaestner (2009)
Male Any Dr Visits # Dr Visits Any Hosp. Stay
D&K Our
est.
D&K Our
est.
D&K Our
est.
Def1 Uninsured*
65orM
0.080*
(0.045)
0.104*
(0.047)
0.532***
(0.169)
0.501**
(0.163)
0.075
(0.055)
0.046
(0.043)
Uninsured*
A6364
0.004
(0.046)
0.0323
(0.048)
0.223
(0.181)
0.298
(0.198)
0.027
(0.055)
-0.022
(0.041)
MDVPU 0.615 0.727 5.013 5.843 0.149 0.197
Def2 Uninsured*
Post65
0.084**
(0.036)
0.112**
(0.037)
0.552***
(0.130)
0.418**
(0.134)
0.037
(0.043)
0.028
(0.0356)
Uninsured*
A6364
0.010
(0.035)
0.0198
(0.039)
0.238*
(0.131)
0.188
(0.155)
-0.007
(0.042)
-0.022
(0.033)
MDVPU 0.601 0.719 4.414 5.843 0.128 0.180
Female Any Dr Visits # Dr Visits Any Hosp. Stay
D&K Our
est.
D&K Our
est.
D&K Our
est.
Def1 Uninsured*
65orM
-0.015
(0.033)
0.0421
(0.036)
0.315**
(0.118)
0.527***
(0.136)
0.059
(0.046)
0.0271
(0.036)
Uninsured*
A6364
-0.043
(0.033)
-0.00203
(0.036)
-0.073
(0.119)
0.235
(0.121)
0.026
(0.046)
0.0473
(0.033)
MDVPU 0.787 .8424528 7.308 8.352 0.150 0.189
Def2 Uninsured*
Post65
0.055**
(0.025)
0.0387
(0.027)
0.276***
(0.087)
0.331**
(0.106)
0.010
(0.035)
0.027
(0.031)
Uninsured*
A6364
0.006
(0.025)
0.008
(0.028)
0.002
(0.088)
0.080
(0.112)
0.011
(0.034)
0.020
(0.029)
MDVPU 0.796 0.845 7.564 8.563 0.140 0.184
Notes: D&K: these columns report the D&K estimators. Our est.: our estimates. MDVPU: Mean of dependent variable
for previously uninsured . Note that here we have taken into account the adjustment suggested by D&K: 65orM is in
fact an indicator of post 65, and 6364 is actually an indicator of 64 or 65 years old. The stars are for the p-value if ≤1%
(***), ≤5% (**), ≤10% (*).
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person-specific fixed effect; therefore we estimate the model using fixed-effect (FE) OLS
for the binary variables and FE Poisson otherwise. Like D&K, we also control for age
(single year age dummy variables), marital status (married and divorced), employment
status (indicators of full-time and part-time job, full-time and partial retirement, unem-
ployment), household size, number of living parents, assets, total years worked and year
dummy variables. They present the results only for the male and female sub-samples.93
We assume that they use now the sample of individuals aged between 60 and 69 years
old, with no disabled, no individuals benefiting from Medicare prior to age 65 and only
the ones with less than a high school degree. In Table 50, the results are based on def1.
Using the male sample, we obtain very similar estimates, although for some the
magnitude varies. The probability to have doctor visits is significantly higher after 65
for the uninsured; using def1 and based on our estimates, they are about 10 percentage
points more likely to visit a doctor, but only 8 percentage points based on D&K’s
estimates. The number of doctor visits for the uninsured after 65 years old is also
significantly higher of about 0.5. Both results are very similar for def1 but differ of
0.134 when using def2. The probability to have any hospital stay does not differ between
the insured and uninsured based on their or our estimates.
Using the female sample, the insured and uninsured are generally less different
at the ages 65 when comparing the probability to have a doctor visit or a hospital stay
(apart from def2 in D&K’s results where the uninsured are 5 percentage points more
likely to visit the doctor). The uninsured are however more likely to have a higher
number of doctor visits if uninsured and 65 or more. D&K obtain estimates around 0.3
whereas our estimates vary between 0.3 (def2 ) and 0.5 (def1 ).
As D&K do not provide the total number of observations used in the regres-
sions, it is not possible to know how different our samples are. The main problem
we encountered here when trying to replicate D&K’s results is the dependent variable
adjustment. We have chosen to assume that the treatment (receiving Medicare) is from
the age 66 as suggested by the authors and so we do not loose any observation, but it is
possible that D&K use the average over two interviews which would reduce the sample.
As the number of observations for each regression is not provided, we cannot confirm
that.
B.3 The Ex Ante Moral Hazard effect
D&K study six measures of lifestyle (Lit): indicators of participation in vigorous phys-
ical activities three or more times a week (VIGPHYS - only available in waves 1 to
93Probably because this allows them to estimate the impact of gender, which would not be possible
by running a FE regression on the whole sample.
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6), of daily cigarette consumption (CIGD), of cigarette ending (CIGQUIT ), of current
alcohol participation (DRINKER), of daily drinking (DRINKD), and the number of
cigarettes smoked daily (CIGNB).
D&K present the effect for male and female separately. They apply a FE OLS
for binary dependent variables and FE Poisson for count dependent variables. For each
dependent variable, the first regression represents the effect of Medicare on lifestyles
without controlling for doctor visits (equation (52)), whereas in the second one (equa-
tion (53)), we take into account whether the individual has had any doctor visits and
allow for interactions with age and the indicator of insurance status. D&K also include
a dummy variable for ages 63 and 64 (A6364it) to control for pre-age 65 differences in
the age pattern of the outcomes between the two groups. Finally, in both equations, we
also control for age (AGEat), marital status, employment, household size, number of
living parents, assets, total years worked and the year of the interview (all included in
Xit). The uninsured group (UNINSi) is defined following def1 in the results presented
below. The different models are
Lit = αi + βxXit +
69∑
a=61
ηaAGEat + γU65UNINSi ∗ A65Mit
+γU6364UNINSi ∗ A6364it + εit (52)
Lit = αi + βxXit +
69∑
a=61
ηaAGEat + γU65UNINSi ∗ A65Mit
+βDDOCit + βD65DOCit ∗ A65Mit + γUDUNINSi ∗DOCit
+γUD65A65Mit ∗ UNINSi ∗DOCit
+γU6364UNINSi ∗ A6364it + εit (53)
with i = 1, ..., N and t = 1992, ..., 2006. We define the uninsured group on the sub-
sample of individual aged between 60 and 69, we restrict the sample to individuals with
less than high school and drop the disabled on a wave-to-wave basis.94
Male sample
The estimates for the male sample are presented at the top of Tables 53, 56 and 59.95
We obtain very similar results as D&K, and as theirs, they are rarely significant, so it
is a bit surprising that they say they have found (robust) evidence of EAMH.
94We do not drop the individuals insured by Medicare before 65 years old as D&K do not remember
having dropped them.
95D&K results are from Table 3 in Dave and Kaestner (2009).
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In the case of vigorous physical activity, the change between 63/64 years old and
65 or more is of about -1 percentage point without controlling for doctor visits and about
-3 percentage points when controlling for doctor visits based on our estimates compare
to about -9 percentage points and -15.1 percentage points respectively in their case,
but none of these results are significant. Regarding the number of cigarettes smoked,
based on our estimates, we observe a reduction between 63/64 and 65 or more, whereas
D&K find a reduction when not controlling for doctor visits and an increase of 0.227
cigarettes when controlling for doctors visits. The probability to smoke daily (to quit
smoking) increases (decreases) based on all estimates between 63/64 and 65 or more,
but in their case, the main difference between the two groups seems to be around 63/64
years suggesting rather the presence of anticipatory behaviour at least if we do not
account for doctor visits. The probability to have ever drunk increases after receiving
Medicare, but the change is only significant in our case when we account for doctor
visits. Finally, the difference between the two groups in terms of the probability to drink
daily is not significant and does not change once the individuals receive Medicare.
Female sample
The estimates for the male sample are presented at the bottom of Tables 53, 56 and
59.96 Our results differ more from D&K compared to the analysis on the male sample.
In the case of vigorous physical activity, D&K find significant results in terms of EAMH
and anticipatory behaviour when not controlling for doctor visits whereas we find signi-
ficant evidence of EAMH once we control for doctor visits which better supports their
assumption of indirect effect. The analysis of the number of cigarettes smoked per day
does lead D&K to suggest the presence of EAMH, whereas our estimates suggest the
presence of anticipatory behaviour, at least when we do not control for doctor visits, i.e.
the uninsured are much more likely to smoke more around 63/64 years old (about 0.3
cigarettes per day). The probability to smoke daily (to quit smoking) is significantly
reduced (increased) if the individual has seen a doctor, but the EAMH estimates, al-
though positive (negative) when getting covered by Medicare, are not significant in any
of their or our regressions. The probability to have ever drunk alcohol is smaller for the
uninsured when becoming 65 or more and when controlling for the doctor visits based
on D&K estimates, but based on our estimates, when controlling for the doctor visits as
well, the uninsured becomes 2.1 percentage points more likely to ever drink. However
none of these estimates are significant. Finally, the difference between the insured and
uninsured in term of the probability to drink daily becomes positive after 65 years old
96D&K results are from table 5 in Dave and Kaestner (2009).
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or more; the change is of about 2 percentage points based on D&K’s estimates and of
about 1.5 percentage points in our case.
B.4 Discussion
D&K argue that they have identified EAMH when they account for doctor visits, but
their results are almost never significant. Overall our approximation of D&K results
allow us to draw the same conclusions on the weak existence of EAMH and possibly
anticipatory behaviour (although D&K do not discuss it). Differences between the
estimates can be explained by the lack of details on some crucial issues, such as whether
individuals insured by Medicare are really dropped, on which sample is the health
insurance status defined, and what is the adjustment used for the medical care variables.
The main difficulty in their paper is the definitions of the uninsured group (def1,
def2 ). First, we believe it is necessary to impose a minimum number of years for
which the individual must have been observed before her 65. Moreover only a few
individuals report no cover for all the waves, but we know that individuals who are
not continuously covered are very similar to the continuously uninsured. Therefore,
allowing to have only one interview before the granting of Medicare to define whether
the individual is considered as uninsured or not is likely to bias the results (see for
example individual 3 in Table 47 who illustrates this problem).
Another major issue in the D&K paper is that they do not allow the uninsured
individuals to be different from the insured ones before 63. Their model assumes that
the uninsured and insured individuals behave in the same way before 63 year old. If
adverse (or positive) selection exists and EAMH does not, by construction the dummies
A6364 and A65M capture the self-selection effect and not the EAMH effect. Similarly,
if anticipatory behaviour is present it will only be identified from 63 years old.
We estimate the following model, allowing the uninsured to differ at younger
ages (Equation 54):97
Lit = αi + βxXit +
69∑
a=61
ηaAGEat + γU65UNINSi ∗ A65Mit
+βDDOCit + βD65DOCit ∗ A65Mit + γUDUNINSi ∗DOCit
+γUD65A65Mit ∗ UNINSi ∗DOCit
+γU6364UNINSi ∗ A6364it + γU6162UNINSi ∗A6162it + εit (54)
97It is however not possible to have an interaction term of the uninsured indicator with all age ranges
because of the FE that has to drop at least one of the them.
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Table 53: EAMH - Dave & Kaestner (2009)’s main results (1)
Male VIGPHYS16 CIGNB
D&K Our estimates D&K Our estimates
Unins*
65M
-0.067
(0.071)
-0.123
(0.132)
-0.053
(0.059)
-0.076
(0.099)
0.007
(0.150)
0.290
(0.223)
-0.079
(0.179)
0.243
(0.422)
Unins*
A6364
0.024
(0.068)
0.028
(0.069)
-0.044
(0.062)
-0.048
(0.061)
0.020
(0.150)
0.063
(0.159)
0.385
(0.282)
0.407
(0.267)
Dr 0.002
(0.037)
-0.010
(0.034)
-0.100
(0.082)
-0.097
(0.143)
Dr*
Unins
0.079
(0.095)
0.104
(0.086)
0.011
(0.210)
-0.097
(0.143)
Dr*
65M
-0.045
(0.060)
-0.034
(0.063)
0.037
(0.136)
0.222
(0.342)
Dr*Unins*65M 0.041
(0.147)
-0.009
(0.108)
-0.421
(0.277)
-0.382
(0.439)
MDVPU 0.380 0.380 0.313 0.313 13.346 13.346 12.972 12.972
Female VIGPHYS16 CIGNB
D&K Our estimates D&K Our estimates
Unins*
65M
-0.132**
(0.064)
-0.219
(0.166)
-0.098
(0.053)
-0.350*
(0.151)
-0.025
(0.160)
-0.224
(0.376)
0.115
(0.126)
-0.0486
(0.336)
Unins*
A6364
-0.104*
(0.057)
-0.091
(0.059)
-0.059
(0.054)
-0.068
(0.054)
-0.114
(0.168)
0.085
(0.155)
0.329*
(0.162)
0.310
(0.159)
Dr 0.076*
(0.041)
0.081*
(0.040)
0.045
(0.110)
0.0976
(0.0820)
Dr*
Unins
-0.160
(0.089)
-0.160
(0.088)
-0.033
(0.235)
0.0452
(0.129)
Dr*
65M
-0.058
(0.083)
-0.112
(0.084)
-0.268
(0.189)
-0.185
(0.192)
Dr*Unins*65M 0.119
(0.177)
0.290
(0.158)
0.214
(0.409)
0.144
(0.373)
MDVPU 0.297 0.297 0.304 0.301 8.008 8.008 11.233 11.233
Notes: Dr: indicator of doctor visits, 65M: indicator of 65 years old or more (to adjust for the doctor
visit variable, it is in reality more than 65 only), A6364: to adjust for the doctor visit variable, this
is in reality an indicator of 64 or 65 years old, MDVPU: Mean of dependent variable for previously
uninsured. Stars convention: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
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Table 56: EAMH - Dave & Kaestner (2009)’s main results (2)
Male CIGD CIGQUIT
D&K Our estimates D&K Our estimates
Unins*
65M
-0.035
(0.028)
0.028
(0.048)
-0.025
(0.044)
0.014
(0.072)
0.047
(0.036)
-0.028
(0.062)
0.015
(0.039)
-0.064
(0.050)
Unins*
A6364
-0.047*
(0.028)
-0.039
(0.029)
-0.050
(0.044)
-0.051
(0.043)
0.064*
(0.036)
0.053
(0.037)
0.040
(0.038)
0.045
(0.034)
Dr -0.032**
(0.014)
0.004
(0.022)
0.031*
(0.018)
0.0251
(0.019)
Dr*
Unins
0.025
(0.040)
-0.011
(0.058)
-0.037
(0.050)
-0.021
(0.039)
Dr*
65M
0.022
(0.023)
0.0279
(0.038)
-0.017
(0.030)
-0.031
(0.029)
Dr*Unins*65M -0.084
(0.055)
-
0.054(0.072)
0.106
(0.070)
0.117
(0.061)
MDVPU 0.425 0.425 0.237 0.237 0.451 0.451 0.569 0.569
Female CIGD CIGQUIT
D&K Our estimates D&K Our estimates
Unins*
65M
-0.010
(0.024)
0.025
(0.059)
0.041
(0.030)
0.061
(0.071)
0.044
(0.044)
-0.030
(0.117)
0.021
(0.047)
-0.005
(0.087)
Unins*
A6364
0.006
(0.024)
0.006
(0.024)
0.038
(0.027)
0.036
(0.027)
0.005
(0.045)
0.013
(0.046)
-0.032
(0.035)
-0.034
(0.037)
Dr -
0.044***
(0.017)
-0.056*
(0.025)
0.088
(0.028)
0.108**
(0.037)
Dr*
Unins
0.044
(0.038)
0.020
(0.049)
-0.095
(0.074)
-0.144*
(0.061)
Dr*
65M
-0.019
(0.029)
-0.044
(0.039)
0.042
(0.051)
0.061
(0.065)
Dr*Unins*65M -0.049
(0.064)
-0.027
(0.076)
0.103
(0.124)
0.040
(0.094)
MDVPU 0.230 0.230 0.146 0.145 0.561 0.561 0.603 0.605
Notes: Dr: indicator of doctor visits, 65M: indicator of 65 years old or more (to adjust for the doctor
visit variable, it is in reality more than 65 only), A6364: to adjust for the doctor visit variable, this
is in reality an indicator of 64 or 65 years old, MDVPU: Mean of dependent variable for previously
uninsured. Stars convention: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
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Table 59: EAMH - Dave & Kaestner (2009)’s main results (3)
Male DRINKE DRINKdaily
D&K Our estimates D&K Our estimates
Unins*
65M
0.014
(0.047)
0.087
(0.082)
0.007
(0.042)
0.171*
(0.074)
-0.053
(0.040)
-0.037
(0.066)
0.021
(0.037)
-0.002
(0.072)
Unins*
A6364
-0.026
(0.048)
-0.029
(0.048)
0.0267
(0.0423)
0.018
(0.042)
-0.055
(0.039)
-0.058
(0.040)
0.020
(0.043)
0.020
(0.044)
Dr -0.068***
(0.024)
-0.053*
(0.023)
0.006
(0.018)
0.003
(0.026)
Dr*
Unins
0.140**
(0.067)
0.108
(0.056)
-0.055
(0.058)
-0.0246
(0.055)
Dr*
65M
0.030
(0.039)
0.052
(0.043)
-0.004
(0.029)
0.011
(0.039)
Dr*Unin*65M -0.113
(0.093)
-0.229**
(0.081)
-0.017
(0.071)
0.038
(0.075)
MDVPU 0.365 0.365 0.481 0.484 0.135 0.135 0.095 0.096
Female DRINKE DRINKdaily
D&K Our estimates D&K Our estimates
Unins*
65M
-0.001
(0.031)
-0.042
(0.076)
-0.0209
(0.0279)
0.017
(0.062)
-0.017
(0.017)
0.007
(0.036)
0.001
(0.011)
0.019
(0.021)
Unins*
A6364
-0.003
(0.031)
-0.003
(0.032)
0.00214
(0.0269)
-0.004
(0.027)
-0.015
(0.16)
-0.013
(0.016)
0.004
(0.012)
0.004
(0.012)
Dr -0.036*
(0.021)
-0.011
(0.026)
0.008
(0.011)
0.006
(0.014)
Dr*
Unins
0.012
(0.049)
-0.010
(0.046)
0.020
(0.025)
0.020
(0.025)
Dr*
65M
0.002
(0.038)
0.035
(0.045)
-0.001
(0.018)
0.001
(0.013)
Dr*Unin*65M 0.052
(0.081)
-0.040
(0.067)
-0.033
(0.038)
-0.025
(0.026)
MDVPU 0.104 0.104 0.199 0.201 0.026 0.026 0.015 0.015
Notes: Dr: indicator of doctor visits, 65M: indicator of 65 years old or more (to adjust for the doctor
visit variable, it is in reality more than 65 only), A6364: to adjust for the doctor visit variable, this
is in reality an indicator of 64 or 65 years old, MDVPU: Mean of dependent variable for previously
uninsured. Stars convention: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
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Results for the binary dependent variables, based on def1 and for the male
sample only are presented in Table 62. In the case of vigorous physical activity, we
see that the difference between the two groups already appears at the age 61/62 and
increases gradually with age which suggests the presence of anticipatory behaviour.
Uninsured individuals are less likely to smoke daily before 65, and become more likely
to smoke daily after 65. This suggests the presence of EAMH although the coefficients
are not significant. The uninsured however do not appear significantly less likely to quit
smoking before or after 65. The uninsured are more likely to have ever drunk after 65
years old once we control for doctors visits and the estimate is even higher compared
to the previous results. Although this pattern is similar to the one expected in case
of EAMH, the rational that would explain why individuals start drinking when old is
unclear. Finally, the uninsured appear to be more likely to drink daily independently
of their age, which suggests the existence of positive selection. However, similarly to
the previous results, these conclusions are very weak as the relevant coefficients are not
significant.
Another issue is the construction of the number of cigarettes smoked per day
variable and the model used to test the existence of EAMH. This variable only considers
smokers and thus is truncated. The Poisson regression estimated on this sub-sample is
not appropriate if all the zeros are missing. A selection model would be a better choice.
Finally, the rational for D&K sample selection is not clear. Including individual
insured by Medicare before their 65 years old should not bias the results as Medicare
at this age only covers specific disabilities such as end-stage renal diseases. The main
issue is rather to determine whether these individuals should be considered as insured
or not. Moreover, dropping the disabled on a wave-to-wave basis is questionable: it
is likely that these individuals already encountered some difficulties before reporting
officially a disability status (unless of a health shocks). At last, although they explain
why they focus only on individuals with less then high school, it is necessary to explain
what kind of policy recommendation could be made from their results, and an analysis
that would compare their results to the ones using the whole sample would have been
interesting.
To conclude, we believe that the D&K suggestion of an indirect effect created by
Medicare at the age of 65 is very sensible, however their evidence for it is very weak as
their results are relatively insignificant.
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C Additional Results on Ex Ante Moral Hazard
In this section, we present the results for the “All Types” and “Private Only” definitions.
The first Section presents the estimated propensity score, the second Section the results
of the propensity score matching, Section C.3 the results of the DID propensity score
matching, Section C.4 the results of the classical DID regression approaches, and Section
C.5 has the results of the double-robust approach.
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C.1 Estimated propensity score
Table 64: Propensity score regression estimates and balancedness tests of the covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Balancedness tests
Means
Estimates Uninsured Insured% bias reduc. P>|t|
SAH -0.085 Unmatched 3.205 3.530 0.000
(0.044) Matched 3.205 3.221 95.2 0.755
Mobility index -0.041 Unmatched 0.760 0.657 0.011
(0.042) Matched 0.760 0.805 56.5 0.426
Male 0.032 Unmatched 0.399 0.443 0.016
(0.094) Matched 0.399 0.397 94.8 0.923
White -0.438* Unmatched 0.729 0.855 0.000
(0.205) Matched 0.729 0.694 72.4 0.105
Black -0.010 Unmatched 0.214 0.120 0.000
(0.229) Matched 0.214 0.237 74.7 0.234
Hispanic 0.752*** Unmatched 0.190 0.048 0.000
(0.143) Matched 0.190 0.206 88.9 0.405
Census West -0.401** Unmatched 0.169 0.166 0.854
(0.125) Matched 0.169 0.196 -982.6 0.141
Census mid-West -0.536*** Unmatched 0.177 0.275 0.000
(0.108) Matched 0.177 0.197 79.4 0.274
Census North-East -0.637*** Unmatched 0.117 0.167 0.000
(0.125) Matched 0.117 0.124 86.4 0.662
Married -0.831*** Unmatched 0.616 0.780 0.000
(0.220) Matched 0.616 0.601 90.4 0.497
Partnered -0.018 Unmatched 0.042 0.021 0.000
(0.314) Matched 0.042 0.039 89.0 0.810
Divorced -0.206 Unmatched 0.178 0.109 0.000
(0.233) Matched 0.178 0.183 91.9 0.758
Widowed -0.145 Unmatched 0.119 0.066 0.000
(0.246) Matched 0.119 0.109 81.0 0.502
Went to high school -0.601*** Unmatched 0.349 0.392 0.015
(0.101) Matched 0.349 0.317 27.2 0.159
Went to college -0.942*** Unmatched 0.144 0.224 0.000
(0.130) Matched 0.144 0.170 67.5 0.134
Finished college or more -1.245*** Unmatched 0.085 0.224 0.000
(0.151) Matched 0.085 0.072 90.3 0.291
Works full-time -0.472** Unmatched 0.478 0.496 0.332
(0.169) Matched 0.478 0.493 17.2 0.538
Works part-time -0.279 Unmatched 0.215 0.170 0.001
(0.178) Matched 0.215 0.205 77.6 0.600
Retired -1.251*** Unmatched 0.105 0.235 0.000
(0.187) Matched 0.105 0.102 98.3 0.876
Unemployed 0.680* Unmatched 0.044 0.011 0.000
(0.304) Matched 0.044 0.051 79.2 0.503
Self-employed 0.907*** Unmatched 0.191 0.119 0.000
(0.127) Matched 0.191 0.184 90.7 0.716
# years worked (log) -0.058 Unmatched 3.133 3.345 0.000
(0.059) Matched 3.133 3.166 84.8 0.492
HH total assets -1.067* Unmatched 0.135 0.319 0.000
(0.416) Matched 0.135 0.193 68.1 0.087
HH total assets (squared) 0.052** Unmatched 0.176 0.568 0.184
(0.020) Matched 0.176 0.916 -88.9 0.206
Has long-term care -1.128*** Unmatched 0.020 0.089 0.000
insurance (0.258) Matched 0.020 0.024 95.1 0.627
Has life insurance -0.676*** Unmatched 0.591 0.796 0.000
(0.092) Matched 0.591 0.600 95.6 0.699
Constant 1.603***
(0.369)
N 5,912
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’All Types’. SAH is self-assessed health. HH (Household) total
assets are expressed in million. The propensity score is estimated using logit on individuals 59 or 60
years old and the coefficient estimates are reported in column 1. Matched sample is based on nearest
neighbour matching with replacement. Column 2 and 3 report the means of the different covariates
for the uninsured and insured respectively, for the unmatched and the matched sample. Column 4
reports the percentage bias reduction in the standardised bias before and after matching, and the last
column presents the t-tests for the equality of means in the uninsured and insured groups, both before
and after matching. Stars convention: * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 65: Propensity score regression estimates and balancedness tests of the covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Balancedness tests
Means
Estimates Uninsured Insured % bias reduc. P>|t|
SAH -0.168*** Unmatched 3.069 3.613 0.000
(0.038) Matched 3.069 3.077 98.5 0.842
Mobility index 0.111*** Unmatched 0.992 0.571 0.000
(0.032) Matched 0.992 0.993 99.8 0.989
Male 0.389*** Unmatched 0.419 0.442 0.136
(0.080) Matched 0.419 0.427 65.7 0.677
White -0.429* Unmatched 0.729 0.870 0.000
(0.200) Matched 0.729 0.698 77.6 0.062
Black 0.108 Unmatched 0.222 0.107 0.000
(0.218) Matched 0.222 0.255 72.1 0.043
Hispanic 0.631*** Unmatched 0.151 0.043 0.000
(0.130) Matched 0.151 0.148 96.8 0.793
Census West -0.309** Unmatched 0.173 0.165 0.443
(0.104) Matched 0.173 0.193 -125.7 0.175
Census mid-West -0.657*** Unmatched 0.174 0.287 0.000
(0.092) Matched 0.174 0.154 82.7 0.157
Census North-East -0.642*** Unmatched 0.128 0.169 0.000
(0.102) Matched 0.128 0.123 86.2 0.651
Married -0.879*** Unmatched 0.615 0.800 0.000
(0.180) Matched 0.615 0.633 90.5 0.334
Partnered 0.161 Unmatched 0.042 0.019 0.000
(0.257) Matched 0.042 0.032 55.4 0.136
Divorced -0.122 Unmatched 0.180 0.099 0.000
(0.191) Matched 0.180 0.172 89.6 0.555
Widowed -0.029 Unmatched 0.120 0.059 0.000
(0.206) Matched 0.120 0.126 89.6 0.608
Went to high school -0.451*** Unmatched 0.361 0.393 0.030
(0.088) Matched 0.361 0.328 -2.8 0.064
Went to college -0.576*** Unmatched 0.175 0.223 0.000
(0.108) Matched 0.175 0.166 79.5 0.486
Finished college or more -1.119*** Unmatched 0.087 0.240 0.000
(0.130) Matched 0.087 0.090 97.7 0.742
Works full-time -0.651*** Unmatched 0.386 0.527 0.000
(0.150) Matched 0.386 0.389 98.5 0.908
Works part-time -0.261 Unmatched 0.185 0.174 0.322
(0.159) Matched 0.185 0.187 81.7 0.885
Retired -0.033 Unmatched 0.257 0.202 0.000
(0.144) Matched 0.257 0.224 41.0 0.044
Unemployed 0.615* Unmatched 0.034 0.010 0.000
(0.281) Matched 0.034 0.054 17.8 0.011
Self-employed 0.864*** Unmatched 0.148 0.124 0.018
(0.115) Matched 0.148 0.136 50.8 0.362
# years worked (log) -0.207*** Unmatched 3.113 3.376 0.000
(0.051) Matched 3.113 3.110 98.7 0.928
HH total assets -1.477*** Unmatched 0.133 0.341 0.000
(0.387) Matched 0.133 0.207 64.5 0.011
HH total assets (squared) 0.073*** Unmatched 0.169 0.617 0.069
(0.018) Matched 0.169 1.094 -106.8 0.076
Has long-term care -0.679*** Unmatched 0.034 0.092 0.000
insurance (0.174) Matched 0.034 0.046 80.6 0.126
Has life insurance -0.625*** Unmatched 0.620 0.811 0.000
(0.078) Matched 0.620 0.623 98.5 0.877
Constant 2.538***
(0.329)
N 5,912
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private Only’. SAH is self-assessed health. HH (Household) total
assets are expressed in million. The propensity score is estimated using logit on individuals 59 or 60
years old and the coefficient estimates are reported in column 1. Matched sample is based on nearest
neighbour matching with replacement. Column 2 and 3 report the means of the different covariates
for the uninsured and insured respectively, for the unmatched and the matched sample. Column 4
reports the percentage bias reduction in the standardised bias before and after matching, and the last
column presents the t-tests for the equality of means in the uninsured and insured groups, both before
and after matching. Stars convention: * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the propensity score for each uninsured definition
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Notes: The insured (U=0) are on the left, and the uninsured (U=1) on the right.
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C.2 PSM estimators
Table 66: Propensity score matching - “All Types” definition (binary variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
Vigorous physical activity
age 59/60 0.053 0.029 0.072 776 564 776 4,170
age 61/62 0.034 0.032 0.284 700 506 700 3,657
age 63/64 -0.043 0.037 0.242 559 397 559 2,983
age 65/66 -0.058 0.045 0.200 378 261 378 1,988
age 67/68 -0.017 0.061 0.785 242 167 242 1,277
Kernel 
age 59/60 0.020 0.023 0.388 765 4,168 776 4,170
age 61/62 -0.003 0.025 0.900 684 3,653 700 3,657
age 63/64 -0.053 0.028 0.058 543 2,977 559 2,983
age 65/66 -0.026 0.034 0.439 357 1,983 378 1,988
age 67/68 -0.001 0.044 0.978 223 1,269 242 1,277
Stratification
age 59/60  0.024 0.021 0.269 776 4,153 776 4,153
age 61/62 0.000 0.021 0.998 700 3,643 700 3,643
age 63/64 -0.058 0.023 0.010 559 2,974 559 2,974
age 65/66 -0.058 0.038 0.121 378 1,982 378 1,982
age 67/68 -0.036 0.042 0.396 242 1,273 242 1,273
Quit smoking
age 59/60 -0.095 0.037 0.011 525 384 525 3,023
age 61/62 -0.106 0.036 0.004 520 384 520 2,994
age 63/64 -0.122 0.035 0.001 522 384 522 3,011
age 65/66 -0.141 0.040 0.000 418 305 418 2,421
age 67/68 -0.148 0.043 0.001 345 248 345 1,999
Kernel 
age 59/60 -0.116 0.029 0.000 510 2,794 526 2,804
age 61/62 -0.121 0.028 0.000 522 2,833 538 2,843
age 63/64 -0.121 0.028 0.000 523 2,841 539 2,851
age 65/66 -0.133 0.032 0.000 416 2,301 432 2,313
age 67/68 -0.148 0.033 0.000 334 1,878 358 1,899
Stratification
age 59/60  -0.113 0.028 0.000 525 3,000 525 3,000
age 61/62 -0.117 0.028 0.000 520 2,971 520 2,971
age 63/64 -0.112 0.027 0.000 522 2,988 522 2,988
age 65/66 -0.130 0.029 0.000 414 2,305 418 2,305
age 67/68* -0.149 0.038 0.000 343 1,874 345 1,874
Drink daily
age 59/60 0.012 0.015 0.414 568 430 568 3,304
age 61/62 0.020 0.016 0.205 730 543 730 4,105
age 63/64 0.022 0.014 0.108 859 642 859 4,940
age 65/66 0.033 0.015 0.029 675 507 675 3,979
age 67/68 0.015 0.016 0.334 580 430 580 3,338
Kernel 
age 59/60 -0.003 0.013 0.840 571 3,056 584 3,089
age 61/62 0.023 0.013 0.066 747 3,890 762 3,906
age 63/64 0.018 0.011 0.122 885 4,705 896 4,707
age 65/66 0.024 0.013 0.076 683 3,775 694 3,780
age 67/68 0.019 0.014 0.184 573 3,144 592 3,163
Stratification
age 59/60* -0.003 0.010 0.766 568 3,270 568 3,270
age 61/62* 0.021 0.011 0.055 730 4,070 730 4,070
age 63/64 0.016 0.010 0.113 859 4,904 859 4,904
age 65/66 0.022 0.011 0.045 675 3,890 675 3,890
age 67/68 0.016 0.011 0.159 580 3,273 580 3,273
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’All Types’. The nearest neighbour and kernel matching use
Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity score.
Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov kernel. Stratification estimates are based on the common
support only. * indicates that the bootstrapped variances are reported. The p-values are computed
assuming independent observations asymptotically normally distributed.
191
Table 67: Propensity score matching - “All Types” definition (count variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
# cigarettes smoked per day
age 59/60 1.193 0.628 0.057 586 431 586 3,095
age 61/62 1.692 0.550 0.002 764 550 764 3,915
age 63/64 1.728 0.466 0.000 896 633 896 4,711
age 65/66 1.704 0.583 0.003 695 497 695 3,785
age 67/68 2.064 0.545 0.000 591 412 591 3,162
Kernel 
age 59/60 1.043 0.506 0.039 573 3,062 586 3,095
age 61/62 1.658 0.459 0.000 749 3,899 764 3,915
age 63/64 1.389 0.397 0.000 885 4,709 896 4,711
age 65/66 1.834 0.436 0.000 684 3,780 695 3,785
age 67/68 2.011 0.462 0.000 575 3,143 591 3,162
Stratification
age 59/60* 0.979 0.429 0.022 586 2,906 586 2,906
age 61/62* 1.587 0.452 0.000 764 3,701 764 3,701
age 63/64 1.398 0.387 0.000 896 4,687 896 4,687
age 65/66 1.779 0.406 0.000 695 3,771 695 3,771
age 67/68 2.181 0.424 0.000 591 3,148 591 3,148
# alcoholic drinks per day
age 59/60 0.893 0.423 0.035 581 427 581 3,087
age 61/62 0.778 0.472 0.099 762 547 762 3,897
age 63/64 0.690 0.370 0.062 891 630 891 4,699
age 65/66 1.244 0.343 0.000 694 496 694 3,777
age 67/68 0.186 0.395 0.637 591 412 591 3,157
Kernel 
age 59/60 0.456 0.371 0.219 568 3,054 581 3,087
age 61/62 0.706 0.360 0.050 747 3,881 762 3,897
age 63/64 0.610 0.314 0.052 880 4,697 891 4,699
age 65/66 0.799 0.341 0.019 683 3,772 694 3,777
age 67/68 0.515 0.320 0.108 573 3,138 591 3,157
Stratification
age 59/60* 0.478 0.397 0.228 581 2,898 581 2,898
age 61/62* 0.758 0.393 0.054 762 3,684 762 3,684
age 63/64 0.561 0.293 0.055 891 4,675 891 4,675
age 65/66 0.690 0.318 0.030 694 3,763 694 3,763
age 67/68 0.492 0.271 0.069 591 3,143 591 3,143
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’All Types’. The nearest neighbour and kernel matching use
Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity score.
Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov kernel. Stratification estimates are based on the common
support only. * indicates that the bootstrapped variances are reported. The p-values are computed
assuming independent observations asymptotically normally distributed.
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Table 68: Propensity score matching - “Private Only” definition (binary variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
Vigorous physical activity
age 59/60 -0.018 0.029 0.542 1,248 769 1,248 3,890
age 61/62 0.002 0.031 0.953 1,103 664 1,103 3,401
age 63/64 -0.009 0.034 0.793 888 541 888 2,776
age 65/66 -0.050 0.040 0.215 583 377 583 1,860
age 67/68 -0.042 0.050 0.406 382 243 382 1,176
Kernel 
age 59/60 0.003 0.021 0.893 1,212 3,888 1,248 3,890
age 61/62 -0.028 0.023 0.235 1,071 3,399 1,103 3,401
age 63/64 -0.017 0.026 0.513 860 2,760 888 2,776
age 65/66 -0.038 0.031 0.224 562 1,851 583 1,860
age 67/68 -0.017 0.041 0.675 362 1,169 382 1,176
Stratification
age 59/60  -0.006 0.022 0.770 1,248 3,890 1,248 3,890
age 61/62 -0.024 0.024 0.319 1,103 3,401 1,103 3,401
age 63/64 -0.032 0.026 0.227 888 2,770 888 2,770
age 65/66 -0.053 0.031 0.081 583 1,857 583 1,857
age 67/68 0.015 0.035 0.671 382 1,176 382 1,176
Quit smoking
age 59/60 -0.133 0.036 0.000 892 525 892 2,577
age 61/62 -0.139 0.035 0.000 913 523 913 2,609
age 63/64 -0.109 0.034 0.001 914 523 914 2,618
age 65/66 -0.122 0.035 0.000 711 427 711 2,146
age 67/68 -0.145 0.038 0.000 578 339 578 1,766
Kernel 
age 59/60 -0.113 0.025 0.000 850 2,559 892 2,577
age 61/62 -0.107 0.024 0.000 869 2,591 913 2,609
age 63/64 -0.100 0.023 0.000 870 2,600 914 2,618
age 65/66 -0.095 0.026 0.000 675 2,130 711 2,146
age 67/68 -0.120 0.028 0.000 538 1,755 578 1,766
Stratification
age 59/60  -0.108 0.032 0.001 892 2,576 892 2,576
age 61/62 -0.101 0.032 0.001 913 2,608 913 2,608
age 63/64 -0.096 0.031 0.002 914 2,617 914 2,617
age 65/66 -0.091 0.024 0.000 711 2,146 711 2,146
age 67/68 -0.106 0.028 0.000 544 1,783 578 1,749
Drink daily
age 59/60 -0.006 0.016 0.691 953 588 953 2,905
age 61/62 0.002 0.016 0.917 1,231 717 1,231 3,647
age 63/64 0.012 0.013 0.365 1,446 858 1,446 4,387
age 65/66 0.012 0.015 0.435 1,108 682 1,108 3,546
age 67/68 0.006 0.017 0.699 926 554 926 2,961
Kernel 
age 59/60 -0.004 0.012 0.747 909 2,899 953 2,905
age 61/62 0.006 0.012 0.613 1,180 3,643 1,231 3,647
age 63/64 0.006 0.010 0.599 1,404 4,383 1,446 4,387
age 65/66 0.006 0.012 0.644 1,076 3,544 1,108 3,546
age 67/68 0.007 0.014 0.584 897 2,959 926 2,961
Stratification
age 59/60 -0.002 0.009 0.808 953 2,904 953 2,904
age 61/62 0.010 0.009 0.281 1,231 3,646 1,231 3,646
age 63/64 0.011 0.008 0.187 1,446 4,386 1,446 4,386
age 65/66 0.013 0.009 0.144 1,108 3,546 1,108 3,546
age 67/68 0.009 0.009 0.308 926 2,952 926 2,952
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private Only’. The nearest neighbour and kernel matching use
Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity score.
Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov kernel. Stratification estimates are based on the common
support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent observations asymptotically normally
distributed.
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Table 69: Propensity score matching - “Private Only” definition (count variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
# cigarettes smoked per day
age 59/60 1.701 0.579 0.003 956 588 956 2,910
age 61/62 1.917 0.532 0.000 1,233 719 1,233 3,655
age 63/64 1.622 0.448 0.000 1,449 859 1,449 4,387
age 65/66 1.463 0.460 0.001 1,109 682 1,109 3,549
age 67/68 1.703 0.461 0.000 927 552 927 2,958
Kernel 
age 59/60 1.098 0.452 0.015 912 2,904 956 2,910
age 61/62 1.403 0.401 0.000 1,182 3,651 1,233 3,655
age 63/64 1.091 0.341 0.001 1,407 4,383 1,449 4,387
age 65/66 1.202 0.363 0.001 1,077 3,547 1,109 3,549
age 67/68 1.657 0.391 0.000 898 2,956 927 2,958
Stratification
age 59/60 1.132 0.450 0.012 956 2,909 956 2,909
age 61/62 1.215 0.517 0.019 1,233 3,654 1,233 3,654
age 63/64 1.081 0.359 0.003 1,449 4,386 1,449 4,386
age 65/66 1.167 0.342 0.001 1,109 3,549 1,109 3,549
age 67/68 1.604 0.337 0.000 927 2,949 927 2,949
# alcoholic drinks per day
age 59/60 -0.038 0.460 0.934 950 586 950 2,903
age 61/62 0.371 0.436 0.395 1,228 717 1,228 3,641
age 63/64 0.649 0.346 0.061 1,440 855 1,440 4,380
age 65/66 0.352 0.335 0.294 1,108 682 1,108 3,543
age 67/68 0.466 0.334 0.163 924 553 924 2,956
Kernel 
age 59/60 0.046 0.314 0.884 906 2,897 950 2,903
age 61/62 0.575 0.308 0.062 1,177 3,637 1,228 3,641
age 63/64 0.515 0.268 0.054 1,398 4,376 1,440 4,380
age 65/66 0.130 0.282 0.645 1,076 3,541 1,108 3,543
age 67/68 0.208 0.303 0.493 895 2,954 924 2,956
Stratification
age 59/60 0.157 0.278 0.572 950 2,902 950 2,902
age 61/62 0.671 0.269 0.012 1,228 3,640 1,228 3,640
age 63/64 0.605 0.224 0.007 1,440 4,379 1,440 4,379
age 65/66 0.249 0.246 0.311 1,108 3,543 1,108 3,543
age 67/68 0.261 0.237 0.272 924 2,947 924 2,947
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private Only’. The nearest neighbour and kernel matching use
Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity score.
Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov kernel. Stratification estimates are based on the common
support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent observations asymptotically normally
distributed.
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Figure 7: Propensity score matching estimates
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Notes: The graphs represent the PSM estimates. The plain lines are the results from the ’Private &
Public’ definition. The dotted lines are the results from the ’Private Only’ defintion, and the dashed
lines are the results from the ’All Types’ definition. The light grey is based on NN matching, the
medium grey one on the Kernel matching and the black one on the Stratification matching. The
standard errors are only reported for the Kernel matching using the ’Private & Public’ definition.
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C.3 MDID estimators
Table 70: MDID estimators - “All Types” definition (binary variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
Vigorous physical activity
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.067 0.039 0.088 685 488 685 3,579
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.021 0.045 0.648 533 371 533 2,839
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.092 0.055 0.093 360 265 360 1,885
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.082 0.071 0.252 220 162 220 1,183
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.134 0.044 0.002 543 374 543 2,882
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.016 0.051 0.753 371 273 371 1,958
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.094 0.067 0.157 212 155 212 1,150
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.033 0.035 0.337 494 2,381 685 3,579
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.021 0.044 0.631 362 1,651 533 2,839
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.093 0.061 0.125 200 844 360 1,885
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.031 0.074 0.681 115 456 220 1,183
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.062 0.041 0.135 369 1,693 543 2,882
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.045 0.054 0.401 209 884 371 1,958
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.080 0.071 0.259 108 426 212 1,150
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.016 0.028 0.562 685 3,565 685 3,565
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.053 0.034 0.119 533 2,830 533 2,830
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.075 0.042 0.072 360 1,879 360 1,879
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.041 0.053 0.443 220 1,179 220 1,179
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.053 0.032 0.099 543 2,873 543 2,873
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.028 0.040 0.484 371 1,952 371 1,952
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.033 0.050 0.502 212 1,146 212 1,146
Quit smoking
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.021 0.024 0.373 522 373 522 2,774
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.010 0.027 0.714 511 368 511 2,721
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.019 0.035 0.579 411 289 411 2,204
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.067 0.040 0.095 329 228 329 1,755
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.004 0.024 0.871 523 372 523 2,761
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.014 0.027 0.599 418 296 418 2,249
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.000 0.028 1.000 326 226 326 1,735
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.029 0.022 0.179 339 1,497 522 2,774
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.002 0.024 0.940 331 1,436 511 2,721
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.024 0.031 0.448 240 1,059 411 2,204
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.018 0.036 0.621 169 804 329 1,755
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.027 0.022 0.220 343 1,489 523 2,761
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.007 0.023 0.778 248 1,081 418 2,249
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.019 0.021 0.364 167 761 326 1,735
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.003 0.018 0.874 522 2,763 522 2,763
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.000 0.019 0.993 511 2,710 511 2,710
age 65/66 – 59/60* -0.025 0.028 0.374 411 2,197 411 2,197
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.042 0.033 0.209 327 1,751 329 1,749
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.005 0.018 0.794 523 2,749 523 2,749
age 65/66 – 63/64* -0.015 0.019 0.424 418 2,241 418 2,241
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.011 0.017 0.535 324 1,730 326 1,728
Drink daily
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.014 0.015 0.374 583 427 583 3,086
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.034 0.015 0.026 581 425 581 3,059
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.012 0.017 0.483 432 310 432 2,372
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.025 0.022 0.264 325 223 325 1,764
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.015 0.015 0.314 750 532 750 3,841
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.009 0.013 0.489 684 494 684 3,720
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.009 0.015 0.534 531 366 531 2,886
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.030 0.015 0.047 417 1,985 583 3,086
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.038 0.016 0.017 417 1,960 581 3,059
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.019 0.018 0.294 294 1,406 432 2,372
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.027 0.021 0.205 211 997 325 1,764
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.006 0.013 0.679 548 2,617 750 3,841
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.008 0.013 0.564 502 2,489 684 3,720
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.007 0.016 0.652 375 1,809 531 2,886
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60* 0.013 0.012 0.257 583 2,898 583 2,898
age 63/64 – 59/60* 0.014 0.011 0.202 581 2,871 581 2,871
age 65/66 – 59/60* 0.014 0.011 0.200 432 2,222 432 2,222
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.011 0.014 0.441 323 1,651 325 1,649
age 63/64 – 61/62* -0.003 0.007 0.645 750 3,630 750 3,630
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.003 0.010 0.795 684 3,706 684 3,706
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.002 0.010 0.815 531 2,873 531 2,873
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’All Types’. The nearest neighbour and Kernel matching use Maha-
lanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity score. Kernel
matching is based on epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.08. Stratification estimates are based
on the common support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent observations asymp-
totically normally distributed. * indicates that the error terms are estimated using bootstrapping.
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Table 71: MDID Estimators - “All Types” definition (count variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
# cigarettes smokes per day
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.259 0.504 0.607 586 429 586 3,095
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.151 0.571 0.792 583 426 583 3,065
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.781 0.653 0.232 434 312 434 2,378
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.865 0.834 0.300 325 225 325 1,763
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.278 0.467 0.552 752 535 752 3,850
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.072 0.399 0.858 685 494 685 3,730
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.173 0.454 0.703 531 368 531 2,887
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.853 0.442 0.053 419 1,992 586 3,095
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.184 0.511 0.720 418 1,964 583 3,065
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.830 0.560 0.138 296 1,409 434 2,378
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.260 0.714 0.715 211 996 325 1,763
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.801 0.351 0.023 550 2,620 752 3,850
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.716 0.349 0.041 503 2,494 685 3,730
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.365 0.379 0.336 375 1,807 531 2,887
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60* 0.420 0.307 0.172 586 2,906 586 2,906
age 63/64 – 59/60* -0.062 0.376 0.869 583 2,877 583 2,877
age 65/66 – 59/60* 0.368 0.503 0.464 434 2,228 434 2,228
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.371 0.558 0.506 323 1,650 325 1,648
age 63/64 – 61/62* -0.426 0.350 0.224 752 3,638 752 3,638
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.005 0.311 0.987 685 3,716 685 3,716
age 67/68 – 65/66  0.267 0.347 0.443 531 2,874 531 2,874
# alcoholic drinks per week
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.253 0.332 0.445 580 424 580 3,077
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.191 0.327 0.559 575 418 575 3,050
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.485 0.463 0.295 429 307 429 2,370
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.709 0.513 0.167 323 221 323 1,761
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.122 0.325 0.708 747 530 747 3,826
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.544 0.327 0.096 682 493 682 3,714
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.122 0.404 0.762 531 366 531 2,879
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.532 0.358 0.137 414 1,962 580 3,077
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.457 0.359 0.203 411 1,932 575 3,050
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.050 0.485 0.918 291 1,387 429 2,370
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.800 0.563 0.156 209 988 323 1,761
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.085 0.346 0.806 546 2,608 747 3,826
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.477 0.344 0.166 501 2,483 682 3,714
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.285 0.375 0.447 375 1,803 531 2,879
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60* -0.041 0.269 0.879 580 2,889 580 2,889
age 63/64 – 59/60* -0.260 0.287 0.366 575 2,862 575 2,862
age 65/66 – 59/60* -0.349 0.287 0.224 429 2,220 429 2,220
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.664 0.389 0.087 321 1,648 323 1,646
age 63/64 – 61/62* -0.153 0.220 0.487 747 3,615 747 3,615
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.341 0.270 0.206 682 3,700 682 3,700
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.062 0.284 0.826 531 2,866 531 2,866
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’All Types’. The nearest neighbour and Kernel matching use Maha-
lanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity score. Kernel
matching is based on epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.08. Stratification estimates are based
on the common support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent observations asymp-
totically normally distributed. * indicates that the error terms are estimated using bootstrapping.
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Table 72: MDID estimators - “Private Only” definition (binary variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
Vigorous physical activity
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.008 0.033 0.802 1,082 654 1,082 3,328
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.079 0.040 0.045 844 528 844 2,648
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.115 0.046 0.012 556 355 556 1,766
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.020 0.060 0.734 342 222 342 1,098
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.063 0.038 0.098 857 533 857 2,689
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.035 0.045 0.435 574 364 574 1,832
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.131 0.056 0.019 327 213 327 1,070
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.003 0.030 0.931 785 2,442 1,082 3,328
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.056 0.037 0.133 584 1,777 844 2,648
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.077 0.048 0.105 304 931 556 1,766
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.042 0.060 0.476 161 465 342 1,098
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.053 0.035 0.131 594 1,799 857 2,689
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.007 0.043 0.863 313 967 574 1,832
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.076 0.060 0.209 153 448 327 1,070
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.023 0.027 0.410 1,082 3,328 1,082 3,328
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.022 0.036 0.536 844 2,642 844 2,642
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.064 0.037 0.085 556 1,763 556 1,763
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.011 0.043 0.793 342 1,098 342 1,098
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.013 0.031 0.681 857 2,683 857 2,683
age 65/66 – 63/66 0.007 0.035 0.845 574 1,829 574 1,829
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.058 0.042 0.170 327 1,070 327 1,070
Quit smoking
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.003 0.020 0.868 885 539 885 2,549
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.007 0.022 0.756 863 524 863 2,506
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.015 0.028 0.594 672 419 672 2,052
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.035 0.032 0.271 519 332 519 1,647
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.006 0.020 0.777 884 540 884 2,539
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.001 0.020 0.942 688 427 688 2,089
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.000 0.020 1.000 517 336 517 1,627
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.028 0.017 0.109 536 1,521 885 2,549
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.001 0.020 0.974 526 1,476 863 2,506
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.004 0.026 0.889 384 1,131 672 2,052
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.017 0.029 0.553 277 822 519 1,647
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.032 0.018 0.070 537 1,518 884 2,539
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.017 0.019 0.385 392 1,162 688 2,089
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.020 0.018 0.268 272 813 517 1,627
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.007 0.015 0.649 885 2,548 885 2,548
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.011 0.016 0.475 863 2,505 863 2,505
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.006 0.030 0.834 672 2,052 672 2,052
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.032 0.024 0.176 486 1,663 519 1,630
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.005 0.016 0.742 884 2,538 884 2,538
age 65/66 – 63/66 -0.011 0.027 0.684 688 2,089 688 2,089
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.002 0.017 0.887 485 1,642 517 1,610
Drink daily
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.007 0.013 0.575 952 599 952 2,903
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.021 0.013 0.104 942 595 942 2,883
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.019 0.014 0.188 698 439 698 2,245
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.004 0.019 0.833 505 324 505 1,673
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.011 0.013 0.412 1,207 751 1,207 3,593
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.000 0.012 1.000 1,090 675 1,090 3,493
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.010 0.014 0.477 824 515 824 2,717
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.015 0.012 0.220 659 2,012 952 2,903
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.024 0.013 0.073 651 1,984 942 2,883
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.025 0.015 0.102 452 1,477 698 2,245
age 67/68 – 59/60 0.014 0.017 0.418 314 1,038 505 1,673
age 63/64 – 61/62 0.010 0.011 0.381 868 2,634 1,207 3,593
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.003 0.012 0.766 786 2,547 1,090 3,493
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.008 0.014 0.577 577 1,909 824 2,717
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.005 0.009 0.604 952 2,902 952 2,902
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.014 0.009 0.137 942 2,882 942 2,882
age 65/66 – 59/60 0.009 0.010 0.348 698 2,245 698 2,245
age 67/68 – 59/60* 0.012 0.012 0.332 505 1,644 505 1,644
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.002 0.009 0.865 1,207 3,592 1,207 3,592
age 65/66 – 63/66 0.000 0.008 0.968 1,090 3,493 1,090 3,493
age 67/68 – 65/66 -0.005 0.009 0.550 824 2,708 824 2,708
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private Only’. The nearest neighbour and Kernel matching use
Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity score.
Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.08. Stratification estimates
are based on the common support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent obser-
vations asymptotically normally distributed. * indicates that the error terms are estimated using
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Table 73: MDID estimators - “Private Only” definition (count variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ATT SE P-value uninsured insured uninsured insured
obs. used obs. used obs. available obs. available
# cigarettes smokes per day
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.504 0.427 0.238 687 431 687 2,222
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.015 0.469 0.975 680 428 680 2,208
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.011 0.527 0.983 494 305 494 1,642
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.456 0.566 0.421 317 196 317 1,125
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.664 0.331 0.045 914 573 914 2,935
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.346 0.392 0.378 885 562 885 2,904
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.515 0.441 0.243 806 518 806 2,764
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 -0.089 0.388 0.818 642 2,204 687 2,222
age 63/64 – 59/60 -0.569 0.409 0.164 636 2,190 680 2,208
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.814 0.484 0.092 445 1,618 494 1,642
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.935 0.608 0.124 271 1,098 317 1,125
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.522 0.288 0.071 858 2,911 914 2,935
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.167 0.296 0.573 836 2,892 885 2,904
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.028 0.292 0.925 753 2,747 806 2,764
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.386 0.311 0.214 687 2,169 687 2,169
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.002 0.353 0.996 680 2,156 680 2,156
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.160 0.446 0.720 494 1,604 494 1,604
age 67/68 – 59/60*  -0.269 0.486 0.580 317 1,104 317 1,104
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.244 0.270 0.367 914 2,890 914 2,890
age 65/66 – 63/64 0.186 0.307 0.546 885 2,868 885 2,868
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.204 0.269 0.448 806 2,736 806 2,736
# alcoholic drinks per week
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.549 0.359 0.126 947 598 947 2,896
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.287 0.376 0.446 935 592 935 2,875
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.229 0.387 0.554 695 439 695 2,243
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.453 0.399 0.256 503 323 503 1,670
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.191 0.309 0.537 1,200 747 1,200 3,582
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.508 0.261 0.052 1,088 675 1,088 3,487
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.113 0.276 0.683 824 515 824 2,710
Kernel
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.544 0.292 0.063 655 2,007 947 2,896
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.307 0.285 0.282 646 1,975 935 2,875
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.078 0.364 0.831 450 1,467 695 2,243
age 67/68 – 59/60 -0.438 0.439 0.318 312 1,028 503 1,670
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.061 0.274 0.824 861 2,622 1,200 3,582
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.540 0.251 0.031 785 2,541 1,088 3,487
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.216 0.291 0.458 577 1,904 824 2,710
Stratification
age 61/62 – 59/60 0.286 0.221 0.196 947 2,895 947 2,895
age 63/64 – 59/60 0.261 0.226 0.247 935 2,874 935 2,874
age 65/66 – 59/60 -0.317 0.253 0.211 695 2,243 695 2,243
age 67/68 – 59/60*  -0.345 0.311 0.267 503 1,641 503 1,641
age 63/64 – 61/62 -0.096 0.207 0.645 1,200 3,581 1,200 3,581
age 65/66 – 63/64 -0.422 0.209 0.044 1,088 3,487 1,088 3,487
age 67/68 – 65/66 0.034 0.228 0.883 824 2,701 824 2,701
Nearest 
Neighbour
Nearest 
Neighbour
Notes: The uninsured definition is ’Private Only’. The nearest neighbour and Kernel matching use
Mahalanobis matching on race, working status, household assets and the estimated propensity score.
Kernel matching is based on epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.08. Stratification estimates
are based on the common support only. The p-values are computed assuming independent obser-
vations asymptotically normally distributed. * indicates that the error terms are estimated using
bootstrapping.
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C.4 Regression models
Table 74: Complete list of coefficients of Table 14
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Vigorous Physical Activity Quit smoking Drink daily
FE Probit FE Logit FE Probit FE Logit FE Probit FE Logit
SAH 0.030*** 0.060*** 0.003*** -0.011*** 0.031*** -0.000 -0.001 0.005* -0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
Mobility index -0.034*** -0.080*** -0.004*** 0.010*** 0.003 0.000* -0.000 -0.007*** -0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
male 0.074*** 0.048*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.007)
White -0.019 0.031 0.055**
(0.030) (0.047) (0.024)
Black -0.011 0.067 0.002
(0.033) (0.050) (0.026)
Hispanic -0.042** 0.107*** -0.034**
(0.020) (0.032) (0.013)
married 0.021 0.018 0.000 -0.042 0.008 -0.001 0.018 -0.006 0.002
(0.094) (0.029) (0.009) (0.051) (0.044) (0.002) (0.043) (0.017) (0.003)
partnered 0.039 0.006 0.002 -0.051 -0.097* -0.001 0.056 0.036* 0.001
(0.097) (0.040) (0.008) (0.052) (0.054) (0.002) (0.049) (0.022) (0.002)
divorced or -0.011 0.009 -0.003 -0.058 -0.068 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.000
separated (0.092) (0.031) (0.011) (0.050) (0.046) (0.002) (0.043) (0.018) (0.001)
widowed -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.059 -0.102** -0.002 0.022 -0.015 0.001
(0.093) (0.031) (0.011) (0.051) (0.046) (0.002) (0.043) (0.019) (0.002)
went to high school 0.007 0.020 0.005
(0.014) (0.019) (0.009)
went to college 0.001 0.026 0.017*
(0.016) (0.022) (0.010)
has college degree -0.020 0.121*** 0.017*
or more (0.017) (0.026) (0.010)
working full-time -0.057** -0.123*** -0.006 -0.012 0.073*** -0.001 0.005 -0.016 0.000
(0.027) (0.020) (0.008) (0.017) (0.027) (0.001) (0.008) (0.012) (0.001)
working part-time -0.027 -0.079*** -0.003 -0.007 0.072*** -0.000 0.001 -0.011 -0.000
(0.026) (0.021) (0.004) (0.017) (0.027) (0.001) (0.008) (0.012) (0.001)
retired -0.015 -0.033* -0.001 0.001 0.047** -0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.000
(0.022) (0.018) (0.003) (0.016) (0.023) (0.000) (0.006) (0.011) (0.001)
unemployed 0.016 0.015 0.002 -0.051* 0.027 -0.001 0.024 0.009 0.001
(0.045) (0.043) (0.005) (0.030) (0.045) (0.002) (0.023) (0.024) (0.002)
self-employed 0.028 0.052*** 0.003 0.019 0.046** 0.001* 0.005 0.018** 0.000
(0.024) (0.016) (0.005) (0.015) (0.021) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.001)
# years worked 0.108 0.012 0.012* -0.148*** -0.026** -0.004*** 0.012 0.002 0.003
(log) (0.068) (0.008) (0.011) (0.051) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005)
job requires some 0.097*** 0.169*** 0.009*** -0.013 -0.016 -0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000
physical activity (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.000) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001)
HH total assets 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.002*** -0.005 0.011*** -0.000 0.001 0.010*** 0.000
(log) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
HH total assets 0.111** 0.076* 0.015** -0.042 0.104** -0.001 0.015 0.089*** 0.001
zero or below (0.056) (0.044) (0.019) (0.035) (0.046) (0.001) (0.015) (0.023) (0.003)
has life insurance 0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.008 0.014 0.000 0.003 -0.019*** 0.000
(0.015) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014) (0.000) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000)
has long-term 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.004** -0.007 0.028 0.000 -0.009 0.005 -0.001**
insurance (0.016) (0.014) (0.006) (0.011) (0.019) (0.000) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002)
# private insurance -0.016 -0.007 -0.002* 0.012** 0.019* 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.000
(0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000)
Census: West -0.118 -0.712 -0.011 -0.006 0.063*** -0.001 0.013 0.026*** 0.001
(0.078) (0.603) (0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.003) (0.036) (0.008) (0.002)
Census: Midwest -0.073 -0.650 -0.010 -0.008 0.022 -0.001 -0.027 -0.001 -0.002
(0.072) (0.451) (0.016) (0.043) (0.017) (0.002) (0.026) (0.007) (0.004)
Census: Northeast -0.085 -0.367 -0.006 -0.000 0.045** -0.002 -0.034 0.029*** -0.001
(0.065) (0.383) (0.010) (0.027) (0.020) (0.004) (0.038) (0.008) (0.002)
Nb. of individuals 5019 5,019 2,214 3,424 3,424 567 5,571 5,571 449
Nb. of observations 15205 15,205 8,009 13,004 13,004 2,275 19,766 19,766 1,703
Notes: The uninsured definition used here is ’Private & Public’. The reference age is 59/60. The
coefficients for the probit and fixed effect (FE) logit regressions report the average marginal effects
and the associated standard errors are obtained using the delta method. Standard errors given in
parenthesis are clustered at the individual level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
of unknown form. Stars convention: * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01. The significance
levels reported next to the marginal effects are based on the orginal coefficients.
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Table 75: Complete list of coefficients of Table 16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# cigarettes smoked per day # alcoholic drinks per week
FE Nbreg FE Nbreg FE Nbreg FE Nbreg
SAH 0.147** -0.490*** 0.025 0.055 0.235*** 0.127***
(0.069) (0.106) (0.022) (0.049) (0.073) (0.017)
Mobility index -0.203*** 0.176** -0.085*** -0.031 -0.247*** -0.063***
(0.065) (0.081) (0.018) (0.043) (0.070) (0.018)
male 1.008*** 2.856***
(0.253) (0.215)
White 0.421 1.533**
(0.789) (0.615)
Black -2.022** 0.042
(0.854) (0.657)
Hispanic -2.497*** -0.953***
(0.526) (0.344)
married 0.578 -0.238 0.037 -0.560 -0.459 -0.291*
(0.869) (0.793) (0.187) (0.650) (0.450) (0.162)
partnered 0.414 2.070** 0.432** 0.760 2.138*** -0.211
(1.005) (0.900) (0.210) (0.960) (0.670) (0.176)
divorced or 0.318 1.589* 0.342* -0.710 -0.246 -0.296*
separated (0.834) (0.819) (0.192) (0.626) (0.473) (0.168)
widowed 0.638 1.162 0.335* -0.245 -0.384 -0.311*
(0.857) (0.817) (0.194) (0.631) (0.492) (0.175)
went to high school -0.170 0.071
(0.270) (0.261)
went to college -0.540* 0.241
(0.320) (0.276)
has college degree -1.906*** 0.276
or more (0.430) (0.285)
working full-time 0.604** -1.139*** 0.089 0.201 -0.507 0.053
(0.248) (0.416) (0.093) (0.132) (0.323) (0.080)
working part-time 0.387 -1.033** 0.045 0.162 -0.271 0.075
(0.251) (0.434) (0.094) (0.133) (0.333) (0.080)
retired 0.271 -0.253 -0.008 -0.032 -0.244 -0.055
(0.233) (0.372) (0.078) (0.090) (0.289) (0.072)
unemployed 0.749 -0.606 0.397** 0.462 0.329 0.149
(0.604) (0.693) (0.180) (0.347) (0.564) (0.158)
self-employed -0.446** -0.445 -0.308*** 0.074 0.173 0.089
(0.225) (0.392) (0.088) (0.177) (0.220) (0.055)
# years worked 1.074** 0.597*** -0.060 0.194 0.495*** 0.001
(log) (0.469) (0.195) (0.049) (0.328) (0.132) (0.059)
job requires some 0.296* 0.014 0.076 0.042 0.047 -0.067
physical activity (0.156) (0.250) (0.060) (0.125) (0.212) (0.046)
HH total assets 0.106* -0.296*** -0.026* 0.059 0.293*** 0.102***
(log) (0.054) (0.073) (0.015) (0.040) (0.054) (0.015)
HH total assets 0.805 -2.436*** -0.217 0.391 2.463*** 1.065***
zero or below (0.570) (0.787) (0.152) (0.412) (0.611) (0.171)
has life insurance 0.083 0.010 -0.010 0.118 -0.481*** -0.002
(0.165) (0.231) (0.050) (0.109) (0.161) (0.038)
has long-term 0.094 -1.147*** -0.067 -0.117 -0.023 -0.053
insurance (0.147) (0.321) (0.073) (0.096) (0.187) (0.045)
# private insurance -0.183** -0.168 -0.116*** -0.076 -0.131 0.017
(0.091) (0.182) (0.042) (0.068) (0.114) (0.025)
Census: West -0.207 -0.889*** 0.154 0.892 1.103*** 0.296***
(0.557) (0.341) (0.097) (0.569) (0.213) (0.085)
Census: Midwest 0.478 -0.265 0.140* 0.177 0.184 0.326***
(0.664) (0.267) (0.079) (0.283) (0.203) (0.082)
Census: Northeast -0.063 -0.382 0.336*** -0.232 1.109*** 0.160*
(0.429) (0.338) (0.100) (0.401) (0.225) (0.083)
Nb. of individuals 5,571 5,571 1,181 5,569 5,569 2,458
Nb. of observations 19,795 19,795 4,265 19,735 19,735 8,993
Notes: The uninsured definition used here is ’Private & Public’. The reference age is 59/60. The
coefficients for the negative binomial (nbreg) and fixed effect (FE) nbreg regressions report the average
marginal effects and the associated standard errors are obtained using the delta method. Standard
errors given in parenthesis are clustered at the individual level and robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation of unknown form. Stars convention: * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
The significance levels reported next to the marginal effects are based on the orginal coefficients.
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Part 6
Appendix: Parenting Style and
Children’s Health
A Cluster and Factor Analysis
The literature review in Section 3.2.1.1 presents the main definitions of types of parent-
ing style that have been considered in the literature, and in Section 3.3.1.2, we reviewed
how different groups of parents have been identified. In this section, we conduct cluster
and factor analysis in order to investigate possible patterns of parenting style and to see
if it is possible to select representative measures of parenting style (factor analysis) or
simple categorisations of mother’s parenting style (cluster analysis). We use parenting
style reported at sweep 3.
The literature has predominantly focused on the intensity of parents’ involvement
and strictness. Figure 8 plots mother’s total involvement and strictness practices. The
size of the circles is proportional to the number of observations. We see that the majority
of mother are highly involved, whereas the distribution of strictness practices is more
normally distributed. The correlation between mother’s involvement and strictness is
slightly negative implying that mothers who are highly involved in the education of
their child are less likely to impose numerous strictness methods. The observations are
grouped in the higher centre of the graph without clearly representing specific types of
parenting style.
A.1 Cluster analysis
Cluster analysis attempts to identify natural groups or types of observations based
on individual’s characteristics. The greater the similarities between groups and the
dissimilarities across, the better the clustering. As we are interested in classifying
mother’s parenting style into different groups similar to those in the psychology lit-
erature, we apply partitional clustering.98 This method breaks the observations into
a pre-set number of non-overlapping groups. We apply the commonly used k-means
algorithm (MacQueen, 1967) defined as the set S = {S1, Sk, ...Sk} that minimises the
98This is by opposition to hierarchical clustering which would not make sense in our case.
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Figure 8: Correlations between total involvement and strictness
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function F defined as
F =
k∑
i=1
∑
pjSk
||pj − µi||2 (55)
where µi is the centre (mean) of the parenting style type Sk and pj the parenting style
of the parent belonging to type Sk. The objective is to minimise the difference between
each observation and its group mean.99
We investigate possible groups for the 8 different measures of mother’s parenting
methods, as well as for the mother’s involvement and strictness indices which are more
similar to what has been done to the literature. As an alternative to the k-means
algorithm, we also implement k-medians algorithm as the variables are not continuous.
To evaluate the distance between each observation and the group’s mean or median, we
compare the results using Euclidean distance, absolute-value distance, and maximum-
value distance. Cluster analysis requires users to specify the number of clusters to
create and we investigate the possibility of 3, 4 and 5 groups. Each time, we impose
the groups to be non-overlapping, so that a mother does not belong to more than one
group, and complete which forces each observation to belong to one group.
99We have performed the same analysis using the median to accommodate the count nature of our
data, but the results remain unchanged.
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These various options give very different results. Focusing first on the results
using just the indices of mother’s involvement and strictness practices, we are able
to identify four groups in line with the authoritative, authoritarian, permissive and
neglectful groups used in the literature. The results are presented in Figure 9.
The first graph of each line illustrates that, depending on the chosen specifica-
tion for the cluster analysis, we can obtain groups in line with the literature. The first
grouping obtained in the first graph can be associated to Baumrind’s initial classific-
ation, with the diamond shape group representing the permissive parents who exert
almost no authority, but are attentive to their child’s needs. Authoritative mothers can
be represented by the squares, that is mothers who are involved as well as strict. And
finally, the triangles could be a large authoritarian group, with mothers generally strict
but not involved. When imposing four groups, the four categories in last graph of the
second line can unequivocally be associated to the four classical parenting style, au-
thoritarian, authoritative, permissive and neglectful. The first graph in the case of five
groups additionally identifies a moderate group in terms of involvement and strictness
that is represented by the crosses in the middle of the parenting style distribution
However, when considering now the other graphs of each line, the new groups
created cannot be related to the ones discussed, suggesting that clustering does not
identifies clear parenting style groups.
Table 10 shows the average specific parenting style by groups obtained when do-
ing cluster analysis using the specific parenting style measures. In the example reported,
we used the k-means algorithm, imposing 4 groups, and using Euclidean distance. If
one tries to identifies one or more categories of mothers similar to the classical four cat-
egories in the literature, it is impossible no matter the clustering method used. Here,
groups 2 and 4 are the less involved on average, and group 4 is also the most strict in
average which suggests it represents the authoritative mothers. However, among groups
1, 2, 3, it is not clear which one is the most strict so that we cannot distinguish between
authoritarian, neglectful and permissive.
We have tried to represent the different groups on the same axis as in Figure
9 but the groups overlap each other. Therefore, we conclude that clustering is not
a robust approach to identify parenting groups. We now turn to factor analysis to
investigate the possibility to reduce the numerous dimensions of parenting style.
A.2 Factor analysis
We use factor analysis as an exploratory approach in order to combine correlated vari-
ables in order to reduce the number of dimensions to analyse.
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Figure 10: Correlations between total involvement and strictness
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Prop. to read with child 0.946 0.923 0.941 0.931
Prop. to do art with child 0.860 0.854 0.872 0.854
Prop. to do physical act. with child 0.690 0.666 0.698 0.677
Prop. to play with child 0.778 0.741 0.789 0.747
Prop. to reason naughty child 0.940 0.885 0.942 0.904
Prop. to shout at child 0.460 0.879 0.576 0.856
Prop. to take away treats from naughty child 0.357 0.357 0.775 0.796
Prop. to ignore naughty child 0.705 0.278 0.175 0.817
Observations 1,817 2,327 2,446 3,558
Notes: Parenting style at sweep 3. Cluster is based on the k-means algorithm, imposing 4 groups, and
using Euclidean distance.
In table 11, we present the results for a factor analysis on the whole set of
specific parenting style variables. Three factors are retained (based on the Kaiser (1958)
criterion that suggests to retain factors with eigenvalue above one). The first factor is
overall positively associated with all the involvement measures, including reasoning with
the naughty child, and negatively with the other punitive measures. The second factor
is negatively associated with mother’s reading activity and reasoning with the child, but
positively associated with all the other measures. The last factor is negatively associated
with the artistic activities, and positively with the other parenting style variables.
Whilst the first factor can be assumed to capture the propensity to be involved with
children, it is difficult to understand which underlying propensity is captured by the
last two factors.
The proportion of the total variance is the percentage explained by each factor,
and here, the main factor only explains 17.94% of the total variance. The first three
retained factors only explain 48.70% of the total variance. Uniqueness, that is the
proportion of the common variance of the variable that is not associated with the factor,
is relatively small for the involvement measures compared to the strictness measures.
The rule of thumb is that, when variables have a uniqueness above 0.6, the factors are
assumed not to explain these variables very well, which is the case for all the strictness
variables except the propensity to shout at the naughty child.
We also applied a principal components analysis to produce a set of uncorrelated
linear combination of the variables that capture most of the variance. The objective is
to find a combination that has the greatest variance, and the principal component is
the one with the maximal overall variance. We could not identify sensible components
with this approach.
We repeated this analysis separately for the involvement and strictness measures,
but it did not provide a meaningful combination of factors.
As cluster analysis and principal component analysis fail to identify specific types
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Figure 11: Factor analysis
Eigenvalue Proportion Factor loadings Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness
Factor1 1.435 0.179 Prop. to read 0.173 -0.200 0.777 0.327
Factor2 1.302 0.163 Prop. to do art 0.397 0.381 -0.551 0.394
Factor3 1.158 0.145 Prop. to do physical act. 0.585 0.415 0.130 0.470
Factor4 0.961 0.120 Prop. to play 0.651 0.338 0.192 0.425
Factor5 0.861 0.108 Prop. to reason 0.294 -0.414 0.138 0.724
Factor6 0.810 0.101 Prop. to shout -0.518 0.436 0.034 0.541
Factor7 0.759 0.095 Prop. to take away treats -0.168 0.500 0.325 0.616
Factor8 0.713 0.089 Prop. to ignore -0.315 0.469 0.268 0.609
N 10148
N parameters 21
Notes: Parenting style at sweep 3. Results from principal component-factor analysis.
of parenting style,100 we pursue our analysis by investigating separately the role of
mother’s total involvement and total strictness, as well as the different specific parenting
style practices.
100Stewart-Brown et al. (2005) undertook a principal component analysis with UK British cohorts
and were as well unable to derive scores.
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B Additional Results on Parenting Style and Chil-
dren’s Outcomes
We present here additional results for the parenting style and children’s outcome ana-
lysis. Section B.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the additional variables used
in the estimation of the parenting style equations. Section B.2 reports the full list of
coefficients of all the control variables for the main regressions, and the results for the
additional children’s outcomes.
B.1 Additional descriptive statistics
Table 82: Additional covariates in the parenting style regressions
Mean Std. dev.
M. works as self-employed 0.057 (0.233)
M. is manager/supervisor at work 0.180 (0.384)
M. works from home 0.061 (0.239)
M. nb days works/week 2.268 (2.268)
M. works at night 0.877 (1.065)
M.'s own parents div/separate 0.291 (0.454)
M.'s own parents never lived together 0.025 (0.155)
M. left home before 17 0.141 (0.348)
M. disagrees w. partner on child's issues 1.542 (1.062)
M. spends time with friends (1-5) 3.210 (0.910)
M. has no religion 0.392 (0.488)
M. attendes religious meeting (0-3) 0.594 (1.061)
P. works as self-employed 0.128 (0.334)
P. is manager/supervisor at work 0.311 (0.463)
Observations 10281
Notes: M: mother, P: partner. The table reports the descriptive statistics for the additional covariates
included in the parenting style equations. The variables are measured at age 5 (sweep 3).
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B.2 Mother’s parenting style and children’s outcomes
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Table 83: Full list of coefficients of selected regressions from Table 32 - Probability to
be in good health
(1) (2) (3)
No PS Pooled probit
Just total PS Specific PS
Child's age -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Child is a boy -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Weight at birth (kg) 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.092*** -0.092*** -0.090***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M.'s age (year) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
M.'s age (squared) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M. is in good health 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
M: currently pregnant -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M.'s depression index -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M. does not smoke 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.009* 0.009** 0.009**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Both parents are in HH 0.005 0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Partner interviewed -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
M. became single 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
M. is married -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
M. became married -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
M. is separated -0.009 -0.008 -0.008
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
M. became separated 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
M. is divorced -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
M. became divorced 0.008** 0.008** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
M. is widowed -0.013 -0.009 -0.010
(0.025) (0.023) (0.022)
Child has longstanding 
illness
Mother tried 
breastfeeding
Aged stopped 
breastfeeding (w)
M. has longstanding 
illness
M. didn't smoke 
pregnant
M.'s nb of cigarettes 
during preg. (log)
M. smokes other tobacco 
products
M.'s alcohol cons. (scale 
0-6)
M.'s partner is child's 
father
Notes: M: mother. The first column reports the socio-economic factors’ effects when parenting style
is not taken into account. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the probit specifications where we control
for the total parenting indices or the specific parenting style practices, respectively. Stars convention:
* for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 84: Full list of coefficients of selected regressions from Table 32 (continued) -
Probability to be in good health
(1) (2) (3)
No PS Pooled probit
Just total PS Specific PS
-0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Annual income >£52600 0.008* 0.008* 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Whether own the house -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M. has A level 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M. has first degree 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M. has higher degree 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
M. has job 0.006** 0.007** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nb. people in HH -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Nb. siblings in HH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Nb. natural siblings 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Grand-parents in the HH 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P. currently has a job -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
P. hours works (week) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White 0.010* 0.009* 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Asian -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Black 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Wales 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Scotland 0.004 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Northern Ireland -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Sweep 4 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
N 14,944 14,944 14,944
N_clust 9,038 9,038 9,038
Annual income [£1600-
£3100]
Annual income [£3100-
£10400]
Annual income [£10400-
£20800]
Annual income [£20800-
£52000]
M. has diploma in higher 
educ.
M. hours works per 
week
Freq. sees grand-parents 
(0-5)
M.'s life satisfaction (1-
10)
Notes: The first column reports the socio-economic factors’ effects when parenting style is not taken
into account. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the probit specifications where we control for the total
parenting indices or the specific parenting style practices, respectively. Stars convention: * for p<0.1,
** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 85: Body mass index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pooled OLS FE Lagged OLS Recursive specifications
PS S3,4 PS S3,4 Health S4, PS S3 Health S4, PS S3 
0.011 0.005 0.028*** 0.077**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.034)
Prop. to read with child 0.202* -0.002 0.194 0.047 0.068
(0.116) (0.101) (0.206) (0.566) (0.572)
Prop. to do art with child 0.031 0.163* -0.085 0.771 0.766
(0.090) (0.091) (0.155) (0.528) (0.525)
-0.037 0.001 0.152 -0.374 -0.337
(0.090) (0.080) (0.149) (0.477) (0.478)
Prop. to play with child -0.025 -0.008 -0.046 0.643 0.611
(0.080) (0.069) (0.137) (0.492) (0.485)
Total 'rules' actions 0.010 0.014 0.003 0.022
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.036)
-0.057 -0.093 -0.074 -0.171 -0.176
(0.088) (0.069) (0.144) (0.465) (0.458)
Prop. to shout at child 0.051 -0.002 0.120 -0.064 -0.039
(0.069) (0.064) (0.106) (0.396) (0.391)
0.032 0.102 -0.009 0.397 0.379
(0.062) (0.064) (0.098) (0.346) (0.343)
-0.114** 0.043 -0.252*** -0.310 -0.324
(0.054) (0.059) (0.084) (0.319) (0.317)
-0.045* -0.045* -0.007 -0.007 -0.103** -0.099** -0.103** -0.102** 0.019
(0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.123)
Nb. days has breakfast -0.071***-0.072***0.027 0.027 -0.116***-0.118***-0.116*** -0.118***-0.245**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.113)
N_clust 8,987 8,987 9,456 9,456
N 14,813 14,813 15,282 15,282 6,537 6,537 10,268 10,268 10,268
r2 0.065 0.065 0.040 0.041 0.074 0.075
Total 'involvement' 
practices
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Goes to bed regularily  
 (0-3)
Notes: S: sweep, PS: parenting style. Columns 1 and 2 are pooled OLS over sweeps 3 and 4. Columns
3 and 4 report results from fixed effect (FE) regressions of child’s health measured in sweeps 3 and 4.
Columns 5 and 6 regress child’s BMI in sweep 4 on controls in sweep 4 and parenting style in sweep 3.
The recursive specifications estimate the child health production function for health measured at age 4
and the reduced form of parenting style measured in sweep 3. Colum 7 and 8 assumes that the overall
parenting style indices and the specific measures of parenting style, respectively, are endogenous but not
the lifestyle measures. Column 9 considers the parenting style variables as well as the lifestyle variables
to be endogenous. Robust standard errors clustered at the family level are given in parenthesis. Stars
convention: * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 88: Hyperactivity reported by the teacher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged probit Recursive specifications (probit)
Health S4, PS S3 Health S4, PS S3 
-0.001 -0.069
(0.005) (0.064)
Prop. to read with child 0.073 0.897 0.846
(0.099) (2.087) (0.981)
Prop. to do art with child 0.134* 1.717 1.023
(0.072) (2.728) (0.862)
-0.067 -1.456 -1.275
(0.075) (2.868) (1.152)
Prop. to play with child 0.043 0.553 0.615
(0.074) (2.011) (1.023)
Total 'rules' actions 0.020*** 0.168***
(0.005) (0.048)
0.017 0.382 0.043
(0.066) (2.352) (0.865)
Prop. to shout at child -0.013 0.795 0.302
(0.052) (0.810) (0.576)
0.014 0.885 0.584
(0.049) (0.770) (0.515)
0.031 -0.528 -0.120
(0.042) (0.820) (0.477)
0.010 0.011 0.048 0.042 -0.170
(0.018) (0.018) (0.075) (0.071) (0.202)
Nb. days has breakfast 0.000 0.002 -0.010 -0.017 0.592***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.057) (0.051) (0.161)
N 667 667 667 667 667
Total 'involvement' 
practices
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Goes to bed regularily  
 (0-3)
Notes: S: sweep, PS: parenting style. Columns 1 and 2 report the results from regressions of child’s
mental health measured in sweep 4 on controls in sweep 4 and parenting style in sweep 3. The
recursive specifications estimate the child health production function for hyperactivity measured at
age 7 (sweep 4) and the reduced form of parenting style measured at age 5 (sweep 3). Colums 3 and
4 assume that the overall parenting style indices or the specific measures are endogenous, but not the
lifestyle measures. Column 9 allows the parenting style variables as well as the lifestyle variables to be
endogenous. The average marginal effects are reported. Stars convention: * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05,
and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 89: Emotional symptoms reported by the child
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged OLS Recursive specifications (cont)
Health S4, PS S3 Health S4, PS S3 
-0.033*** -0.010
(0.008) (0.020)
Prop. to read with child -0.131 -0.612* -0.635*
(0.156) (0.352) (0.344)
Prop. to do art with child -0.126 -0.205 -0.206
(0.119) (0.367) (0.361)
-0.193* -0.205 -0.182
(0.111) (0.304) (0.297)
Prop. to play with child -0.142 0.110 0.081
(0.101) (0.268) (0.264)
Total 'rules' actions 0.030*** 0.017
(0.009) (0.020)
0.128 -0.238 -0.233
(0.114) (0.300) (0.294)
Prop. to shout at child 0.024 -0.077 -0.055
(0.079) (0.222) (0.221)
-0.038 0.125 0.081
(0.072) (0.206) (0.205)
0.091 -0.125 -0.108
(0.062) (0.179) (0.177)
0.038 0.032 0.030 0.176**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.075)
Nb. days has breakfast -0.014 -0.012 -0.013 -0.029
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.050)
N 6,070 6,070 10,204 10,204 10,204
r2 0.036 0.033
Total 'involvement' 
practices
Prop. to do physical act. 
with child
Prop. to reason naughty 
child
Prop. to take away treats 
from naughty child
Prop. to ignore naughty 
child
Goes to bed regularily  
 (0-3)
Notes: S: sweep, PS: parenting style. Internalising behavioural probems reported by the child are only
available in sweep 4. Columns 1 and 2 regress child’s emotional symptoms in sweep 4 on the controls in
sweep 4 and parenting style in sweep 3. The recursive specifications estimate the child’s mental health
function for emotional symptoms measured at age 7 (sweep 4) and the reduced form of parenting style
measured at age 5 (sweep 3). Colum 3 and 4 assume that the overall parenting style indices and
the specific measures of parenting style, respectively, are endogenous but not the lifestyle measures.
Column 5 considers the parenting style variables as well as the lifestyle variables to be endogenous.
Robust standard errors clustered at the family level are given in parenthesis. Stars convention: * for
p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 90: Full list of coefficients of selected regressions from Table 32 - Externalising
behavioural problems
(1) (2) (3)
No PS Pooled probit
Just total PS Specific PS
Child's age -0.270*** -0.215*** -0.258***
(0.066) (0.060) (0.064)
Child is a boy 0.374*** 0.257*** 0.339***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.032)
Weight at birth (kg) -0.040 -0.028 -0.040
(0.033) (0.030) (0.032)
0.227*** 0.218*** 0.239***
(0.041) (0.038) (0.040)
-0.067* -0.125*** -0.062
(0.041) (0.037) (0.039)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
M.'s age (year) -0.043 -0.056** -0.052*
(0.030) (0.027) (0.029)
M.'s age (squared) 0.000 0.001** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M. is in good health -0.060 -0.057 -0.064
(0.054) (0.049) (0.053)
M: currently pregnant -0.067 -0.070 -0.070
(0.069) (0.065) (0.068)
-0.010 -0.010 0.001
(0.039) (0.035) (0.037)
M.'s depression index 0.127*** 0.077*** 0.112***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
0.106 0.139 0.095
(0.097) (0.087) (0.093)
0.181*** 0.164*** 0.160***
(0.046) (0.042) (0.045)
M. does not smoke -0.081* -0.069 -0.080*
(0.049) (0.045) (0.048)
-0.276 -0.337 -0.282
(0.234) (0.211) (0.226)
0.016 -0.008 0.010
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Both parents are in HH -0.141 -0.089 -0.162*
(0.092) (0.084) (0.090)
-0.214* -0.204* -0.168
(0.126) (0.115) (0.123)
Partner interviewed 0.308** 0.270** 0.268**
(0.129) (0.116) (0.125)
M. became single -0.200 -0.149 -0.173
(0.165) (0.157) (0.161)
M. is married -0.109** -0.083* -0.083
(0.055) (0.050) (0.053)
M. became married 0.075 0.090 0.086
(0.077) (0.071) (0.075)
M. is separated -0.084 -0.066 -0.030
(0.159) (0.155) (0.159)
M. became separated -0.013 0.022 -0.025
(0.170) (0.164) (0.169)
M. is divorced -0.008 0.032 0.030
(0.102) (0.095) (0.098)
M. became divorced -0.104 -0.078 -0.079
(0.124) (0.117) (0.121)
M. is widowed -0.828*** -0.689** -0.768***
(0.290) (0.280) (0.279)
M. became widowed -0.381 -0.095 -0.405
(0.452) (0.451) (0.473)
Child has longstanding 
illness
Mother tried 
breastfeeding
Aged stopped 
breastfeeding (w)
M. has longstanding 
illness
M. didn't smoke 
pregnant
M.'s nb of cigarettes 
during preg. (log)
M. smokes other tobacco 
products
M.'s alcohol cons. (scale 
0-6)
M.'s partner is child's 
father
Notes: The first column reports the socio-economic factors’ effects when parenting style is not taken
into account. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the OLS specifications where we control for the total
parenting indices or the specific parenting style practices, respectively. Stars convention: * for p<0.1,
** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 91: Full list of coefficients of selected regressions from Table 32 (continued) -
Externalising behavioural problems
(1) (2) (3)
No PS Pooled probit
Just total PS Specific PS
0.042 0.104 0.028
(0.153) (0.140) (0.144)
0.094 0.110 0.097
(0.150) (0.137) (0.141)
0.104 0.081 0.097
(0.152) (0.139) (0.143)
0.073 0.040 0.072
(0.154) (0.141) (0.145)
Annual income >£52600 0.094 0.039 0.106
(0.158) (0.144) (0.149)
Whether own the house -0.149*** -0.171*** -0.153***
(0.050) (0.046) (0.049)
M. has A level -0.177*** -0.230*** -0.148***
(0.056) (0.051) (0.055)
-0.149*** -0.184*** -0.123**
(0.057) (0.050) (0.055)
M. has first degree -0.331*** -0.387*** -0.279***
(0.050) (0.045) (0.048)
M. has higher degree -0.179** -0.256*** -0.135*
(0.076) (0.070) (0.074)
M. has job -0.061 -0.095** -0.099*
(0.052) (0.048) (0.051)
0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Nb. people in HH 0.096* 0.069 0.094*
(0.054) (0.049) (0.053)
Nb. siblings in HH -0.034 0.008 -0.033
(0.057) (0.052) (0.056)
Nb. natural siblings -0.090* 0.030 -0.052
(0.048) (0.043) (0.046)
Grand-parents in the HH -0.177 -0.090 -0.163
(0.127) (0.119) (0.124)
-0.007 0.001 -0.004
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
-0.092*** -0.051*** -0.076***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
P. currently has a job -0.013 -0.047 -0.029
(0.108) (0.097) (0.104)
P. hours works (week) -0.004** -0.002 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
White 0.207** 0.153** 0.175**
(0.081) (0.073) (0.078)
Asian 0.120 0.228** 0.114
(0.106) (0.097) (0.102)
Black -0.209 -0.236* -0.312**
(0.147) (0.136) (0.140)
Wales -0.084* -0.068* -0.086*
(0.046) (0.041) (0.045)
Scotland 0.085 0.105** 0.092*
(0.052) (0.047) (0.051)
Northern Ireland -0.059 -0.061 -0.045
(0.058) (0.053) (0.056)
Sweep 4 0.337** 0.272** 0.288**
(0.135) (0.122) (0.130)
N 14,582 14,582 14,582
N_clust 8,918 8,918 8,918
Annual income [£1600-
£3100]
Annual income [£3100-
£10400]
Annual income [£10400-
£20800]
Annual income [£20800-
£52000]
M. has diploma in higher 
educ.
M. hours works per 
week
Freq. sees grand-parents 
(0-5)
M.'s life satisfaction (1-
10)
Notes: The first column reports the socio-economic factors’ effects when parenting style is not taken
into account. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the OLS specifications where we control for the total
parenting indices or the specific parenting style practices, respectively. Stars convention: * for p<0.1,
** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 92: Full list of coefficients of selected regressions from Table 32 - Emotional
problems
(1) (2) (3)
No PS Pooled probit
Just total PS Specific PS
Child's age -0.061 -0.039 -0.061
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Child is a boy -0.089*** -0.114*** -0.079***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Weight at birth (kg) -0.036 -0.029 -0.036
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
0.315*** 0.308*** 0.311***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
0.005 -0.009 0.009
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
M.'s age (year) 0.029 0.025 0.027
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
M.'s age (squared) -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
M. is in good health -0.087 -0.086 -0.086
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
M: currently pregnant -0.080 -0.067 -0.073
(0.070) (0.069) (0.070)
0.094*** 0.092** 0.094***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
M.'s depression index 0.167*** 0.154*** 0.162***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
0.055 0.060 0.045
(0.084) (0.083) (0.084)
0.024 0.018 0.011
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
M. does not smoke 0.072* 0.084** 0.077*
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
0.001 -0.022 -0.015
(0.209) (0.206) (0.206)
-0.045*** -0.049*** -0.045***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Both parents are in HH -0.048 -0.038 -0.046
(0.086) (0.085) (0.085)
-0.121 -0.123 -0.127
(0.113) (0.112) (0.112)
Partner interviewed 0.042 0.044 0.051
(0.116) (0.114) (0.115)
M. became single 0.009 0.005 0.001
(0.140) (0.138) (0.140)
M. is married 0.033 0.044 0.044
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
M. became married -0.083 -0.084 -0.083
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
M. is separated 0.132 0.132 0.146
(0.181) (0.180) (0.181)
M. became separated -0.338* -0.323* -0.338*
(0.189) (0.188) (0.189)
M. is divorced 0.007 0.024 0.016
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
M. became divorced -0.101 -0.089 -0.086
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
M. is widowed -0.204 -0.131 -0.162
(0.349) (0.346) (0.341)
M. became widowed 0.084 0.129 0.062
(0.544) (0.523) (0.530)
Child has longstanding 
illness
Mother tried 
breastfeeding
Aged stopped 
breastfeeding (w)
M. has longstanding 
illness
M. didn't smoke 
pregnant
M.'s nb of cigarettes 
during preg. (log)
M. smokes other tobacco 
products
M.'s alcohol cons. (scale 
0-6)
M.'s partner is child's 
father
Notes: The first column reports the socio-economic factors’ effects when parenting style is not taken
into account. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the OLS specifications where we control for the total
parenting indices or the specific parenting style practices, respectively. Stars convention: * for p<0.1,
** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 93: Full list of coefficients of selected regressions from Table 32 (continued) -
Emotional problems
(1) (2) (3)
No PS Pooled probit
Just total PS Specific PS
-0.164 -0.163 -0.178
(0.154) (0.154) (0.153)
-0.155 -0.157 -0.159
(0.152) (0.151) (0.151)
-0.180 -0.188 -0.182
(0.154) (0.153) (0.153)
-0.267* -0.277* -0.267*
(0.156) (0.155) (0.154)
Annual income >£52600 -0.305* -0.323** -0.305*
(0.159) (0.158) (0.158)
Whether own the house -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
M. has A level -0.108** -0.117** -0.092*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
0.058 0.045 0.061
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
M. has first degree -0.027 -0.040 -0.017
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
M. has higher degree 0.056 0.034 0.067
(0.071) (0.070) (0.071)
M. has job -0.133*** -0.143*** -0.141***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
-0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Nb. people in HH 0.046 0.037 0.042
(0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Nb. siblings in HH -0.057 -0.039 -0.053
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056)
Nb. natural siblings -0.050 -0.028 -0.046
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Grand-parents in the HH -0.052 -0.041 -0.051
(0.125) (0.123) (0.124)
-0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
-0.052*** -0.043*** -0.048***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
P. currently has a job 0.109 0.100 0.106
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
P. hours works (week) -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
White 0.072 0.054 0.069
(0.079) (0.078) (0.079)
Asian 0.005 0.039 -0.018
(0.109) (0.108) (0.108)
Black -0.019 -0.012 -0.054
(0.131) (0.129) (0.131)
Wales -0.046 -0.051 -0.051
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Scotland -0.043 -0.044 -0.043
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Northern Ireland -0.037 -0.052 -0.042
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Sweep 4 0.359*** 0.355*** 0.366***
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117)
N 14,364 14,364 14,364
N_clust 8,829 8,829 8,829
Annual income [£1600-
£3100]
Annual income [£3100-
£10400]
Annual income [£10400-
£20800]
Annual income [£20800-
£52000]
M. has diploma in higher 
educ.
M. hours works per 
week
Freq. sees grand-parents 
(0-5)
M.'s life satisfaction (1-
10)
Notes: The first column reports the socio-economic factors’ effects when parenting style is not taken
into account. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the OLS specifications where we control for the total
parenting indices or the specific parenting style practices, respectively. Stars convention: * for p<0.1,
** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 94: Full list of coefficients of selected regressions from Table 32 - Cognitive ability
(1) (2) (3)
No PS Pooled probit
Just total PS Specific PS
Child's age 3.078*** 3.027*** 3.078***
(0.316) (0.316) (0.316)
Child is a boy -1.086*** -1.042*** -1.086***
(0.149) (0.150) (0.149)
Weight at birth (kg) 0.627*** 0.587*** 0.627***
(0.154) (0.153) (0.154)
-0.983*** -0.970*** -0.983***
(0.209) (0.208) (0.209)
0.413** 0.424** 0.413**
(0.187) (0.186) (0.187)
0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
M.'s age (year) 0.319** 0.333** 0.319**
(0.143) (0.143) (0.143)
M.'s age (squared) -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M. is in good health 0.345 0.307 0.345
(0.280) (0.280) (0.280)
M: currently pregnant 1.265** 1.213** 1.265**
(0.517) (0.519) (0.517)
-0.102 -0.091 -0.102
(0.187) (0.187) (0.187)
M.'s depression index -0.111** -0.090** -0.111**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
-0.610 -0.592 -0.610
(0.438) (0.435) (0.438)
-0.346* -0.329* -0.346*
(0.200) (0.199) (0.200)
M. does not smoke 0.016 -0.025 0.016
(0.247) (0.245) (0.247)
-1.272 -1.094 -1.272
(1.221) (1.153) (1.221)
0.086 0.091* 0.086
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Both parents are in HH -0.184 -0.188 -0.184
(0.451) (0.450) (0.451)
0.503 0.539 0.503
(0.583) (0.579) (0.583)
Partner interviewed -0.382 -0.463 -0.382
(0.577) (0.573) (0.577)
M. became single 1.146 1.221 1.146
(1.120) (1.075) (1.120)
M. is married 0.412 0.363 0.412
(0.258) (0.256) (0.258)
M. became married -0.832** -0.809* -0.832**
(0.418) (0.417) (0.418)
M. is separated 0.570 0.521 0.570
(0.650) (0.663) (0.650)
M. became separated -0.254 -0.187 -0.254
(0.756) (0.762) (0.756)
M. is divorced -0.740* -0.858* -0.740*
(0.448) (0.445) (0.448)
M. became divorced 0.506 0.567 0.506
(0.634) (0.625) (0.634)
M. is widowed -1.203 -1.322 -1.203
(1.308) (1.199) (1.308)
M. became widowed -0.648 -0.240 -0.648
(1.877) (1.586) (1.877)
Child has longstanding 
illness
Mother tried 
breastfeeding
Aged stopped 
breastfeeding (w)
M. has longstanding 
illness
M. didn't smoke 
pregnant
M.'s nb of cigarettes 
during preg. (log)
M. smokes other tobacco 
products
M.'s alcohol cons. (scale 
0-6)
M.'s partner is child's 
father
Notes: The first column reports the socio-economic factors’ effects when parenting style is not taken
into account. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the OLS specifications where we control for the total
parenting indices or the specific parenting style practices, respectively. Stars convention: * for p<0.1,
** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Table 95: Full list of coefficients of selected regressions from Table 32 (continued) -
Cognitive ability
(1) (2) (3)
No PS Pooled probit
Just total PS Specific PS
0.025 0.141 0.025
(0.944) (0.945) (0.944)
0.353 0.433 0.353
(0.919) (0.919) (0.919)
0.999 1.103 0.999
(0.926) (0.926) (0.926)
1.403 1.505 1.403
(0.930) (0.931) (0.930)
Annual income >£52600 1.555 1.663* 1.555
(0.950) (0.951) (0.950)
Whether own the house 0.625*** 0.604** 0.625***
(0.237) (0.236) (0.237)
M. has A level 1.059*** 1.074*** 1.059***
(0.250) (0.248) (0.250)
0.845*** 0.853*** 0.845***
(0.236) (0.234) (0.236)
M. has first degree 2.260*** 2.271*** 2.260***
(0.242) (0.243) (0.242)
M. has higher degree 1.679*** 1.735*** 1.679***
(0.372) (0.373) (0.372)
M. has job 0.354 0.381 0.354
(0.265) (0.266) (0.265)
-0.010 -0.011 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Nb. people in HH -0.471 -0.425 -0.471
(0.289) (0.289) (0.289)
Nb. siblings in HH 0.138 0.060 0.138
(0.307) (0.306) (0.307)
Nb. natural siblings -0.351 -0.340 -0.351
(0.226) (0.226) (0.226)
Grand-parents in the HH 1.236* 1.199* 1.236*
(0.659) (0.655) (0.659)
0.002 0.009 0.002
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
0.068 0.058 0.068
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
P. currently has a job 0.728 0.806 0.728
(0.539) (0.535) (0.539)
P. hours works (week) -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
White -0.946** -0.906** -0.946**
(0.412) (0.409) (0.412)
Asian -1.395** -1.506*** -1.395**
(0.579) (0.575) (0.579)
Black -1.553** -1.667** -1.553**
(0.770) (0.769) (0.770)
Wales -0.314 -0.293 -0.314
(0.216) (0.215) (0.216)
Scotland -0.698*** -0.725*** -0.698***
(0.218) (0.219) (0.218)
Northern Ireland 0.625** 0.643** 0.625**
(0.276) (0.277) (0.276)
N 4,478 4,478 4,478
Annual income [£1600-
£3100]
Annual income [£3100-
£10400]
Annual income [£10400-
£20800]
Annual income [£20800-
£52000]
M. has diploma in higher 
educ.
M. hours works per 
week
Freq. sees grand-parents 
(0-5)
M.'s life satisfaction (1-
10)
Notes: The first column reports the socio-economic factors’ effects when parenting style is not taken
into account. Columns 2 and 3 correspond to the OLS specifications where we control for the total
parenting indices or the specific parenting style practices, respectively. Stars convention: * for p<0.1,
** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01.
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Appendix: List of Acronyms
ATE Average Treatment Effect
ATT Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
BRFSS Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance System (a telephone survey)
CSA Common Support Assumption
DID Difference-in-Differences
DR Double-Robust
D&K Dave and Kaestner
EAMH Ex Ante Moral Hazard
EPMH Ex Post Moral Hazard
FE Fixed Effect
HIE Health Insurance Experiment
HMO Health Maintenance Organisation
HRS Health and Retirement Study
IPW Inverse Probability Weight
IV Instrumental Variable(s)
LHS Left Hand Side
MB Marginal Benefit
MC Marginal Cost
NHS National Health Service (UK)
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
PA Physical Activity
PSID Panel Study of Income Dynamics
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PSM Propensity Score Matching
RAND Research ANd Development Coporation
RHS Right Hand Side
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